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RULE 144, THE SEC, AND
RESTRICTED SECURITIESBy HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL**

Rule 144 (effective April 15, 1972) is one of the most interesting and potentially far-reaching of the rules recently
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Discarding outworn concepts such as fungibility and de-emphasizing the necessity of proving "investment intent," the rule, for
the first time, sets forth fairly definite limits within which a
person acquiring stock in a section 4(2) private offering may
sell that stock to the public without being deemed an underwriter. Harold S. Bloomenthal's article discussing Rule 144 and
related SEC rules is an excerpt from chapter 4 of Securities &
Federal Corporate Law, his recently released treatise. The first
such work to be written in a number of years, Mr. Bloomenthal's treatise promises to become a standard reference work in
every legal library. In this article, footnotes have been renumbered and changed to law journal form and cross-references have
been altered; otherwise the text is substantially as it appears in
the completed book.
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I. THE

WHEAT

REPORT

AS

A

CATALYST -

OF RULE

"LEGISLATIVE

HISToRY"

144

N November 1967, the Securities and Exchange Commission
organized a small internal study group charged with the task
of reappraising disclosure policies under the Securities Act of

RULE 144

1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of recommending changes which could be accomplished within the Commission's existing power to adopt rules and regulations.' The Study
Group saw as its goals:
(a) to enhance the degree of coordination between the disclosures required by the '33 and '34 Acts;
(b) to respond to the call for greater certainty and predictability; and
(c) to develop a consistent interpretative pattern which would
help to assure that appropriate disclosures are made prior
to the creation of 2interstate public markets in the securities of any issuer.
In reporting in March of 1969 on what it observed with regard to the prior regulatory pattern to control leakage, 3 the
Wheat Report, named after the chairman of the group, Francis
M. Wheat, 4 commented on the fact that not only were prevailing
notions relating to investment intent difficult to apply, but
whether unregistered securities could be sold turned upon events
wholly unconnected with the need of investors in that, among
other things, the prevailing pattern failed to make the following
pertinent distinctions: 5
(1) Whether or not information is regularly available concerning the affairs of the issuer;
(2) Whether the quantity of securities being offered were
"massive or modest";
(3) Whether or not a heavily compensated selling effort was
involved.
The Wheat Report found it anomalous that under the prevailing
pattern a controlling shareholder might sell a substantial block
of stock under Rule 154,' but an employee having acquired a
relatively few shares upon the exercise of his stock option would
7
be precluded from selling such shares without registration.
Perhaps most significantly, the Study Group perceived that from
a disclosure standpoint the resale of shares to the public of
shares acquired in a private placement and the sale of shares by
controlling shareholders both have much in common in that
in both instances the means exist for compelling registration
I SEC,

DIsCLOSURE TO INVESTORS,

A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRA-

'33 AND '34 Acts (THE WHEAT REPORT) 3 (CCH
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT].
2 Id. at 8.
3 See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 4.10
(1972) [hereinafter cited as H. BLOOMENTHAL].
TIVE POLICIES UNDER THE

4 Mr. Wheat was then a member

of the Commission and is presently
chairman of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.

5 WHEAT REPORT

at 155-56.

6 For a general discussion of Rules 154, see H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.09.
7 WHEAT REPORT

at 156.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

prior to resale." The Report conceivably could have gone on
and recommended the Rule 155" pattern generally which would
have precluded any leakage of unregistered securities into the
public securities markets. However, the Study Group opted for
a limited and controlled amount of leakage, suggesting for the
first time that sales of shares acquired in reliance on private
placements and those being sold by controlling persons be
treated in substantially the same manner for this purpose.
Utilizing the Rule 154 experience as a guide, the Study Group
drafted and recommended the adoption of a series of specific
rules that are commonly referred to as the 160 series. 10
In this context, respectable support can be gathered for a
number of different approaches. There undoubtedly has always
been a group within and outside of the Commission in favor
from a policy standpoint of preventing leakage without registration completely. In their view, whenever registration is feasible it should be insisted upon before securities reach the interstate public securities markets. Registration is feasible whenever securities are being sold by the issuer or persons who
control the issuer or who acquire their securities in a private
placement directly from the issuer. This group, perhaps, had
their one moment of triumph in the adoption of Rule 155. There
have been others that would permit leakage, but essentially, in
terms of the prior pattern, based upon the definition of a statutory underwriter and the investment-intent concept. This group,
as the Wheat Report points out, has a stake in the existing lore
which had developed and their special expertise; among some
of the regulators it may have found favor because its ambiguities allowed considerable flexibility and administrative
discretion. A third viewpoint and the one that ultimately prevailed placed some emphasis on the extent to which information
concerning issuers is available outside of '33 Act disclosures; It
recognized that the desire of controlling shareholders to sell
limited amounts of the issuers' securities was not per se unlawful; the fact that private placements play an important role
in the capital markets of America; and that conscientious counsel should not be penalized by their unwillingness to render
opinions built on shifting legal sands.
The foregoing is recounted as an explanation of the struggle
one can only presume went on within the Commission and
among its staff as is reflected by what followed. In September
s Id. at 19-20.

9See generally H.

10

WHEAT REPORT

BLOOMENTHAL

app. VI-1.

§ 4.10 (5).

RULE 144

of 1969, the Commission proposed the adoption of Rules 160
through 164, being essentially the rules recommended by the
Wheat Report."' The rules would have established as to securities of reporting companies acquired in private placements
a one-year holding period and would have thereafter permitted
resales of such shares as well as shares being offered by controlling persons essentially in accordance with the requirements
of Rule 154 in terms of quantitative limits and manner of sale."
Generally, the proposed Rule 160 series was welcomed by the
securities bar as providing definite and reasonable standards
and eliminating subjective questions about "investment intent."
However, on September 22, 1970, the Commission withdrew the
3
proposed Rule 160 series and proposed in lieu thereof Rule 144'
which in the original version made a number of significant
changes including the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Increased the holding period from twelve months to eighteen months;
Instead of establishing reliable standards, merely created
a "presumption" that an exemption is available;
Changed the six-month period in which quantity limita-

tions were to be determined to a twelve-month period,
(4)

thus reducing the number of shares that could be offered;
As to controlling persons placed an aggregate limit not
only on what they could sell individually under .the rule
during the appropriate period, but also on what they could
sell collectively.

Rule 144 as initially proposed was widely criticized as restoring "subjectivity" and reflecting a staff desire to (1) keep
the law in this area ambiguous, and (2) severely and unrealistically restrict leakage.14 In November of 1971, reacting to the
criticism, the Commission published a revised version of Rule
144 for comment which increased the holding period to two
years, but otherwise liberalized the initial Rule 144 proposal. 15
On January 11, 1972, the Commission announced the adoption
of Rule 144 effective April 15, 1972; the rule as adopted was
essentially the version proposed in November of 1971 with some
further liberalization, particularly with respect to aggregations
for the purpose of determining the individual quantity limita11 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969), CCH FED. SEc. L.

REP., Special Rep. No. 272.
12 See H. BLOOMENTHAL

§

4.09(1).

SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,909.
14 See Note,
Secondary Distribution and Broker's Transactions: The
Withering of Wheat, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 588 (1971); Morrow, Investment Letter Dilemna and Proposed Rule 144: A Retreat to Confusion,
11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 37 (1970).
15 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5186 (Sept. 10, 1971), CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP., Special Rep. No. 387.
13
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tions. 16 To recount the variations in the various proposals may
confuse more than enlighten; the Commission's vacillations are
enumerated primarily for the purpose of illustrating the fact
that contending viewpoints had to be resolved to reach the
finalized version of the rule and to make one aware of the
"legislative" history of the rule, as in some instances specific
omissions or revisions may tend to give meaning to the rule
as finally adopted. In adopting the rule, the Commission stated
that it was "in the nature of an experiment" and will be observed closely to determine whether it appropriately protects
investors. 17 Nonetheless, one suspects that the substance of the
rule will remain with us for some time and that the whole
area of restricted securities will be dominated by the Rule 144
18
philosophy for an indefinite period.
II. RULE 144
A.

An Overview

Rule 144 adopts essentially the approach of Rule 154 (which
was concurrently rescinded) with various important modifications and applies it to securities issued in transactions not involving a public offering, as well as to securities sold by affiliates (controlling persons). No differentiation is made in this
regard as between convertible securities and other securities;
Rule 155 also being concurrently rescinded except as to convertible securities issued prior to April 15, 1972, which the holder
resells other than in conformity with Rule 144.19 Rule 144 is
not applicable to securities issued in reliance on the intrastate
exemption 20 nor to securities issued in a merger or other transactions subject to Rule 14521 except that it may be applicable to
16 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 78,487. Rule 144 will become 17
C.F.R. § 230.144 and will hereinafter be cited as R. 144 with appropriate
indication of the subdivisions thereof concerning which reference is
made. The accompanying release (SEC Securities Act Release No.
5223) will hereinafter be referred to as Release 33-5223. Release 33-5223
is in some respects almost as important as the rule itself as it contains
a general explanation of the relationship of the rule to other action
taken at the same time by the Commission including the adoption
of Rule 237; a statement of the "Background and Purpose" of the rule;
and "Explanation and Analysis of the Rule"; a "Synopsis of the Rule";
a "Preliminary Note to Rule 144"; the rule; and Form 144.
17Release 33-5223, under caption "Operation of the Rule."
8
I See S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECuRrTIES (1972)
for additional information on Rule 144.
19 Release 33-5223. The effect of this should ordinarily be to induce reliance on Rule 144 since Rule 155 was more restrictive. See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.10(5).
20 This follows from the definition of the term "restricted securities" to
mean securities "acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer thereof,
or from an affiliate of such issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offering." R. 144(a) (3).
21 This follows from the definition of the term "restricted securities." Id.
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shares issued in such transactions which essentially are not
public offerings. 2 It is not clear as to the extent to which Rule
144 is applicable as to securities issued in violation of the regis23
tration provisions.
As with Rule 154, Rule 144 is not available for sales by the
issuer.2 4 It is available for the resale of shares ("restricted
shares") acquired in reliance on the Section 4(2) exemption
for transactions not involving a public offering and for sales for
the account of a controlling person. However, it is applicable
only to securities of issuers concerning which appropriate information is publicly available. Restricted shares sold in reliance
on the rule must have been paid for and been held for a period
of two years. Sales must be made in unsolicited brokerage transactions and cannot exceed a quantitative limit during any sixmonth period which is similar to, but not identical to, the old
Rule 154 limitations. Except for limited situations, an appropriate
notice must be transmitted to the Commission concurrently with
the placing of the order to sell the shares. There are detailed
attribution rules for determining the extent to which sales by
various related persons and entities must be taken into account
in determining the selling shareholders' quantitative limitations.
There are also explicit rules as to the extent to which selling
shareholders can tack the holding period of their predecessors
in interest in the shares in question and the extent to which
under such circumstances sales of the selling shareholder and
his predecessor have to be aggregated for purposes of the quantitative limitations.
B.

The Conceptual Format
Analytically, the rule provides that anyone acquiring securities pursuant to the Section 4(2) exemption for private
transactions from an issuer (or controlling person) who resells
them after a two-year holding period in unsolicited brokerage
transactions and in limited amounts in conformity with the requirements of the rule is not a statutory underwriter. The rule
further provides that anyone selling securities for a controlling
person in conformity with the requirements of the rule shall
22 The inapplicability of Rule 144 follows from the definition of the term

"restricted securities."

Id. For persons whose shares are subject to

restrictions on resale under Rule 145, see H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.15(1).
23

24

See p. 312-13 & notes 46-50 infra.
This follows from the fact that the exemption is in terms of determining
circumstances under which a person is not an "underwriter" and, hence,
makes the exemption of Section 4(1) available for transactions not involving an "issuer or underwriter." R. 144(b). In the event the transaction involves an "issuer," there can, of course, be no Section 4(1)
exemption. See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.08.
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not be deemed an underwriter. 25 This should be all that is
necessary to take care of the conceptual rationalization for the
rule since it appears to cover the position of the selling shareholders and executing broker. In the case of the person who
is not a controlling person acquiring shares in a private placement, if such person is not a statutory underwriter under the
rule with respect to the resale of shares, it would follow that
a Section 4(1) exemption would be available for him, and no
2
further exemption is necessary for the executing broker.
Similarly, the rule provides that a controlling person reselling
shares held by him for the appropriate period in conformity
with the rule is not an underwriter, and anyone selling shares
for him is not an underwriter; hence, the Section 4(1) exemption
would be available for both the controlling shareholder and
the executing broker. Section 4(4) of the Act for unsolicited
brokerage transactions, while an integral part of the rule in
terms of prescribing the manner in which sales must be made,
does not, as was the case under Rule 154, appear to be the
conceptual basis for the availability of the exemption. To the
extent it is operative as a separate basis for the exemption, it
would appear to serve the limited purpose of making an exemption available to the executing broker in the event Rule 144 is
not applicable because the shareholder is in fact engaged in a
distribution," and the broker innocently executed the order
after making the inquiries and taking the other appropriate
29
steps required of him.
A minor conceptual problem relates to the defining of restricted securities to include securities acquired from an affiliate
in a transaction not involving a public offering ° The nonpublicoffering exemption is applicable to transactions with an issuer;
R. 144(b). Although the rule provides that one selling any securities for
an account of an affiliate in compliance with the provision of Rule 144
is not an underwriter, the rule would not operate to exempt the sale of
shares acquired by an affiliate from the issuer unless such shares were
acquired in a private transaction as restricted shares and held for the
required holding period. Absent such circumstances, the affiliate would
be an underwriter as to such shares and the Section 4(1) exemption for
transactions not involving an issuer or underwriter would not be available. Compare the interpretation of Rule 154 in this respect at H.
BLOOMENTHAL § 4.09(2) n.178.
26 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.08(2) (a).
27 Id. § 4.09(2) n.176.
28 This could result from the selling shareholder exceeding the limitations of Rule 144 or as a result of the Commission's caveat that the
rule is not available despite technical compliance to "any transaction
25

which .

.

. is part of a plan . . . to distribute or redistribute securities

to the public." Release 33-5223, under caption "Operation of the Rule."
See p. 339 at note 138 infra.
2 . See p. 343-46 infra.
80 R. 144(a) (3).
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not to transactions with an affiliate.3 1 This poses some nuances
of interpretation that could be troublesome in contexts discussed at sections II, D, and II, I, 2, infra.
C.

Availability of Current Public Information

Rule 144 is applicable only with respect to securities of an
issuer which is a reporting company under the Exchange Act
or which otherwise makes certain specified information publicly
available. 32 If it is a reporting company, it must have filed the
most recent annual report required to be filed thereunder. Presumably, if no annual report has become due (because, e.g., it
only recently registered under the Exchange Act), it is not by
that fact precluded from being a qualified issuer for purposes
of Rule 144.33 However, it must have filed the reports required
to be filed for a period of at least ninety days immediately
preceding the sales which would require that the issuer have
been subject to the reporting requirements for at least ninety
days.
The issuer must have filed all annual, quarterly, and other
reports which became due during the immediately preceding
ninety-day period and must have filed the most recent annual
report required to be filed. A report is not viewed as due for
this purpose until the date upon which failure to file results
in delinquency. :" If during the preceding ninety days an annual
report on Form 10-K became due, the filing of such report and
the filing of any 8-K that may have become due during the
period would ordinarily satisfy the requirement. If, on the other
hand, a quarterly report on Form 10-Q became due during the
prior ninety days, in order for an issuer who has been subject
to the reporting requirements for some time to be current it
must have not only filed such report as well as any 8-K report
that may have become due during the ninety-day period, but
the Form 10-K for the last fiscal year which would have become
due sometime prior to the ninety-day period. Except as to such
annual report, delinquency in the filing of reports (8-K's, for
example) which became due prior to the immediately preceding
Section 4(2) reads in terms of "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). Sales by affiliates and
persons purchasing from an affiliate have depended upon the exemption provided for by Section 4(1) for "transactions by any person other
than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970).
See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.08(2) (c).
2
3 R. 144(c). See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 3.11(1).
33 Lancer Homes, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter Apr. 13,
78,722.
1972, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
34 Morrison, Foerster, Holloway, Clinton & Clark, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. NoAction Letter (Mar. 21, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. t 78,779.
31
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ninety days apparently does not affect the situation, although
the Commission's accompanying synopsis of the rule suggests
that the reporting company must have filed all reports required
by the Act.35 The issuer must state in each quarterly and annual
report whether or not it has filed all annual, quarterly, and
other reports required to be filed during the prior ninety-day
period, and, in addition, in the quarterly report whether it
has filed the most recent annual report required to be filed.
A selling security holder may rely on this representation in
the latest 10-Q or 10-K or upon a written statement from the
issuer that all such reports have been filed unless he knows
or has reason to believe such is not the case. Since the 10-Q
or 10-K representation relates to the ninety days preceding the
date of the report and the relevant ninety days from the standpoint of requirements of the rule is the ninety days preceding
the sale, it appears inevitable that there will be a hiatus which
36
will not be covered by such representation.
Issuers not subject to the reporting requirements may,
nonetheless, be qualified corporations for the purpose of Rule
144 if they make publicly available specified portions of the
information required by Rule 15c2-111 7 the rule which specifies the information that must be available for nonreporting
companies before their securities can be generally traded in
the over-the-counter market.3 The information includes among
other things the number of shares of the class outstanding, the
nature and extent of the issuer's facilities and the product or
service offered, and financial information (which need not be
"This provision is deemed satisfied if an issuer has been subject to the
reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act for
a period of at least 90 days immediately preceding the sale of the securities and has filed all reports required by that Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder and in addition has filed the most recent annual
report required to be filed thereunder." Release 33-5223, under the capticn "Availability of Public Information." A recent interpretative release also insists that a present delinquency in the filing of any report
makes Rule 144 unavailable. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306, pt.
79,000. However,
VI(A) (3) (Sept. 26, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
deficiencies in reports actually filed do not affect the availability of Rule
144. Electronic Transistors Corp., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter
(June 30, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,942.
'36 The period covered by the representation is ninety days prior to the date
of the filing of the report. If we assume an issuer on the calendar year
and a selling shareholder proposing to sell on June 15, at the time the
selling security holder files his Form 144 the most recent Form 10-Q on
file would cover the pericd January 1 through March 3,1, which report
would have been filed by April 15 leaving a hiatus for reports that may
have been due for April and May. By August 15, there will be a 10-Q
on file which will cover the period through June 30. A shareholder filing a Form 144 on August 16 will have no hiatus, but if he files after
September 10 there will be a hiatus.
37 R. 144(c) (2).
38 See discussion at H. BLOOMENTHAL § 12.05 (3).

35
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certified) concerning the issuer including its most recent balance sheet and profit and loss statement which has to be reasonably current. 39 Since there are no definite standards by which
to determine the adequacy of the information and whether or
not it is publicly available, some risk may be involved in assuming that a nonreporting company has satisfied the foregoing
requirements. The Commission has urged such companies to
voluntarily register under the Exchange Act and has indicated
that if it is not feasible to provide the certified statements required by Form 10 for the three prior fiscal years, the Commission may, under appropriate circumstances, waive such re40
quirement.
For convenience in exposition, we shall refer to reporting
companies and those satisfying the requirements of Rule 15c2-11
as qualified companies and all other companies as nonqualified
companies. 41 Selling shareholders cannot utilize Rule 144 with
respect to shares of a nonqualified company. The circumstances
under which shares of such companies can be sold by controlling
persons or by persons acquiring such shares in a private transaction are discussed infra. In subsequent discussions of Rule
144, the assumption is generally made that the issuer is a qualified issuer except as may be otherwise indicated.
D. Shares to Which Rule 144 Is Applicable
Rule 144 is applicable to restricted securities defined as
securities acquired directly or indirectly from an issuer or an
affiliate of an issuer in a transaction not involving a public
offering. 42 Rule 144 is applicable also to securities sold for the
account of an affiliate (controlling person) whether or not such
securities are restricted securities. The foregoing presumes that
the issuer is a qualified issuer as previously outlined. Nothing
in Rule 144 alters the fact that in situations in which reliance is
placed on the nonpublic-offering exemption, the issuer will
have to continue to comply with the requirements of SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co.43 Those purchasing the securities in such
transactions can utilize Rule 144 so as to dispose of limited
amounts of such securities after the appropriate waiting period
discussed below. A question arises, however, in this type of situa39

R. 15c2-11 (a) (4),

40

Release 33-5223, under caption "Availability of Public Information."
This terminology is not employed in Rule 144 as adopted. Rather Rule
144(b) conditions the availability of the rule to companies concerning
which there is "available adequate current public information" and then
spells out the information which must be available to satisfy this pro-
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Cls. (1) -(14),

(16).

vision.
42R. 144(a) (3).
43

346 U.S. 119 (1953).

Discussed at H.

BLOOMENTHAL

§ 4.05(3).
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tion as to the impact of Rule 144 if no private-offering exemption
is available because of the failure to conform to the Ralston
Purina criteria. It would appear clear that such purchasers
could bring an action under Section 12(1) against the issuer
and rescind the transaction if timely brought, 44 or could bring
an action for fraud if appropriate disclosures relating to the
necessity for registration are not made. 45 The status of persons
who have purchased securities sold in violation of the registration provisions in terms of their classification as "statutory underwriters" has never been definitively determined. In one instance, it has been unsuccessfully urged that such persons are
not statutory underwriters and are free to resell the shares
acquired to the same extent they would have been as if they
had been publicly offered pursuant to a registration statement
or Regulation A offering. 46 However, this particular decision can
be explained by the fact that arguably the purchaser of the
shares was (or should have been) aware of the fact that such
shares were being sold to him in reliance on the nonpublicoffering exemption. One cannot predict precisely how this line
will be drawn, but it would appear that in some instances one
purchasing under some circumstances in which reliance is inappropriately placed on the nonpublic-offering exemption may
be, and in other instances may not be, a statutory underwriter. Perhaps this line will be drawn on the basis of whether
or not there was purported reliance on the exemption, which
reliance was known to and acquiesced in by reasonably aware
investors as in Crowell-Collier,and those in which the securities
were sold in violation of the registration provisions to unaware
investors.47 In those instances in which the purchaser is subject
to classification as a statutory underwriter in the event he resells
the securities, it would appear consistent with the underlying
purposes of Rule 144 to permit him to resell shares in conformity
with the provisions of Rule 144. In such event, strictly speaking,
the shares were sold in a transaction involving a public offering, but are restricted because, absent the rule, the resale will
result in classification as an underwriter. In those situations in
which the person acquiring shares sold to him in violation is
not deemed a statutory underwriter, he is presumably free under
See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 8.04.
45 See p. 346-47 infra.
46 Quinn & Co. v. SEC, 452 F.2d 943 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
47 Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825
(Jan. 12, 1957), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
76,539. See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.10 (2). As to the unaware investor,
compare Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964).
44
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Section 4 (1) to resell them without restriction and without compliance with the provisions of Rule 144.
Two staff interpretations raise some interesting questions
concerning the appropriateness of the foregoing analysis and
pose some additional problems. In one the staff took the position
that securities acquired by an underwriter in connection with an
offering underwritten by it as additional underwriting compensation could not be offered under Rule 144. The shares had
been previously registered for the shelf, but had not been
disposed of. The underwriter now proposed to dispose of the
shares pursuant to Rule 144. The staff took the position that such
shares were not restricted shares as they were acquired in a
transaction involving a public offering and, hence, Rule 144 was
not applicable. 48 This is consistent with the Commission's traditional position that shares acquired by an underwriter in connection with an offering are to be viewed as a part of the public
offering. 49 The other interpretation involved shares acquired
from an issuer, subsequently registered, but not sold and then
deregistered. The staff took the position that Rule 144 is not
available for shares that have been subject to a registration
statement that has been declared effective. 50 This would suggest
that shares acquired with a view to distribution (perhaps regardless of the circumstances) cannot be offered pursuant to Rule
144. In such event it might revive all the old "theology" about
investment intent that Rule 144 was designed to eliminate. 51
The term "restricted securities" is applicable not only to
securities purchased directly from the issuer, but also those
purchased indirectly. Thus, if the issuer sells securities in a
private placement and a purchaser in the private placement
48Telecredit, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 14, 1972),
SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 150:C-2 (May 3, 1972).
49
50

51

See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 7.15.
Technical Operations, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (May
15, 1972). See also remarks of Alan B. Levenson, Director, Div. Corp.
Fin., quoted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 157:B-2 (June 21, 1972).
Since the text was written, the staff has changed its position so that
securities may be withdrawn from a pre-effective registration statement and deregistered as to an effective registration statement and sold
pursuant to Rule 144 provided, in the latter event, the registration
statement is no longer current because the prospectus has become dated
or misleading. If the registration statement is current, Rule 144 may
not be utilized as to securities covered by the registration statement, but
may be for other restricted securities not covered by the registration
statement. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306, pt. I (Sept. 26, 1972)
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,000. However, at the same time the staff
reiterated the position referred to at note 48 supra that an underwriter
cannot utilize Rule 144 for securities received in connection with a
public cffering and placed securities received by a finder in the same
category. Emphasis in this regard was placed on the fact that such
shares are not acquired "in a transaction or a chain of transactions not
involving a public offering." Id. at pt. II.
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resells a portion of the securities to another person who meets
the Ralston Purina requirements, the shares purchased in the
latter transaction are also restricted securities. 52 Each person
along the chain acquiring restricted securities in this manner
has his own waiting period and is subject to his own separate
3
quantitative limitation with respect to resales under Rule 144. '
Shares acquired from an affiliate of an issuer in a transaction not involving a public offering are also classified as restricted securities. 54 To the extent that such shares were acquired
by the affiliate in a transaction not involving a public offering
and are resold to a person meeting the Ralston Purina criteria,
the situation is not essentially different from those resold by
others who acquire shares from the issuer in a private placement as discussed in a previous paragraph. However, a controlling shareholder's shares acquired in the open market and
resold to a person in a transaction not involving a public offering are also classified as restricted shares for the purpose of
Rule 144. This raises a question as to whether the sale to such
persons is itself a violation if they are not sophisticated and
informed investors within the meaning of Ralston Purina. Presumably, absent fungibility, they do not have to be in this context as there has been no transaction by an issuer or an underwriter; it is the resale by the purchaser (resulting in his classification as an underwriter) that leads to a possible violation
of Section 5.55 Accordingly, a transaction not involving a public
offering for this purpose would appear to be essentially one in
which the purchaser from the affiliate has not acquired the
shares for distribution. In such event, the purchaser, by holding
shares for the required waiting period and by complying with
the other requirements of Rule 144, can resell the shares in
appropriate amounts without registration. However, out of an
abundance of caution the controlling person should probably
confine his sales to purchasers meeting the Ralston Purina
criteria. The staff has indicated in a related context that although Section 4(2) is not literally applicable to the affiliate, its
limitations will be applied by analogy.5 6 In the event the
controlling person sells shares to individual purchasers without
regard to the registration provisions, the position of the purchasers presumably would be similar to that of individuals
52

53

R. 144(a) (3).
See p. 316 at note 63 infra.

R. 144 (a) (3).
55 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.08(2) (c).
56 See p. 321 at note 79 infra.
54
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purchasing shares sold to them in violation of the registration
provisions by the issuer as discussed above.
E. The Required Holding Period and Fungibility
Restricted securities must have been beneficially owned for
a period of at least two years by the selling shareholder before
they can be sold under Rule 144. 5 7 In addition, if purchased, the
full purchase price or other consideration must have been paid
at least two years prior to the Rule 144 sale. Payments by
promissory note or purchase under a contract pursuant to an
installment arrangement constitutes payment for this purpose
only if the obligation is secured by collateral other than the
purchased securities equal in fair market value to the purchase
price; the seller has full recourse against the purchaser and the
obligation has been discharged by payment in full prior to the
sale.58 The extent to which holding periods can be tacked and
the effect of separate holding periods is discussed infra.
Notions of fungibility have been discarded. The fact that one
has acquired nonrestricted securities during the waiting period
does not affect either the sale of the nonrestricted securities or
the waiting period as to the restricted securities. Rule 144 does
not expressly refer to fungibility, but the release accompanying
Rule 144 makes it clear that it is not applicable.59 In addition,
Rule 144, as finally adopted, deleted a provision that would have
regarded restricted securities fungible to the extent that if
acquired in successive transactions the last acquisition would
start the holding period running anew for all restricted securities.6 0 There is some possibility that a version of fungibility
may be applicable for limited purposes in relationship to sales
by affiliates as discussed above. The rule is not explicit how
securities acquired at various times are to be identified; presumably, it will be by delivery of identifiable certificates.'
57 R. 144(d) (1). A person becomes the beneficial owner of restricted
securities under a stock option plan on the date he exercises the option
by paying the exercise price; the staff has suggested that the date of
mailing of the check in payment can be used for this purpose. See
National Patent Dev. Corp., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter
(Apr. 13, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
T 78,797.
5
8R. 144(d) (2).
59 "For the purpose of the rule, the doctrine of 'fungibility' will not apply.
That is, the acquisition during the two-year period of other securities
cf the issuer, whether restricted, or nonrestricted, will not start the
holding period running anew." Release 33-5223, under the caption
"Holding Period."
6oProposed R. 144(d) (2), SEC Securities Act Release No. 5186 (Sept. 14,
1971), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., Special Rep. 387.
61 An inquiry to the staff had suggested that so long as the selling shareholder sold securities in appropriate amounts, there should be no need
to identify shares by certificates or otherwise. The staff replied that
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The rule specifically provides that short sales or purchases
of puts (or other option) to sell securities of the same class or
convertible into securities of the same class toll the running
of the waiting period for the period of the short position or the
period of the put or option. 2 Thus, if A acquired shares of
XYZ Corporation in a private offering and after holding them
for one year and one-half, then purchased a six-month put to
dispose of securities of the same class, not only would he be
unable to cover the transaction by the delivery of his restricted
stock but the existence of the put would extend the holding
period an additional six months. Thus, he is precluded from
buying a put exercisable at a price related to the current market price or selling short at current prices so as to hedge against
the possibility that the market price of the stock may go down
before the expiration of his holding period. This is consistent
with the reason advanced by the Commission for establishing a
holding period- to assure that purchasers in a private placement have assumed the economic risks of investment and are
not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered
63
securities on behalf of the issuer.
F.

The Holding Period and Tacking

There are a number of situations in which tacking of holding periods is allowed so that the holder's holding period relates
back to the date upon which his predecessor acquired the shares
in question. However, there is one situation in which tacking
is not applicable and that pertains to the acquisition of restricted shares in a series or chain of transactions in each of
which reliance is placed on the private-offering exemption.
Thus, if A acquired the shares in question in reliance on the
private-offering exemption from an issuer and resold them in
a private transaction to B, B would have a new holding period
and a separate quantitative limit.6 4 This would follow irrespective of whether transferred by A within or after the expiration
of his two-year holding period. In the latter event, A could
tracing and identification of certificates "would be necessary in order
to prevent any questions being raised about the length of the holding
period of the securities to be sold." National Patent Dev. Corp., SEC
Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 13, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,797.
62
R. 144(d) (3).
63
Release 33-5223, under the caption "Explanation and Analysis of the
64

Rule."
This follows from the definition of restricted securities to include shares
acquired indirectly from the issuer
transactions and from the fact that
this situation. As to the definition
(a) (3), and as to the provisions for

as the result of a chain of private
there is no provision for tacking in
of restricted security, see R. 144
tacking, see R. 144(d) (4) (D)-(G).
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have resold the shares in conformity with Rule 144, but if he
chooses to sell them in reliance on the private-offering exemption, B is the one who has indirectly acquired restricted securities from an issuer and must satisfy his own two-year holding
period.
The situations in which tacking is permitted for purposes of
the holding period are a transfer into trust, a gift, a bona fide
pledge with recourse after default, and securities held by an
estate . 65 Although the rule is not explicit in this regard, it would
appear that a trust has reference to inter vivos gifts and trusts
and not to testamentary gifts and trusts which are handled
through the rules relating to estates. In all of the foregoing
instances, the holder's holding period commences with the date
the shares in question were acquired by his predecessor- that
is, the settlor of the trust, the donor of the gift, the pledgor
as to a pledge, and the decedent as to an estate. In the event
a trust or estate has distributed the shares in question, the
beneficiary can similarly use the holding period of the settlor
or decedent as the case may be. If the pledge is without recourse,
tacking is not permitted. Where there are successive donees
each donee's holding period relates back to the date his donor
acquired the shares and not to the date of the initial gift. Thus,
if a donee acquired shares which had been held for less than
two years but which with tacking satisfied the holding period,
and he were to make an immediate gift of the same shares, all
his donee could tack would be the donor's short holding period.
Whenever tacking occurs, certain aggregation rules also come
into play as is discussed infra.
G.

The Holding Period and Stock Dividends,
Splits, and Recapitalization

Rule 144 expressly provides that securities acquired from
the issuer as a dividend or pursuant to a stock split, reverse
split, or recapitalization have a holding period measured from
the date of acquisition of the security as to which the dividend
is based or the stock split or recapitalization relates.6 6 If there
has been more than one stock dividend, the holding period goes
back to the acquisition of the shares upon which the initial
dividend was paid. Although under Rule 145 a recapitalization
subject to approval of shareholders involves a sale and may
6

5R. 144(d) (4), para. (D) as to a pledgee; para. (E) as to a donee; para.
(F) as to a trust, and para. (G) as to an estate.
66R. 144(d) (4) (A).
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require registration under the Securities Act, 67 the security
received in the exchange is deemed the same security as the
one surrendered for purposes of the two-year holding period.
An affiliated person receiving such shares could utilize the
date of acquisition of the surrendered security rather than the
date upon which securities were received as part of the recapitalization. 68 However, as to such a recapitalization this provision appears superfluous since to the extent resales would
otherwise result in classification as an underwriter under Rule
145(c), shares can be resold within the confines of Rule 144
without regard to the length of the holding period. Accordingly,
this provision is applicable to a recapitalization which is essentially a nonpublic offering. There is no comparable provision
with respect to securities issued in corporate combinations (other
than recapitalizations) which are essentially private offerings. "9
H.

Holding Period for Contingently Issued Securities

Rule 144 contains a special provision relating to determination
of a holding period with respect to securities the issuance of
which is contingent upon some condition other than the payment
of a further consideration. The provision is applicable to situations in which restricted securities are to be issued as payment
of part of the purchase price of an equity interest in a business
or the assets of a business purchased by an issuer or an affiliate
of the issuer. This assumes a combination which is not subject
to Rule 145 because the private-offering exemption is available.
If the purchaser is committed to issue the securities upon the
occurrence of an event other than the payment of a further
consideration, the securities are deemed for the two-year holding period requirement of Rule 144 to have been issued as of
the date of the commitment to contingently issue. 70 Contingencies of the type that would be embraced within this provision
would include (1) the acquired business generates a specified
profit within a specified period of time; (2) those receiving the
shares will not compete with the issuer; and (3) those receiving
the shares will remain in the issuer's employ for a specified
period of time. If the issuance is contingent on a further paySee H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.15(1) with respect to the application of Rule
145; Rule 144(d) (4) (A) with respect to determination of the holding period for securities surrendered in connection with a recapitalization.
68 Cf. Communications Consultants, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action
Letter (Apr. 13, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FElD. SEc. L.
67
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1178,764.
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See H.
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ment by the person to receive the shares, this provision has no
application.
The foregoing provision is applicable, however, only to
transactions involving the acquisition of an equity interest in
a business or the assets of a business. The staff has expressed
the view that this provision is not applicable when the securities
have been escrowed pending clearance of some of the require71
ments preliminary to closing the transaction.
I. The Quantitative Limitations
1. The Basic Calculation
The amount of restricted securities of a qualified issuer that
can be sold for the account of a person other than an affiliate
and the amount of restricted or other securities of a qualified
issuer sold for the account of an affiliate under the rule during
any six-month period cannot exceed one percent of the outstanding shares (or other unit) of the same class if the security
is not listed on a national securities exchange. 2 For listed securities, the quantitative limitation is the same one percent
amount or, if less, the average weekly reported volume of trading for all exchanges during the four weeks immediately preceding the filing of the notice (if required) referred to at
section II, M infra. If no notice is required, trading volume is
determined for the four calendar weeks prior to the placing of
the order with the executing broker. This represents a departure from Rule 154 which based the amount that could be
offered on the largest aggregate rather than average reported
weekly volume and measured the four weeks in all instances
from the placing of the order with the broker.7 3
The six-month period is not a semiannual or other calendar
period. It is a six-month period determined in reference to the
six months preceding the sales being presently made in reliance
on Rule 144.74 Insofar as the individual selling shareholder is
concerned, it has the effect of requiring the aggregation of all
shares sold by him in reliance upon Rule 144 during any sixmonth period. However, for purposes of the immediate calculation, it is determined in relationship to the sales during the
preceding six months. Thus, if one is about to rely upon Rule
Communications Consultants, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 13, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,764.
72
R. 144(e) (1)-(2).
73 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.09(1) with respect to Rule 154.
74
R. 144(e) (1)-(2). See also p. 343 at note 160 for variations based on
71

fluctuations in trading volume of listed securities.
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144 he must take into account the sales he has made during the
preceding six months; he does not at that time take into account
sales to be made subsequently. However, when he makes the
subsequent sales if made within six months he will be taking
into account the shares previously sold. Accordingly, his sales
under Rule 144 will be aggregated unless they are spaced six
months apart and the effect of the rule in this context is to include sales during any six-month period. However, in some contexts the fact that the period is the preceding rather than any
six-month period conceivably could make a difference. As is
noted in the succeeding section, in determining quantitative limitations, the selling security holder has to include restricted
shares sold in reliance on the intrastate exemption if such shares
were sold during the preceding six months. If, however, he were
to dispose of restricted shares under Rule 144 and then sell restricted shares under the intrastate exemption (assuming the
availability of the exemption) 75 the subsequent sales would not
affect the availability of Rule 144 for the prior sales as in this
context aggregation is only in terms of what went before. We
shall note at a later point that in the specific context in which
the Rule 144 requires aggregation because of tacking of holding
periods that for this purpose the appropriate measuring period
is any six-month period.
2.

Securities Included and Excluded

The quantity of securities that could be sold under Rule
154 was seriously limited in that all securities of the same class
sold by the appropriate selling shareholder during the appropriate six-month period had to be taken into account including
securities which may have been registered, sold in exempted
transactions, or covered by a Regulation A filing.7 6 Rule 144
explicitly provides that securities sold in reliance on the Section
4(2) exemption for transactions not involving a public offering
and securities covered by a registration statement or a Regulation A filing do not have to be included in making the quantitative calculation. 77 However, securities previously sold during
the appropriate six-month period in reliance on Rule 144, restricted securities sold in reliance on the intrastate exemption,
and restricted securities sold in violation of the registration
provisions do have to be included in determining the quantitative limitation. The exclusion of securities sold in reliance on
75
76
77

§ 4.04.
Id. § 4.09 (2) at nn.179-81.
See H. BLOOMENTHAL

R. 144(e) (3) (G).
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Section 4(2) poses a conceptual problem from the standpoint
of sales by an affiliate (controlling person) in reliance on Rule
144 since in many instances reliance is technically being placed
on the Section 4(1) exemption inasmuch as Section 4(2) is
literally applicable only to transactions by an issuer, and an
affiliate is not an issuer for this purpose.7 8 Presumably, in this
context the transactions by the affiliate will be viewed as if
they did involve an issuer; in such event it would appear necessary for the affiliate, if he wishes to have the shares excluded
from the calculation, to sell the shares to purchasers who not
only acquire for investment, but who also meet the Ralston
Purina criteria. This appears to be the position of the staff 9
No comparable problem exists as to the nonaffiliated person
selling securities in reliance on Rule 144 as such person includes
in his quantitative calculation only the prior sale of restricted
securities. To the extent he has acquired securities in the open
market from a nonaffiliate, he can sell such shares in reliance
on the Section 4(1) exemption, and they are not included in
the quantitative calculation as they are not restricted securities.
However, an affiliate has to include all sales of securities of
the appropriate class (whether restricted or not) in his quantitative calculation unless exempt under Section 4(2), registered,
or covered by a Regulation A filing.
3.

The Attribution Rules

In determining the quantitative limitations applicable to a
person (selling security holder) selling securities in reliance on
Rule 144, the attribution rules must be taken into account. The
attribution rules function by defining the term "person" so as to
include under certain circumstances one's spouse and the relatives of the person and spouse and specified associated legal
entities. Identical attribution rules are applicable under Rule 237
and Regulation A. s0 The term "person" is defined to include in
addition to the selling security holder any person who is his
(her) spouse or a relative (without regard to consanguinity) of
the selling security holder or of his (her) spouse. Also attributed
to a selling security holder are sales by a trust or estate in which
the person and any of the related persons living together as discussed above collectively own 10 percent or more of the total
beneficial interests in the trust or estate, or as to which the
78
7*

See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.08(2) (c).
Harris, Beech & Wilco, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 14,
1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,773.

80 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 5.05(2) (d) for detailed discussion of the attribu-

tion rules in the context of Regulation A.
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selling security holder serves as a trustee or executor or in a
similar capacity. Similarly, sales by any corporation or other
organization (other than the issuer) in which the selling security
holder and the related persons referred to above own beneficially collectively 10 percent or more of any class of equity
interest or of the equity interest are attributed to the selling
shareholder."' To illustrate the attribution rules in determining
the one percent (or other appropriate) limit, a person would
have to take into account the sales of the appropriate security
during the appropriate period by his wife and son if they lived
in the same home with him.
In some instances the attribution rules operate in both directions - that is, sales by both persons are attributed to each other
so that their sales are always aggregated. This would be true
with respect to a husband and wife living together, for example,
and for the most part with respect to related persons living together in the same household. The husband as a selling security
holder must take into account sales by his wife and she would
have to take into account sales by her husband. If, however,
the attributable person is a relative of a spouse living in the
same household, the attribution rules work only in one direction. To illustrate: If the selling security holder's mother-in-law
lives with him, he would have to take into account appropriate
sales of his mother-in-law. However, if the mother-in-law
is the selling security holder, she does not have to take into
account the sales of her son-in-law although she would under
similar circumstances have to take into account the sales by
her daughter. The attribution rules as applied to sales by entities
(trusts, estates, organizations) operate only in one direction;
they are taken into account by the individual selling security
holder but not by the entity. Thus, if the trustee is the selling
security holder for his own account he must take into account
sales made by the trust. On the other hand, the trust as a selling
security holder does not have to take into account sales made
by the trustee for his own account. In those instances in which
attribution operates in only one direction, the sequence in which
transactions take place can affect the availability of Rule 144.
If, for example, in the situation described, the trust were to sell
securities of the appropriate issuer in one month and the trustee
in the following month, both sales would be aggregated under
Rule 144. If, on the other hand, the trustee were to sell his
81

The attribution rules under Rule 144 are found in Rule 144 (a) (2). Para.
(A) thereof relates to relatives; para. (B) relates to trusts and estates;
and para. (C) relates to corporations or other organizations.
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shares before the trust sold its shares, they would not be aggregated. This appears to follow from the fact that the shares that
can be sold under Rule 144 in this context are calculated in
relationship to those sold within the preceding six months.8 2 If
transactions were planned in this context so as to maximize
the amount of securities that could be sold under Rule 144, the
possibility exists that the sales would be aggregated under the
rules relating to sales by persons acting in concert discussed
at section II, I, 6 infra.
4.

The Aggregation Rules

We have observed above that tacking of holding periods
is permitted with respect to a gift, a transfer into trust, a bona
fide pledge with recourse, and securities held by an estate., " If
tacking of holding periods is allowed, the aggregation rules
generally come into play; accordingly, if a trust, pledgee, donee,
or an estate has relied upon tacking in determining the holding
period, account must be taken of the aggregation rules. For this
purpose, the appropriate sales of the tacking party and his predecessor must be aggregated if they take place during any sixmonth period occurring within the period (generally two years
4
from the appropriate event) within which tacking is allowed.
The result is that both parties concerned (for example, the donor
and donee) must take into account what the other has done.
The rule is not a model of clarity in this respect and will undoubtedly confuse some because of its reference to the "same
six-month period," the syntax of which appears to be the donee's
six-month period85 which for some purposes is a period related to
the date upon which the donee sold shares. However, in this
context the donee's six-month period is not the six months immediately preceding his sales but any six-month period during
which the donee sold shares within the tacking period.
Assume that the donee within two years of the gift were
to sell restricted shares in reliance on Rule 144 and the donor
the following month also proposes to sell restricted shares under
Rule 144. At the time of the donee's sales, he will have to
take into account the sales made during the preceding six
months by his donor in determining the quantitative limitations
on his sales. If the donor's sales are also made within two years
of the gift, he would have to take into account the sales made
See p. 319 and note 74 supra.
83 R. 144(d) (4) (D)-(G).
82

84

Id. (e) (3) (C) - (F).

85 Id.

(e) (3) (C).
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by his donee within six months prior to the donor's sales. Although the donor's six-month period and the donee's six-month
period are not the same, their respective sales occurred within a
six-month period which is the same.
After tacking is no longer necessary, the aggregation rules
are no longer applicable. Tacking ceases to be necessary two
years after the occurrence of the appropriate event for a trust,
donee, or pledgee. The appropriate event as to a trust and donee
is the date of acquisition of the securities; in the case of a
pledgee with recourse, it is the date of default of the collateralized obligation. 86 Although tacking continues to be necessary
for an estate or a beneficiary of an estate for a period of two
years, the maximum period of time during which there is any
possibility of aggregation with prior sales of the decedent is six
months for apparent reasons. The one situation, possibly an
oversight, in which tacking is allowed without bringing into
play the aggregation rules is the distribution of shares of a
trust (but not an estate) to a beneficiary."7 In that event, although the beneficiary's holding period relates back to the
settlor's, there is no requirement that the settlor's sales be
aggregated with the beneficiary's. In some instances the attribution rules may come into play, but not necessarily.88 Although
beneficiaries receiving shares from a trust or an estate can tack
the settlor's or decedent's holding period, their sales are not
aggregated with the sales of the trust or the estate as the case
may be. 9
5. The Interrelationship of Attribution and Aggregation
The interrelationship of the attribution rules and the aggregation rules is complex and probably best understood in the
context of specific situations pertaining to trusts, gifts, and the
like as will be presently discussed. However, the following general procedures may be helpful in applying the aggregation and
attribution rules:
144(e) (3) (C)-(D) for gifts and trusts; R. 144(e) (3) (B) as to
pledged shares.
87Rule 144(d) (4) (F) provides that securities acquired from the settlor
of a trust or acquired by a beneficiary from the trust are deemed to
have been acquired when they were acquired by the settlor. On the
other hand, Rule 144(e) (3) (D) requires the trust to aggregate shares
sold for the account of the trust with those sold during the same sixmonth period for the account of the settlor, but includes no similar requirement as to the beneficiary of the trust.
88They would come into play if the beneficiary and the settlor are related
and reside in the same home. R. 144(a) (2) (A).
89 For tacking, see R. 144(d) (4) (F)-(G); for aggregation, see R. 144(e)
(3) (D) - (E). However, the beneficiary receiving shares from the estate
has to aggregate his sales with those of the decedent if aggregation is
otherwise appropriate. R. 144(e) (3) (E).
86R.
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(1)
(2)
(3)

Determine if tacking has to be relied upon in order
to establish a holding period.
If tacking is being relied upon, apply the aggregation rules as appropriate.
After applying the aggregation rules, or if the
aggregation rules are not applicable, apply the attribution rules.

Thus, one would determine whether the securities being sold
are being sold by a donee, trust, estate, or by one having received the shares in a distribution from an estate, by a pledgee
(or, in some instances, a purchaser from a pledgee). Then determine whether the selling security holder has made a gift, transferred shares into trust, or pledged shares of the appropriate
class. In either of the two situations, apply the aggregation rules.
Then apply the attribution rules to determine, for example,
whether the selling security holder's spouse has sold restricted
securities during the appropriate periods. In the event the aggregation rules are not applicable because a donee, etc., is not involved or because tacking is no longer necessary, apply only the
attribution rules. If, to illustrate the foregoing general procedures, a settlor has made a gift of restricted securities into
trust, of which he is trustee and the trust within two years of
the gift sells the restricted shares in reliance on Rule 144, it
must take into account sales of restricted shares made in reliance on Rule 144 by the settlor of his own shares during the
same six-month period. If, on the other hand, the sales were
made by the trust after two years from the transfer into trust,
the trust would not have to take prior sales of the settlor into
account. Should the trustee-settlor make sales before or after
the expiration of the two-year period, he would have to take
the Rule 144 sales of the trust into account because so long as
he is the trustee all of the sales of the trust are attributed
to him. If the settlor were not a trustee and the beneficiaries
of the trust were neither his spouse nor related to him nor his
spouse, the attribution rules would not be applicable. In such
event, the settlor in selling his own restricted securities within
two years from the date of the transfer into trust would take
into account sales made by the trust. If, however, he sold shares
after the two-year period, he would not take into account prior
sales by the trust.
The aggregation provisions come into play only at the time
the donee or other appropriate party sells restricted shares
relying on tacking, not with respect to other sales by the party.
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If, for example, a donee resells shares within two years of the
gift so that he has to rely on tacking, he must take into account
and aggregate prior sales of restricted securities made by his
donor during the immediately preceding six months. If within
a month he sells additional restricted securities which he acquired directly from the issuer and has held for two years, he
must take his own prior sale of the gift securities into account;
but even if it is within two years of the date of the gift, he
does not have to take into account the sales of the donor unless
they are attributable to him under the attribution rules. Thus,
if the donor were his father and they lived together, he would
take them into account; if they did not live together, he would
not take them into account.
6.

Persons Acting in Concert

One of the serious limitations on the use of Rule 154 was
the Commission's interpretation of who constituted a "person"
for the purpose of computing the quantitative limitations. The
Commission's release interpreting Rule 154 had stated in that
regard that "consideration must be given not only to sales by
the specified control person but also the question whether such
sales are, or may be, a part of a distribution being effected by
a group of closely related persons of which the particular individual is a member.... Rule 154 does not provide an exemption
for portions of group distributions ... the offering by the group
as a whole would have to be included in a single computation."9
The practical implications of this in terms of Rule 154 was often
to impose the one percent (or other appropriate) limit on controlling persons as a group. The careful consideration given in
Rule 144 as to the extent to which sales by related persons and
the like must be aggregated, hopefully, if complied with should
avoid problems in this regard. However, Rule 144 does provide,
both with respect to sales by an affiliate and sales of restricted
securities by others, that sales by persons who "agree to act in
concert" shall be aggregated for the appropriate six-month
period in determining the quantitative limitation. 91
The staff has stated that the "in concert" provision "is generally intended to group all persons who agree to act together
in order to sell securities." Specifically, they have suggested that
a meeting of individuals for the purpose of discussing and arranging an orderly method of sale pursuant to Rule 144 would
90 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669 (Feb. 17, 1964), CCH
REP. 1, 2920.

91R. 144(e) (3) (F).

FED.
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appear to fall within the phrase.9 2 Certainly any planning among
two or more persons designed to maximize the availability of
Rule 144 would fall within the phrase. While the staff has not
raised any question concerning an agreement among shareholders to withhold shares from the market during a period in which
a registered offering is being made by them, the implication is
that any comparable agreement while shares are being offered
under Rule 144 would be viewed as acting in concert. 93 While
the traditional "underwriting" is not feasible in connection with
Rule 144 transactions, an agreement by a group to channel their
shares through a single broker could well constitute acting in
concert.9 4 Perhaps the best course to follow in this context
would be for every shareholder who is a potential Rule 144
offeror to consult his own counsel, sell through his own broker,
and scrupulously avoid any meetings or conversations with other
similarly situated shareholders concerning their plans for the
disposition of stock under Rule 144. This may pose a real problem to counsel who is accustomed to otherwise advising several
members of the group.
J.

Rule 144 in Operation
1. Sales by Nonaffiliated Persons
An individual who acquired restricted shares from a qualified issuer, but who is not an affiliated person of such issuer,
must first take into account if he proposes to sell such shares
under Rule 144 whether he has held and paid for the securities
for the required two-year period. He would then take into account all sales of restricted securities of the same class of the
same issuer made by him during the prior six months. He would
also review the extent to which he has made a gift, transferred
into trust, or pledged restricted securities of the same class and
of the same issuer during the preceding two years (or longer
with respect to a pledge). In the event such transactions have
taken place, he would also have to determine the extent to
which his donee, the trust, pledgee, or purchaser from the
pledgee may have sold the restricted securities in reliance on
92 Stroock, Stroock & Lavan, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter
(Apr. 12, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93

78,774.

Damson Oil Corp., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 13,
1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1T 78,763;
Dynarad, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 13, 1972),
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,769.
94 While not directly in point, the staff has suggested that a single broker
engaged to effectuate a registered secondary distribution through an
exchange would be deemed an "underwriter." Texas Int'l Co., SEC
Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 5, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
78,792.
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Rule 144. He would finally take into account sales of restricted
securities of the same class of the same issuer made by persons
whose sales are attributable to him under the attribution rules.
Assume that A acquired common shares from XYZ Corporation in a private placement which he has held for more than two
years and now proposes to dispose of in conformity with Rule
144. A must take into account restricted shares of XYZ Corporation common that he has sold during the prior six months if sold
in reliance on Rule 144 and restricted shares sold in violation of
the registration provisions as well and aggregate such shares
with those he proposes to presently sell. Assume further that
A made a gift of a portion of his restricted securities to State
University and that State University disposed of those shares in
reliance on Rule 144 within the preceding six-month period. If
the gift had taken place more than two years prior to A's proposed sales, A could disregard such sales. If, on the other hand,
less than two years has elapsed from the date of the gift, A must
aggregate the sales made by State University. If the gift had
been to A's son rather than to State University even if two years
had elapsed from the date of the gift, A would have to take
his son's sales into account if the son lived with him but not
otherwise if two years has elapsed.
2. Sales by an Affiliate
If A, a controlling person of ABC Corporation, intends to
sell shares of ABC Corporation in reliance on Rule 144, he must
take into account the prior sales that he has made of ABC Corporation in reliance on Rule 144 during the appropriate sixmonth period. He must take into account the prior sales and the
proposed sales even with respect to securities which he may
have acquired in the open market. A nonaffiliated person in the
same context could disregard the sales of shares he acquired
in the open market since his quantitative limitations take into
account only the sale of restricted securities. Except for this fact
and the greater probability that an affiliate may have sold shares
in violation, the discussion relating to Rule 144 as applied to
nonaffiliated persons (see prior section) would also be appropriate. As to sales made during the prior six months by an
affiliate in reliance on the nonpublic-offering exemption, the
affiliate has a conceptual problem in that technically he is relying on the Section 4(1) exemption rather than the Section 4(2)
exemption.9 5 The staff has expressed the view that if such transactions are effected in a manner similar to private placements
95

See p. 314 at note 56 supra.
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by issuers under Section 4(2), such shares can be excluded.9 6
Accordingly, if an affiliate sells shares to persons meeting the
Ralston Purina criteria, he does not have to take them into account in determining the amount he can sell under Rule 144. To
illustrate: Assume that A, an affiliate, owns 100,000 shares of
ABC Corporation of which amount he acquired 80,000 shares
from the issuer, which hence are restricted shares, and 20,000
shares in the open market, the latter not being within the definition of restricted shares since neither acquired from an issuer
nor an affiliate. If A were to resell a portion of his restricted
shares to B, a person meeting the Ralston Purina criteria, the
shares would be exempt as there has been no distribution; A
is not an underwriter in this context and B has acquired restricted shares. In a comparable situation, X, a nonaffiliated person, having acquired restricted shares from ABC Corporation
and reselling them to B in compliance with Ralston Purina
would not be an underwriter and B would have indirectly acquired restricted shares from the issuer. If A were to resell a
portion of the shares he acquired in the open market under similar circumstances to B who acquired the shares for investment,
the transaction would be exempt under Section 4 (1) rather than
Section 4 (2). However, for the reasons noted above they probably do not have to be included in A's calculations and they
are restricted shares to B as shares acquired from an affiliate
in a transaction not involving a public offering. In the identical
situation, X, a nonaffiliated person, could resell the shares he
acquired in the open market without regard to Rule 144 as X
includes only restricted shares in his quantitative calculations.
3.

Sales by Donees

Prior to adoption of Rule 144, it was the position of the
Commission's staff that a donee may be an underwriter with respect to the gift securities if acquired from an affiliate of the
issuer or from one who had acquired such shares in a private
placement. 97 The critical consideration in this regard is whether
to effectuate the gift it is necessary or probable that the gift
securities will be resold. Rule 144 appears to be deliberately
drafted so as to assure that gift securities will be embraced by
the rule in that, among other things, restricted securities are
defined in terms of securities acquired from an issuer or affiliate
of an issuer rather than in terms of securities purchased from
96 Harris, Beech & Wilco, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 14,
1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,773.
97 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966), CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.

2925.
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an issuer or affiliate. 98 The Commission also emphasized in its
release announcing Rule 144 that one may be an underwriter
despite the fact that he did not purchase with a view to distribution if he participates in a distribution.9 9 Since the Commission
also announced that Rule 144 is not the exclusive means for
selling restricted securities, it is conceivable that in limited
situations a donee might be able to resell unregistered securities
without being characterized as an underwriter. However, the
Commission cautioned generally as to those relying on an exemption other than Rule 144 in the resale of restricted securities
that "they will have a substantial burden of proof in establishing that an exemption from registration is available."' 00
A donee about to sell restricted shares in reliance on Rule
144 would determine his holding period by the acquisition date
of his donor. If he had acquired the shares from the donor within the preceding two years, he would take into account any sales
made by the donor within the appropriate six-month period; if
the gift took place more than two years previously he would
take into account sales by his donor only to the extent the
attribution rules are applicable. He would also have to take into
account whether he had made a gift or transferred into trust,
or pledged the gift securities or other restricted securities and,
in such event, under appropriate circumstances whether 'his
donee, the trust, or pledgee has utilized Rule 144 for resale of
the shares in question. Finally, in addition to his own sales during the preceding six months, he would have to take into account sales made by persons whose sales are attributable to
him under the attribution rules.
Assume that B proposes to sell restricted shares of XYZ
Corporation acquired from A, his father, who is an affiliate of
XYZ Corporation, as a gift twenty-six months previously. The
two-year holding period is satisfied without tacking; accordingly,
B need not take into account sales made by A unless the attribution rules are applicable which would depend upon whether
he is living with his father. The situation would have been
otherwise if the gift had been made twelve months previously
as in that event B would have to rely on the tacking of A's holding period in order to utilize Rule 144. Returning to our initial
assumptions, assume further that B, eighteen months earlier,
made a gift of a portion of the securities received from A to C,
98 R. 144 (a) (3).

99 Release 33-5223, under the caption '"Background and Purpose."
1001d. at the introductory general explanation.
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his girlfriend, which she has resold in reliance on Rule 144 one
month earlier. B would have to take C's sales into account under
the aggregation rules since C would have had to rely on the
tacking of B's holding period. Assume that B's grandfather who
lives with him has also resold restricted shares of XYZ Corporation of the same class during the preceding six-month period
under Rule 144; B would have to take his grandfather's shares
into account under the attribution rules.
The aggregation rules do appear to allow a donor to leak a
substantial number of restricted shares into the market without
registration provided he can avoid the attribution rules. Thus, if
we assume that A, an affiliate of ABC Corporation, has four
adult children, all of whom reside in their own homes, and
makes a substantial gift of shares of ABC Corporation which
have been held by A for in excess of two years to each of them,
each of the children could resell the shares immediately under
Rule 144 without taking into account the shares sold by the
other donees. Thus, each might sell up to one percent of the
outstanding shares or collectively four percent of the outstanding
shares during a six-month period. If the children and/or the
donor act in concert, however, all of their shares would be
aggregated.' 0 ' Further, although not a specific part of the rule,
the Commission has announced that the exemption provided for
by the rule is not available despite technical compliance with
the provisions of the rule if the transactions are part of a plan
to distribute securities to the public. 10 2 The situation described
may well come within the foregoing caveat.
The rules relating to trusts are substantially identical to
those relating to gifts and, hence, the discussion of various trust
situations immediately below may have relevance to similar
gifts not made in trust and the discussion of donees may be applicable to a gift in trust.
4. Sales by Trusts
A trust can utilize the holding period of its settlor with respect to restricted securities. 11 3 Thus, if the settlor had held the
shares for only twelve months at the time he created the trust,
the trust would have to hold the shares for another twelve
months prior to relying on Rule 144. The holding period of
shares distributed by the trust to its beneficiaries is also de04
termined in reference to the settlor's acquisition date.1 If the
lOR. 144(e) (3) (F).
102 See p. 339-40 infra.
103R. 144(d) (4) (F).
104
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trust resells the shares received from the settlor within two
years from the transfer into trust, it must take into account sales
of restricted shares by the settlor during the preceding six
months. By an apparent oversight, a beneficiary to whom shares
are distributed does not similarly have to take into account
sales by the settlor' 0 5 except under the attribution rules. The
settlor may have to take into account sales by the trust under
both the aggregation and attribution rules, but will have to take
into account sales by a beneficiary only to the extent the attribution rules are applicable. The attribution rules attribute sales
of the trust to the settlor if the settlor is a trustee or if he
and/or his wife, his relatives, and the relatives of his wife living
with him collectively own 10 percent of the beneficial interest
in the trust. 10 If the shares had been distributed to a beneficiary,
whether attributed depends upon whether the beneficiary is related to the settlor or his wife and lives with them. 0 7
If we assume a fairly common family trust, transfer of restricted securities in trust for the benefit of the settlor's wife and
children, application of the aggregation and attribution rules
may vary depending upon the circumstances. The extent to
which the attribution rules come into play in connection with
a trust depends in part on who is the trustee, the living arrangements of the beneficiaries, and whether or not the shares transferred into trust have been distributed to some or all of the
beneficiaries. It is also conceivable that there may be some differences depending upon whether the settlor creates a single
trust or multiple trusts. 10 8
Assume the settlor transfers restricted shares which he has
held for two years into trust for the benefit of his wife and
children with an independent trustee (a bank, for example).
Conceivably, if all the children reside in their own homes and
the wife is beneficiary for life with remainder to the children,
an immediate problem in terms of the attribution rules would
involve determination of whether the wife owns 10 percent or
more of the beneficial interest in the trust. This may involve
valuations based upon her age and selection of an appropriate
See p. 324 at notes 87-89 supra.
144(a) (2) (B).
107 Id. (a) (2) (A).
108 While sales of affiliated trusts have to be attributed to selling shareholders under appropriate circumstances, there are no provisions requiring sales of vaTious trusts to be attributed to each other. See, however, on technical compliance, the Commission's general caveat at p.
339 infra.
105
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life expectancy and valuation table.109 Assume alternatively that
each of the beneficiaries has the same interest in the trust;
does it make any difference whether it purports to be one trust
with five separate beneficiaries or five separate trusts? If it is
five separate trusts, each trust would have its own one percent
or other appropriate limitation and would not have to take into
account the sales by the other trusts. Conceivably, the use of
different trustees and/or different terms of the respective trusts
may determine whether they are to be regarded as one or five
trusts.'10 None of the foregoing matters are specifically referred
to in the rule although they are common questions in the estate
planning area generally.
For purposes of simplicity, assume a transfer of restricted
securities which have been held for two years into a single trust
for the benefit of five children of the settlor. Assume, further,
that the trust has distributed a portion of such securities to
one of the beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the
trust upon his attaining the age of thirty-five which occurred
shortly after the trust was created. If within two years of the
transfer into trust, the trust sells the restricted securities in
reliance on Rule 144, it must take into account any restricted
securities sold during the prior six months by its settlor. If, on
the other hand, the beneficiary to whom shares were distributed
sold such shares, he would not have to take sales by the settlor
into account if he does not live with the settlor)" Yet, if the
settlor had made a gift of such shares directly to him, he would
have had to take the settlor's sales into account under comparable circumstances.'1 2 If the settlor proposes to sell shares in
reliance on Rule 144, after two years he will not have to take
the sales by the trust into account unless he is the trustee or
unless the beneficiaries living with him collectively own 10
percent of the beneficial interest in the trust. 13 In view of this
109 While the approach suggested in the text appears reasonable, as might

be expected the staff did not disagree with the suggestion that the remainderman's beneficial ownership be determined upon the basis of
the number of shares to which he would be entitled upon the expiration of the life estate. Otterbourg, Steindler, Housten & Rosen, SEC
Div. Ccrp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 14, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Smc. L. REP. 1 78,754. This is, of course, the most
stringent possible test, and if this were intended, there appears little
reason why the rule should not have expressly so provided.
11oIr the tax context, twenty separate trusts with the same trustee have
been held to be separate trusts. Each was created by a separate instrument and separate records were maintained as to each. Estelle
Morris Trusts, Nos. 401-410 v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.
1970).
111 R. 144(e) (3) (D).
112

Id. (e) (3) (C).

113 Id. (a) (2) (B).
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fact, a settlor undoubtedly will be encouraged to use a bank
or other independent trustee rather than act as trustee himself.
If one of the children-beneficiaries is a trustee, that child upon
selling restricted shares held by him will have to take into
account shares sold by the trust even though neither he nor
the children living with him own 10 percent of the beneficial interest in the trust."14 If the beneficiaries are children
and grandchildren of the settlor, the attribution rules may be
applicable to some of the beneficiaries and not to others.
Thus, if A and his children living with him collectively (but
not individually) have a 10 percent beneficial interest in the
trust, A in relying on Rule 144 must take into account sales of
restricted shares by the trust during the preceding six-month
period. On the other hand, if B and his children collectively (but
not individually) have a 10 percent beneficial interest in the
trust but B's children do not live at home, sales by the trust
would not be attributable to B. The possibilities in terms of
attribution and aggregation in the trust situation are numerous.
5. Sales by an Estate and Beneficiaries of an Estate
Perhaps the most complex situation in this general context
is that of an estate which includes restricted securities held by
the decedent at the time of his death, or, if the decedent was an
affiliate, other securities of the appropriate issuer held by the
decedent at the time of his death. If the estate is not itself an
affiliate, in itself a difficult question of fact, 1 5 the status of the
decedent as an affiliate has limited relevance. It may be of some
significance in determining whether the estate is to be viewed
as an affiliate although obviously not conclusive on this issue.
As to shares the decedent held which were not acquired from
the issuer (and, hence, which were not restricted shares), it
would appear that the estate should be able to sell such shares
without registration and without regard to Rule 144. However,
it is conceivable that the estate would be viewed as participating
in a distribution by an affiliate (now deceased) if it were to
sell such shares and as such it would be an underwriter. 116
As to restricted shares acquired by the estate from the decedent,
the Commission does not in this situation view the death of the
decedent as in itself changing the restricted character of the
shares. Presumably, the justification for this is the fact that
from the standpoint of investor protection, the shares were
114 Id.

See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.09(3), and in particular at n.196.
116 Compare the rationalization with respect to donees generally in id. §
115

4.09(4).
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117
issued in a private transaction and have never been registered.
In this context, however, assuming that the estate is not itself
an affiliate, no holding period is required and shares may be
sold in unlimited amounts under Rule 144. Nonetheless, the
other requirements of Rule 144, such as the giving of appropriate notice, selling in brokerage transactions and the like, are
applicable. 118 Thus, holding shares until death does not establish
investment intent in this context, but liberalizes the circumstances under which such shares may be resold without registration.

If the estate (or beneficiary to whom shares have been distributed) selling restricted securities acquired from the decedent
is itself an affiliate, Rule 144 with certain qualifications applies
as it would to the sale of any other shares by an affiliate. The
estate (or beneficiary) under such circumstances determines its
holding period in reference to the date of acquisition by the
decedent" 9 and must take into account the shares sold by the
decedent during the prior six-month period. 120 If the securities
were not restricted securities and hence no holding period is
required, it would appear nonetheless necessary for the estate
(or the beneficiary) to include in its sales securities sold by
the decedent during the prior six months, since in this one
instance the rule appears to require aggregation even in the
absence of tacking.12 1 If the beneficiary who is also an affiliate
having received restricted shares from the estate sells restricted
shares of the issuer, it appears that he must include sales made
by the decedent during the prior six-month period even if he
does not sell the shares received from the estate. 22 Further,
even if the beneficiary had not received any distribution from
the estate, in selling restricted shares in reliance on Rule 144
he would have to aggregate all sales of the decedent in reliance
23
on Rule 144 during the preceding six months.
Assume that A, the decedent, was a controlling person of the
ABC Corporation and his estate includes a substantial block of
restricted stock of ABC Corporation, and that the estate controls
ABC Corporation. If the estate sells restricted securities of ABC
the role of "investor protection" generally in the drafting of Rule
144, see Release 33-5223, under the caption "Explanation and Analysis
of the Rule."
118R. 144(d) (4) (G), (e) (3) (E). See also Release 33-5223, under the
caption "Holding Period."
119R. 144(d) (4) (G).
120 Id. (e) (3) (E).
121 Id.
1170n
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Corporation within six months of A's death, it must take into account any sales made by A during the preceding six-month
period. For apparent reasons, after six months has elapsed from
A's death there is no further possibility of aggregation. If B, A's
son, is an affiliate of ABC Corporation and the executor of the
estate but not a beneficiary and also holds restricted securities
of ABC Corporation, he does not have to take into account under
the attribution or aggregation rules any sales made by A during the preceding six months as he obviously, at the time of his
sales is not living with A. He must, however, take into account
in connection with his sales under Rule 144 the sales made by
the estate of restricted securities of ABC Corporation during the
preceding six months under the attribution rules. 124 Further, if
he were a beneficiary and the estate had distributed restricted
shares of ABC Corporation to him as a beneficiary and he resold
these shares under Rule 144, he would have to take into account
sales made by A during the preceding six months under the
aggregation rules. As noted above, under the aggregation rules,
he would also have to take into account if he were a beneficiary
of the estate all sales made by A during the preceding six months
even if the restricted shares sold by him were not those received from the estate and even though none had been dis125
tributed to him.
There may be some situations in which, by planning, the
extent to which Rule 144 can be utilized by an estate and the
beneficiaries may be maximized. Thus, if the estate distributes
some of the shares to beneficiaries, the estate and the individual
beneficiaries will each have separate one percent or other appropriate limitations, provided the attribution rules do not come
into play. The aggregation rules would be applicable to the
individual beneficaries to the extent each would have to take
into account sales made by the decedent during the prior six
months. However, absent application of the attribution rules,
the beneficiaries do not have to take into account the sales made
by each other or by the estate. In many instances, however, the
attribution rules will be applicable as some of the beneficiaries
may be executors, or be part of a related group with a 10 percent beneficial interest in the estate or may be within the
relationships to each other that result in attribution. 126 The
possible variations relating to attribution and aggregation as to
an estate are numerous. The "in concert" provisions conceivably
(a) (2) (B).
Id. (e) (3) (E).
126 Id. (a) (2).
124 Id.
125
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may be applicable if the estate and the beneficiaries attempt to
arrange their transactions so as to maximize the availability of
Rule 144.127 If the Rule 144 limits have been exhausted, an
estate may wish to consider offering shares under Regulation
A.1

28

6.

Sales by Pledgees

A pledgee selling restricted shares pledged as collateral or
shares pledged by an affiliate may be an underwriter.1 29 Rule
144 specifies the circumstances under which such pledged shares
may be resold without registration. 1' 0 Rule 144 distinguishes
between shares pledged with recourse and those pledged without recourse. It also assumes two applicable situations: one in
which the pledgee has sold to a private purchaser, and the
other in which upon foreclosure the securities are offered
publicly.
If the restricted shares (or other shares in the case of an
affiliate) are pledged with recourse and if the pledge is bona
fide, the pledgee (or the private purchaser) for purposes of
the holding period is deemed to have acquired the shares when
acquired by the pledgor. It should be observed that the pledge
must be bona fide; that is, presumably, with the intention to
repay and reasonable probability of repayment of the collateralized obligation."1 ' If not, presumably, the holding period would
be calculated as in the case of securities pledged without recourse as discussed below. Any sales under Rule 144 by the
pledgee or the private purchaser from the pledgee made within
two years of the default, must take into account prior sales by
the pledgor and by each other during the appropriate six-month
period for purposes of the quantitative limitations. 132 Thereafter, sales by the pledgee or the private purchaser can be
made under Rule 144 without regard to sales by the pledgor or
those made by each other except to the extent the attribution
rules are applicable which would seldom be the case. The
pledgor, until expiration of the two-year period referred to
Id. (e) (3) (F).
See discussion in H. BLOOMENTHAL § 5.05(2) (c).
129 Id. § 4.09(4).
130R. 144(d) (4) (D), (e) (3) (B).
131 Cf. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960).
132 R. 144(e) (3) (B). However, if the pledgee (or the private purchaser)
in reliance on Rule 144 sells the shares publicly in a brokerage transaction, the purchaser is free to resell the shares without restriction. If
the pledgee sells in a private transaction, the private purchaser in effect
steps into the pledgee's shoes in determining the application of Rule
144. See Valicenti, Leighton, Reid & Pine, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. NoAction Letter (March 28, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
78,761.
SEC. L. REP.
127

128
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above, must take into account sales made by his pledgee or the
purchaser from the pledgee; thereafter, he may sell securities
under Rule 144 without taking into account sales by the pledgee
or purchases from the pledge.'33
If the pledge is not bona fide or if the pledge is made without recourse, neither the pledgee nor the private purchaser can
tack on the pledgor's holding period.'1 3 4 In such event, the holding period for the pledgee commences from the date of the
pledge and for the private purchaser commences from the date
of his purchase from the pledgee. Accordingly, neither the
pledgee nor the private purchaser can sell the shares in reliance on Rule 144 for a period of two years from the date of
the appropriate event.1 35 Thereafter, each can sell in reliance
on Rule 144 without taking into account sales by the pledgor
except to the extent the attribution rules may be applicable,
which would seldom be the case.
7.

Sales by Organizations

A corporation, partnership, or other business entity holding
securities of an affiliated issuer or restricted securities of another issuer, can utilize Rule 144 for the purpose of selling such
securities. It must, of course, establish its own appropriate
holding period with respect to the securities in question. 'It
ordinarily does not have to take into account sales made by
others, although certain related persons owning a 10 percent
equity interest would have to take into account under the
attribution rules sales made by the organization in reliance on
Rule 144.136 However, conceivably, the corporation or other organization may own 10 percent or more of an equity interest
in an organization other than the issuer of the restricted securities which also owns restricted securities, in which event
sales by such organization during the appropriate six-month
period would have to be taken into account. 137 Assume, to illustrate, that A Corporation and B Corporation, A Corporation's
wholly owned subsidiary, acquire shares of XYZ Corporation in
a private placement. Assume that A owns in excess of 10 percent of the common stock of A Corporation and also owns
restricted shares in XYZ Corporation. If A were to sell restricted shares of XYZ Corporation in reliance on Rule 144,
133

134

R. 144 (e) (3) (B).

Id. (d) (4) (D).

Id.
136 Id. (a) (2) (C).
135
137

Id.
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he would have to take into account sales of restricted shares
of XYZ Corporation made during the prior six months by
both A Corporation and B Corporation as he owns of record
and beneficially 10 percent or more of the equity interest in
A Corporation and he owns beneficially 10 percent of the B
Corporation. If A Corporation sold shares of XYZ Corporation in
reliance on Rule 144, it would have to take into account prior
sales of B Corporation, but not of A during the appropriate sixmonth period. If B Corporation sold restricted shares of XYZ
Corporation in reliance on Rule 144, it would not have to take
into account prior sales by A or A Corporation.
K.

Technical Compliance and a Distribution
The Commission has cautioned as follows:

138

In view of the objectives and policies underlying the Act, the
rule shall not be available to any individual or entity with respect
to any transaction which, although in technical compliance with
the provisions of the rule, is part of a plan by such individual or
entity to distribute or redistribute securities to the public. In
such case registration is required.

Conceivably, this language (although not part of the rule
itself) could be the basis for retreating from the liberality of the
rule in the event those members of the Commission's staff
having reservations about the adoption of the rule in the present
form should dominate the regulatory scene at some future date.
It is often easier for the bureaucracy to change the ground rules
by interpretation than by amended rules. Although Rule 154
contained no limitation on utilizing it for sales within the confines of the rule within successive six-month periods, the staff
interpreted such practices as constituting a distribution beyond
the confines of the rule. 139 Presumably, the foregoing warning is
not directed at that situation as the same release specifically
states, "[T] he rule permits sales within successive 6-month
periods, but no accumulation would be permitted." 140 We have
noted that it is possible by making a series of gifts"' and creating a number of trusts142 for one to arrange in conformity
with Rule 144 for large blocks of unregistered securities to leak
into the market. Conceivably, this is the type of situation that
the Commission had in mind. In any event, it suggests that
138 Release 33-5223, under caption "Operation of the Rule."
13:See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.09(2) at n.182. Generally staff interpretations to date as reflected by no-action letters do not appear to be unduly
restrictive or to evidence an intention to frustrate the objectives of
Rule 144.

140Release 33-5223, under caption "Limitation on Amount of Securities
Sold."
141 See p. 329-31 infra.
142 See p. 331-34 infra.
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considerable caution be employed in attempting to plan the
utilization of Rule 144 on a large scale- as a means of avoiding

registration.
L. Manner of Sale
In the event reliance is placed on Rule 144, securities must
be sold in unsolicited brokerage transactions 143 which in this
context requires strict compliance with all of the following:
The broker engaged for the purpose of effectuating the
transaction must act as the agent of the seller who is
relying on Rule 144. The "broker" cannot purchase the
securities from the seller.
(2) The broker must be paid no more than the usual and
customary broker's commission. The seller must compensate no one other than the broker in connection with the
transaction.
(3) The seller must not solicit or arrange for the solicitation
of orders to buy the securities.
(4) The broker must not solicit or arrange for the solicitation
of orders to buy the security. This means, for example,
that the broker cannot call one of his customers and ask
him if he would be interested in buying the shares. It
also means that he must not engage in any market-making activities with respect to the class of security since
in that event he would be making offers (and soliciting
offers) through the medium of the sheets or NASDAQ or
otherwise. A provision in earlier versions of the proposed
rule would have allowed the broker to continue to insert
quotations in an interdealer quotation service. 144 These
provisions were deleted from the rule as adopted and a
Rule 144 transaction cannot be effectuated through a
broker who is also a market-maker with respect to the
145
security.
(5) As with Rule 154, the broker can, however, make inquiry
of other dealers who are market-makers. Under Rule
154, such inquiries could be directed only to dealers who
during the previous sixty days had made a written bid or
a written solicitation of an offer to sell the security.
Under Rule 144, such an inquiry can be made of a dealer
who has indicated interest in the securities within the
143 R. 144 (f) - (g).
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept.
144 Proposed R. 144(g) (2).
22, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,909.
145 R. 144(g) (2).
The Commission explained that to permit a marketmaker to effectuate Rule 144 transactions "would raise questions of conflict with the anti-manipulative provisions of Rule 10b-6 under the
Exchange Act and accordingly has been deleted." Release 33-5223,
under caption "Manner of Sale" at n.6. Since the text was written, the
staff has outlined a procedure under which the market-maker can withdraw from the market for a period (generally approximately 24 hours)
and effectuate a Rule 144 transaction. Kindel & Anderson, SEC Div.
Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (June 5, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,921. The Commission has also proposed amended Rule 144(g) (2)
which would permit a bona fide market-maker in the security to effectuate Rule 144 transactions as agent for a selling shareholder without
discontinuing its market-making activities. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5307 (Sept. 26, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 79,001.
(1)

RULE 144

(6)

preceding sixty days 14 6 which is broad enough to include
1 47
over
one who has placed quotations in the sheets,
14
NASDAQ 8 or contacted the executing broker orally
14 9
Unsolicited brokerage
concerning the same security.
transactions can normally be effectuated through an ex15 0
change with respect to a listed security.
Nothing in the foregoing precludes the broker from
soliciting the selling shareholder; that is, contacting him
5
and suggesting he may want to sell his shares.' '

In substance the typical Rule 144 transaction will be effectuated by the selling security holder contacting a broker-dealer
who does not make a market in the security 52 and placing a
brokerage order with him. Obviously, the selling security holder
should instruct the broker-dealer that the transaction must be
effectuated in accordance with Rule 144. The broker will then
contact a known market-maker in the security after assuring
himself that the market-maker has been in the sheets or otherwise made a market in the security during the past sixty days
and will sell the shares to the market-maker as agent for the
selling security holder. The broker will then confirm to the
selling security holder and charge him the usual brokerage commission. Alternatively, the broker could wait until someone (a
customer or other broker-dealer) contacted him offering to
purchase the security. In view of the improbability of this occurring on any sort of predictable basis, this method will ordinarily be used, if at all, only with respect to securities as to
which there is no real market-maker or market. Absent an active
market-maker in a security, it will be difficult to effectuate a
Rule 144 transaction which may be the case as to securities of
many unseasoned companies.
M.

Filing of Notice and Intention to Sell

If the selling security holder relying on Rule 144 does not
propose to sell in excess of 500 shares (or other units) and the
aggregate sale price does not exceed $10,000 during any period
of six months, there is no need to file a notice. 15 3 Conceivably,
46

R. 144(g) (2).
147 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 12.03(3).
148 See id. § 12.03(5).
149The executing broker may, for example, during the prior sixty days
have sold unrestricted securities to a dealer who indicated an interest
at that time in purchasing additional shares.
150 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 12.02.
151 The prohibited solicitation is a "solicitation of customers' orders to buy
the securities," not the solicitation of customers' orders to sell. R.
144 (g) (2).
1 2 For subsequent developments relating to market-makers, see note 145
supra.
15 3 R. 144 (h).
3
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one might not have to file such a notice at the time of his initial
sales, but, due to an increase in market price or a change of
intentions might have to file such a notice before the expiration
of an appropriate six-month period. Although the rule is not
explicit, a person probably has to take into account the attribution rules in determining whether the quantitative limits that
trigger the notice requirement are applicable.154 If the selling
security holder proposes to sell 500 or more shares (or other
units) or irrespective of the number of units the aggregate sale
price may exceed $10,000 during any six-month period, he must
concurrently with the placing of his order with the broker transmit to the Commission's principal office in Washington, D.C.
three copies of a "Notice of Proposed Sale" on Form 144 which
is to be signed (manually at least as to one copy) by the person
for whose account the securities are to be sold. 155
The notice on Form 14415" calls for information relating to
the issuer's IRS identification number and SEC file number
which ordinarily will have to be obtained from the issuer. It
also calls for the number of shares to be sold, aggregate market
value of the shares to be sold as of ten days prior to the filing,
and the approximate date on which the securities are to be sold.
He must include appropriate information relating to acquisition
and payment for the shares designed to establish his holding
period and he must include appropriate information as to all
securities sold during the past six months by himself, by persons whose sales are attributable to him, and by persons whose
sales are required to be aggregated with his sales. Finally, he
must represent that he does not know any material adverse
information relating to the issuer which has not been publicly
disclosed.
The person filing the notice must have a bona fide intention
to sell the securities covered by the notice within a reasonable
time. 57 In the event securities covered by the notice remain
unsold after ninety days, the selling security holder must file
an amended notice. 58 Presumably, the information set forth in
the amended notice would relate to proposed date of sale and
prior sales by the appropriate persons which could differ to a
degree from the original notice because of a new appropriate
six-month period. The rule is not explicit as to whether the
154

Id.

155 Id.

156 See Form 144, Release 33-5223.
157 R. 144 (i).
158 Id.
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filing of an amended notice requires a redetermination with
respect to a listed security of the average weekly reported
volume of trading which is measured by reference to the four
calendar weeks preceding the filing of the notice. 159 The staff
has taken the position that a new determination is not triggered
by the amended filing; the date of the initial filing controls the
volume determination for all shares sold during the succeeding
160
six months.
N.

Brokers' Compliance Responsibilities

A broker effectuating a Rule 144 transaction must, of course,
be able to identify the situation as one involving the application
of Rule 144. Presumably, in most instances the selling security
holder will bring this fact to the broker's attention. However,
the broker's responsibilities with respect to the sale of unregistered securities go beyond merely complying with Rule 144 after
a selling security holder has called his attention to the fact
that the shares are restricted or are being sold on behalf of an
affiliate. A broker has the responsibility of determining that
the securities he is selling can be sold without registration; if he
fails to exercise appropriate care in this regard, the broker
may be an underwriter and the sales made by him may be in
violation. For a broker to sell securities in violation of Section
5 not only subjects him to the usual sanctions, civil and criminal, but to disciplinary administrative proceedings within the
6
SEC, the consequences of which can be extremely serious.' '
The Commission insists that each broker-dealer adopt written supervisory procedures known to its salesmen sufficient to
assure prompt notice to supervisory officials that specific transactions in this context require scrutiny. 62 As part of this procedure, the broker-dealer in opening an account for new customers should insist that the account be opened by the cus159

Id.

Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter
(Mar. 26, 1972), SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 149:C-1 (APR. 14, 1972).
Since the text was written the staff has reversed itself in this regard.
The quantitative limit is determined at the time of the proposed sale
notwithstanding that it is within the six months succeeding the filing
cf Form 144. Thus, if an increase in trading volume would now permit
additional sales without exceeding the 1% limitation, the selling shareholder may by filing an amended Form 144 sell additional shares based
upon the average volume for the immediately preceding four weeks.
He would, of course, have to take into account the sales made during
the prior six months pursuant to the original Form 144 filing. SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5306, pt. VIII(A) (Sept. 26, 1972), CCH
79,000.
FED. SEC. L. REP.
161 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (1970).
162 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5168 (July 7, 1971), CCH FED. SEC. L.

160

REP.

22,760.
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tomer himself and not some third person. 163 The broker-dealer
must also, through routine inquiry of the selling customer, de1 64
termine the following:
Whether the customer has direct or indirect connections with
any publicly owned company or with the issuer, what his
financial condition is, whether the customer's securities were
acquired on the open market, whether he is the true beneficial
owner of them, whether he is currently selling or attempting
to sell the same securities through other brokerage houses,
and whether he has non-public information about the issuer.

The broker-dealer cannot rely on the fact that the certificate
delivered does not include a restrictive legend. 65 The issuer
may have failed to place an appropriate legend on the certificate
or, in the case of a controlling person, the stock may have been
purchased in the open market and held by him in street name.
The amount of inquiry necessary depends upon the circumstances. The sale of a modest amount of a widely traded security by a customer known to the dealer whose lack of relationship to the issuer is well known to the dealer "may ordinarily proceed with considerable confidence."' 1 66 However, securities of relatively obscure and unseasoned companies which
appear in substantial blocks are particularly suspect. 67 The
sudden appearance of optimistic information relating to the
issuer from management in these and other situations as well
as a change in control of management may be circumstances
68
suggesting careful scrutiny before handling a transaction.
A minimal determination that a broker-dealer can always
make is whether the issuer has made a registered or Regulation
A offering. If it has not, obviously reliance is being placed on an
exemption from registration. However, the fact of a prior registered or Regulation A offering does not preclude the possibility
that the specific securities were issued in an exempt transaction or are being offered by an affiliate. The Commission insists with respect to sales by possible affiliates that a brokerdealer is not justified in relying on an opinion of seller's counsel
that no control relationship exists. The dealer must make his
own investigation to determine who his seller is and whether a
control relationship exists.1 69
163

Id.

164 Id.
165 Id.

166 Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6721 (Feb. 2, 1962), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 22,755.
167 Id.
168 Id. 22,756.
169 Id.
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If the broker-dealer fails to determine that he is selling restricted securities or securities for an affiliate, he inevitably will
have violated the registration provisions. 170 Assuming that he
has made such a determination and the transaction is to be
handled in conformity with Rule 144, the broker has further
responsibilities if his participation in the transaction is to be
exempt. Presumably, these responsibilities become applicable
only if the securities are not sold in conformity with Rule 144;
if the Rule 144 exemption is available to the selling security
holder, the inquiry obligations of the broker would not normally come into play. However, it is nonetheless essential that
the broker establish compliance procedures to discharge the
responsibilities imposed upon him under the rule. In that event,
if Rule 144 is not available to the selling security holder, the
17 1
broker's transaction exemption will be available to the broker.
The broker's responsibilities in this regard are to take reasonable
steps to assure that Rule 144 is applicable to the proposed transaction. In this regard the broker is charged with knowledge of
the information included in the Notice of Proposed Sales and
the Commission suggests that the broker obtain a copy of such
notice and retain it in his files. As a minimum, the rule requires
1 72
the broker to inquire concerning the following:
(1)

The length of time the securities to be sold have been
held by the person selling them.
(2) If practicable, the dealer should make a physical inspection of the securities. Presumably, he could rely on the
date of issuance as shown, but as noted above he cannot
rely on the fact the certificate contains no legend.
(3) The nature of the transaction in which the securities were
acquired.
(4) The amount of securities of the same class sold during
the prior six months by the appropriate persons. The appropriate persons for this purpose include not only the
selling security holder, but all persons whose sales are
attributed to him and all sales which must otherwise be
aggregated with his sales.1 73 To satisfy this requirement a
broker-dealer will have to have someone knowledgeable
in the intricacies of the rule review each Rule 144 transaction and in many instances interrogate the selling
security holder.
(5) Whether the selling security holder has solicited or arranged for solicitation of orders or made any payment to
any other person in connection with the proposed transaction.
(6) Whether the selling security holder intends to sell addi170

See H. BlooMENTHAL

§

4.08.

U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1964); R. 144(g).
172R. 144(g) (3) and notes thereto.
173 See Form 144, Instruction.

17115
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tional securities of the same class through any other
means.
The number of outstanding shares (or other unit) and
the relevant trading volume.

In view of the extensive compliance burden imposed on
brokers, it is probable that many brokers will refuse to handle
Rule 144 transactions at least as to orders below a specified
amount. In such event, the utility of Rule 144 will be significantly reduced for its effectiveness from the standpoint of the
selling security holder depends upon both an active market in
the security and the willingness of brokers to effectuate Rule
144 transactions. In all probability, most dealers will require that
the selling security holder furnish the dealer with an opinion
of counsel covering many of the items listed above.
0.

Issuers' Responsibilities

The issuer has policing and disclosure requirements in connection with the issuance of restricted securities which are
discussed at section IV. A. In the past, through the use of appropriate legends on certificates and stop transfers orders to
the transfer agent, responsible issuers have attempted to assure
that shares issued in reliance on the private-placement exemption were not resold in violation. This is not without risk to the
issuer since the issuer may be exposed to liability if it improperly issues orders to the transfer agent to refuse to transfer the shares in question.' 1 4 The typical legend requires that securities be registered or an exemption be available prior to their
resale and has attempted to vest considerable authority in counsel for the corporation to determine whether or not an exemption is available. In many instances in the past, counsel would
insist on a no-action letter from the staff before allowing restricted shares to be transferred in reliance on an exemption.
The staff has made it clear that although the means employed
for this purpose are to be determined by the issuer, it remains
responsible for assuring that shares resold in reliance on Rule
144 are actually sold in compliance with the provisions of Rule
144.17- This places responsibility on the issuer not unlike those
COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-401; H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 177 (1970). Cf. Kanton v. U.S. Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J.
1965). In the few jurisdictions that may not have adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code, the transfer agent may avoid liability if it acts pursuant to the instructions of its principal (the issuer). See Hulse v.
Consolidated Quicksilver Mining Corp., 65 Idaho 768, 154 P.2d 149 (1944).
However, Section 8-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code expressly
refuses to follow this line of cases and imposes liability on the transfer
agent as well as the issuer for a wrongful refusal to transfer.
175 Otterbourg, Steindler, Housten & Rosen, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action
Letter (Apr. 19, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
78,754.
REP.

174 UNIFORM
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described in this context with respect to a broker-dealer in the
immediately preceding subsection. As a minimum, it would appear that the issuer should insist prior to authorizing the transfer of restricted securities in reliance on Rule 144 that a copy
of Form 144 be filed with the issuer. In addition, an issuer will
probably also insist that the selling shareholder furnish the issuer with an appropriate opinion of counsel that Rule 144 was
available in connection with the sale. Presumably, this would
be the same opinion that counsel furnished to the broker if such
an opinion was, in fact, furnished. The issuer will probably want
to have such opinions reviewed by its own counsel and would
ordinarily insist that it include sufficient information from
which it could be determined whether the aggregation and/or
attribution rules come into play. The procedure established in
this regard may create some problems in terms of assuring
delivery of certificates without a legend within the settlement
date.
P. Rule 10b-6 and Rule 144
SEC v. Jaffee & Co. 17 6 severely restricts the extent to which
a secondary distribution can be effectuated other than through
the usual syndicated underwriting arrangement. If a distribution
is involved, Rule 10b-61 77 precludes any market-maker from participating in a distribution. Since Rule 144 is predicated on the
assumption that the shares will be purchased in most instances
from the executing broker by the market-maker, the implications of Jaffee would suggest that such purchases violate Rule
10b-6 if a Rule 144 transaction is deemed to involve a distribution. However, the basic rationale of Rule 144 is that if securities
are sold in compliance with the rule then the persons are deemed
not to be engaged in a distribution and therefore are not underwriters. 17' Accordingly, it would appear that Rule 10b-6 has
no application to such transactions. However, the term "distribution" is used in a variety of contexts under the federal securities laws and not necessarily always with the same meaning.
It is, therefore, conceivable that the staff might take the view
that such transactions, while not a distribution for the purpose
of defining an underwriter, may be a distribution for Rule 10b-6
purposes. It is not believed that the staff is likley to do so since
176446 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1971). Discussed at length in H. BLOOMENTHAL
§ 6.17.
177 Rule 10b-6 is discussed at H. BLOOMENTHAL § 6.15.
However, the same was essentially true with respect to
17 R. 144(b)
Rule 154, but the Commission, nonetheless, cautioned that a Rule 154
4.09(2)
transaction could violate Rule lOb-6. See H. BLOOMENTHAL
n.177.
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in conjunction with Jaffee it would severely restrict the application of Rule 144 and all indications are that the Commission
intends the rule to operate fully within the confines of its own
limitation.
Investment Intent After Rule 144; Is Rule 144 Exclusive?
The Commission has put all persons on notice that in connection with restricted securities issued after April 15, 1972, the
"change in circumstances" concept will no longer be deemed an
appropriate factor in applying the term "underwriter.' 1 79 However, with respect to the resale of restricted securities acquired
before April 15, 1972, by a noncontrolling person, the Commission
will continue to take the "change in circumstances" concept into
account in determining whether such persons are statutory underwriters should they choose to sell such securities other than
in conformity with Rule 144. The Commission's staff will continue to issue no-action letters in the limited situation in which
a noncontrolling person proposes to sell restricted securities
acquired prior to April 15, 1972. The staff will not issue no-action
letters with respect to securities acquired after April 15, 1972,
but will issue interpretative letters to assist persons in comply80
ing with the new rule.1
Q.

The Commission has avoided any argument as to whether it
has authority to make Rule 144 the exclusive means through
which restricted securities can be sold without registration or
compliance with Regulation A or Section 4(2) by stating that
"the rule as adopted is not exclusive."'' 1 One suspects, nonetheless, for most, if not all, purposes it is exclusive. The same release states that in determining whether one reselling restricted
securities outside of the rule is an underwriter, the Commission
will take into account the length of time the securities have been
held but holding "for a particular period of time does not by
itself establish the availability of an exemption from registration. 1' 8 2 Further, the Commission has stated that the definitive
As to nonaffiliates, it may be preferable to rely on old notions of investment intent
if the shares were issued prior to April 15, 1972. This would be true
with respect to (1) shares of nonqualified companies, (2) in instances
in which it is difficult market-wise to effectuate Rule 144 transactions,
and (3) in instances in which the proceeds realized from transactions
effectuated within the limitations of Rule 144 will be relatively small.
To the extent reliance can be placed on the old doctrines, it may be
that a three-year holding period will be sufficient to establish investment intent. See H. BLOOMENTRAL § 4.08(2) (d) n.155 & § 4.10(3)
n.219. However, one suspects that the staff may in addition require a
demonstration of changed circumstances in this context.
18ORelease 33-5223, under caption "Operation of the Rule."
1'1 Id., at introductory general explanation.
182 Id.
179Release 33-5223, at introductory general explanation.
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two-year holding period provided in the rule "may be relied
on only in connection with sales made pursuant to the rule."'183
The fact that Rule 237 was adopted to permit resales under limited circumstances outside of the rule for securities held for
five years, as discussed at section III infra, suggests that holding for a five-year period does not in itself establish that the
securities were not acquired with a view to distribution. Further, although an estate which is not itself an affiliate can sell
restricted securities without regard to holding period or the
quantitative limitations under Rule 144, it must nonetheless
comply with the other provisions of Rule 144, suggesting that
holding the securities until death does not establish that securities were not acquired with a view to distribution. If holding securities for five years and/or until death does not establish that
securities were not acquired with a view to distribution, and if
changed circumstances are not to be taken into account for
this purpose, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which
one would not be an underwriter if he sold restricted shares
outside of the confines of Rule 144 or Rule 237.
The Commission's views in this regard are undoubtedly to
be respected by counsel and can be expected to be persuasive
with the courts. However, by shifting (quite appropriately)
emphasis to the need for investor protection which, in the Commission's view, continues irrespective of how long the securities
have been held, l s 4 and refusing to recognize changed circumstances as a factor, the language "with a view to distribution"
(emphasis added) in the definition of the term "underwriter"
is disregarded. The words "with a view to" appear to require
something more than an awareness that at some future date
under some unforeseen circumstances the investor may sell
the shares in question. The language of the street with reference to investment stock - "one has to marry it" - suggests
an appropriate analogy. One acquires a wife with the awareness
that divorce is possible; however, under such circumstances one
has not acquired a wife with a view to divorce.
The context in which counsel may be tempted to raise the
issue if shares have been held for a long period of time and/or
to death or in which there has been a bona fide change in circumstances (terminal illness, for example) will involve situa183 Id., under caption "Holding Period."
184

"The public has the same need for protection afforded by registration
whether the securities are distributed shortly after their purchase or
after a considerable length of time." Id., under caption "Explanation

and Analysis of the Rule."
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tions in which Rule 144 is unavailable because the issuer is not
a qualified company; or it is unavailable because the other persons attributable to the client have exhausted its limits; or it
is realistically unavailable because the market in the security
lacks sufficient depth; or because of the low price at which the
stock sells the amount that can be realized under the quantitative limitations is insignificant. In this context, rather than
meeting the Commission's postion head-on, counsel might argue
that the Commission has said that Rule 144 is not exclusive;
the securities have been held for a long period of time which is
conceded to be a factor and the securities are being sold in
relatively small amounts without special selling efforts if such
1 85
arguments are appropriate.

III. THE RULE 237 ALTERNATIVE
The Commission contemporaneously with the adoption of
Rule 144 liberalized Regulation A in certain respects 8 6 and
adopted Rule 237 as a conditional exemption from registration.'8 7
While Section 237 is available with respect to qualified issuers
as well, it appears to have been adopted for the primary purpose of allowing limited amounts of securities of nonqualified
issuers to be disposed of under limited circumstances without
registration or compliance with the conditions of Regulation A.
It is of very limited operation since it is applicable only to
transactions not involving a broker-dealer. 18 Accordingly, sales
would have to be made on a negotiated face-to-face basis although there is nothing in the rule that precludes advertising
for or otherwise soliciting the purchaser. Conceivably a commission could be paid to an agent finding a purchaser, if that
agent is not a broker-dealer, as the definition of a broker-dealer
depends upon whether one is engaged in the business of acting
as such. 18 9 However, for the most part sales under Rule 237 will
be made to friends, relatives, associates, and the like. Rule 237
185 Cf. WHEAT REPoRT at 156.
8
1 6 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 5.05(2).
187 Discussed in detail at id. § 5.13 (2).
188 For the Commission's announcement

189

and explanation of Rule 237, see
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5224 (Jan. 10, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 78,484. Rule 237 will be 17 C.F.R. §
230.237 and is hereinafter referred to by its rule rather than its code
designation. The rule conditions the availability of the exemption on the
securities being "bona fide sold in negotiated transactions otherwise
than through a broker or dealer." R. 237(a) (4). However, assuming
that the shares are sold in a bona fide negotiated transaction not involving a broker-dealer, the purchaser can resell the shares through a
broker-dealer in an open-market transaction. See Otterbourg, Steindler, Housten & Rosen, SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Apr. 19,
1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,754.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (1970).
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purchasers, provided they are not mere conduits, may resell
the securities without restriction through normal market channels. 190
In order for Rule 237 to be available, the issuer must be a
corporation organized in the United States with its principal
business operations in the United States. It must be and have
been during the past five years a going concern.'" The restricted
securities must be offered by someone other than an issuer or
an affiliate (controlling person) of the issuer, although restricted
securities acquired from an affiliate could be offered if the
required holding period has been met. The exemption is also
available for securities which were acquired from an issuer in
an intrastate offering.' 9 2 The selling security holder must have
paid for and held the securities for a period of five years without
any provision for tacking. 19 3 Payment is defined as it is with
respect to securities being sold in reliance on Rule 144.'"9 The
amount of securities that can be sold under Rule 237 during
any twelve month period is one percent of the outstanding securities of the same class or $50,000 in aggregate gross proceeds,
whichever is the lesser. Such amount must be reduced by the
amount of any securities sold during such year by the selling
security holder under a conditional exemption (usually Regulation A) and the amount of securities of the same class sold
by the selling security holder in reliance on Rule 144.195 In
determining securities sold for this purpose, the same attribution
7
rules as those applicable to Rule 1441"" and Regulation A''
must be taken into account.'9 8 The selling security holder must
file with the regional office of the Commission in which the issuer's principal business operations are conducted three copies
of a notice on Form 237 signed by the selling security holder and
must also send a copy of such notice at the same time to the
issuer. 199 The notice must be on file at least ten days (exclud20 0
ing Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) prior to any sales.
19 0 R. 237 (a) (2).
191 Id.

192 hls follows from the fact that unlike Rule 144 it is not limited to "restricted securities," but is applicable to any securities of an appropriate
issuer held for the required holding period. R. 237(a).
193 R. 237(a) (3).
194 Id. See p. 315 & notes 57-58 supra.
195R. 237 (b).
196 For discussion of the Rule 144 counterpart see p. 321-23 supra.
197 For discussion of the Regulation A counterpart see H. BLOOMENTHAL §

5.05(2) (d).
198

R. 237 (d).

199 Id. (c).
200

Id.
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If the issuer of the securities is a qualified issuer and, hence,
Rule 144 is available, the selling security holder would normally
rely on Rule 144. If the selling security holder is not an affiliate
and he has held the securities for five years, there may be some
situations in which he would rely on Rule 237. If, for example,
there is no real market in the issuer's securities and, hence, it is
necessary to solicit prospective purchasers, Rule 144 is not a
realistic alternative. Under such circumstances, he may rely on
Rule 237 so as to negotiate sales without the assistance of a
broker-dealer by soliciting friends, associates, and others. This
may be preferable to attempting to sell the securities in reliance
on Section 4(2) which would require that the purchasers meet
the Ralston Purina criteria and would start a new holding period
running. 20 1 In other situations, it may be possible to effectuate
some sales through Rule 144, but not up to the quantitative limit.
In such event, after completing the Rule 144 sales the selling
security holder might supplement them with sales under Rule
237. However, in that event, he would have to take into account
his prior sales under Rule 144 if made within the appropriate
one-year period in determining the extent to which he can sell
securities under the quantitative limitations of Rule 237.
IV. ExEwnyrv TRANSACTIONS AFrER RuLE 144
A. Private Offerings of Nonconvertible Securities
There is nothing in Rule 144 that changes the basic requirement of the nonpublic-offering exemption in regard to the
20 2
necessity that all offerees meet the Ralston Purina criteria.
William J. Casey, Chairman of the Commission, has promised
that the Commission, having changed the underwriter concept
from one of theology to one of mathematics, will in the immediate future attempt to provide ascertainable standards for private offerings, although he cautioned that essentially those seeking venture capital without registration can expect to have to
continue to look primarily, if not exclusively, to those who have
20 3
the sophistication and financial capability to assume the risk.
The private-offering exemption is of significance to an issuer
in four different contexts:
201 See p. 316 & note 63 supra.
202 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.05 for discussion of the private-offering exemption. Rule 144 is premised on the assumption that the shares with

203

respect to which the rule functions were acquired in reliance on the
exemption. See p. 307 supra.
Speech of William J. Casey before the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, exerpts from which are quoted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
149:A-16 (Apr. 26, 1972). See also Speech of Commissioner Hugh F.
Owens befcre Annual Meeting of District No. 4, National Association of
Securities Dealers, reproduced in SEC. REa. & L. REP. No. 152: G-1 (May
17, 1972).

A rule, if adopted, apparently will be Rule 146.
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

In the situation in which the issuer is utilizing the exemption as an alternative to registration or Regulation A. In
this context, typically the offering will have to be confined to institutional investors if there is to be reasonable
204
assurance of the availability of an exemption.
Situations in which the issuer in an isolated transaction
is offering stock in exchange for a property or other
assets.
Situations in which the issuer is attempting to utilize the
private-offering exemption as a means of obtaining preliminary or "seed" money, but ultimately expects to make
a registered or Regulation A offering.
Situations in which the issuer is attempting to acquire a
close corporation or other closely held
business by ex205
changing its stock for stock or assets.

Rule 144 facilitates all of the situations in which reliance is
being placed upon the private-offering exemption in that it
permits assurance to be given to the purchasers of circumstances
under which they can sell the securities they acquire from the
issuer. It does not, however, assure the availability of the exemption; in addition to compliance with the Ralston Purina criteria,
the issuer must take into account the fact that the integration
concept discussed at section IV, D below may affect the availability of the exemption particularly with respect to preliminary
financing. The Commission has reiterated its strong suggestion
that issuers use an appropriate legend 20 6 on stock certificates
issued in reliance on the private-offering exemption and give
appropriate instructions to its transfer agent as a policing device. 20 7 It has also given notice that persons acquiring shares
2 04

See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.05(6)-(9).
The business combination situation is discussed at id. § 4.15.
206 For a specimen legend, see H., BLOOMENTHAL § 4.09, penultimate paragraph of specimen escrow agreement. For cases giving effect to such
restrictions, see Short v. Soil Builders Int'l Corp., [1957-1961 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962); General
Dev. Corp. v. Catlin, 139 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). In Prudential Petroleum Corp. v. Rauscher, Pierce & Co., 281 S.W.2d 457
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955), the court refused to give effect to an investment
restriction because it was not on the face of the stock certificate as required by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. In Altman v. American
Foods, Inc., 138 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. 1964), the court permitted an employee
to rescind his exercise of a stock option upon the insistence of the
corporation that the stock certificate include an "investment legend."
See also Kanton v. U.S. Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965).
The noted cases demonstrate some reluctance to implement legends as a
policing device in this context. However, all of the cases referred to
were prior to the adoption of Rule 144 and reflect in part the same type
of concern as that expressed by the Commission (see p. 254 at note 210
infra) concerning awareness of the purchasers of the restricted nature
of the securities and dissatisfaction with the subjective criteria applicable prior to the adoption of Rule 144.
207 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972). [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 78,483. See also SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,943.
205
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from an issuer (or an affiliate), if they desire to distribute them,
should obtain a contractual commitment from the issuer to
voluntarily register under the Exchange Act and become a
208
reporting company.
Contemporaneously with the announcement of the adoption
of Rule 144, the Commission has announced that it will regard
it as a deceptive act or practice (and hence subject to the antifraud provisions) for the issuer or a controlling person or any
other person selling unregistered securities in a private transaction to fail to inform the purchaser as to the applicable
limitations upon the resale of the securities by the purchaser. 0 9
21 0
The Commission stated in this regard as follows:
The seller should inform the purchaser that the securities
are unregistered and must be held indefinitely unless they
are subsequently registered under the Securities Act or an
exemption from such registration is available. It should be
pointed out that any routine sales of securities made in reliance on Rule 144 can be made only in limited amounts in
accordance with the terms and conditions of that rule and that
in the case of securities to which that rule is not applicable
compliance with Regulation A or some other disclosure exemption will be required.

If the issuer has no contractual obligation to register the
securities or comply with Regulation A, it will be regarded as
a deceptive practice to fail to make that fact clear to the issuer. 211 If the issuer represents that it will register the securities
or cover them with a Regulation A filing, it must inform the
purchaser "specifically as to the time when and the circumstances under which such attempt to register will be made or
compliance with such exemption will be effected. ' 212 The issuer
should inform the purchaser that a legend will be placed on
his certificate upon issuance and that a stop transfer order
pertaining to the certificate will be issued to the transfer agent
if such is to be the case. 213 The issuer should also advise the
208

SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 10, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

78,487.

SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,483.
21 0 Id.
209

211

Id.

Id.
Such contractual commitment should be undertaken only with
awareness of its implications. Failure to timely comply with a contractual commitment can result in a substantial liability being imposed
on the issuer. See Kupferman v. Consolidated Research & Mfg. Corp.
[1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. S.c. L. REP.
91,197 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). In any event, the issuer should carefully limit its obligations in
this respect by controlling the timing of the filing of the registration
statement and the number of instances under which it becomes obligated
to file same. On problems related to timing the filing of a registration statement, see H. BLOOMENTHAL § 7.07.
213 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,483.
212
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purchaser as to whether it will furnish the purchaser with information needed in order to make routine sales under Rule
144.214

B.

Section 3(a) (9) Exemption, Convertible Securities, and
Private Offerings

Section 3 (a) (9) of the Securities Act of 1933 exempts certain
voluntary exchanges with the issuer's own security holders.215
As to offers made pursuant to 3(a) (9) generally, Rule 144 probably will have little impact. If the offering is essentially a public
offering, the Commission will probably apply the double-standard version of the definition of "underwriter '216 so that securities acquired can be freely resold by nonaffiliated persons. If
recipients are a small group so that essentially the 3(a) (9)
offering is a private placement, the Commission may, as in the
case of business combinations, treat it as a private placement
which brings Rule 144 into play. This is the distinction that was
made under the old Rule 155 as to convertible securities issued
in reliance on the Section 3(a) (9) exemption. 21 An affiliate
receiving securities in an exempt transaction under Section
3(a) (9) could rely on Rule 144 in connection with the resale of
the securities. Whether such securities are restricted securities
and, hence, whether they must be held for two years prior to
resale would appear to depend upon whether the offering is
essentially a private or public one. The integration concept discussed at section IV, D infra may affect the availability of the
Section 3(a) (9) exemption.
Convertible securities issued in a private placement are subject to Rule 144 whether issued before or subsequent to April 15,
1972.218 Rule 155 is retained for the limited purpose of requiring
registration of convertible debentures issued prior to April 15,
1972, if they are offered publicly and Rule 144 is not complied
with. 219 As to convertible securities, the holding period under
Rule 144 is the date of acquisition (and payment) for the convertible security both with respect to the convertible security
itself and the security underlying the conversion right in the
event converted. This is a significant change which may encourage the use of convertible debt, but is consistent with the
relaxation of the Rule 155 requirement which generally precluded
214 Id.
215 Noted at H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.06.

218

Discussed at id. § 4.08(2).
Proposed Rule 155 Revised, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4248 (July
14, 1960), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SFC. L. Rzp. 76,710.
See p. 306 & note 19 supra.

219

Id.

216
217
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public sale of convertibles without registration. 220 Rule 144, on
the other hand, treats privately placed convertible securities on
the same basis as other privately placed securities and regards
for most purposes the security received upon conversion as
221
standing in the same place as the convertible security itself.
Determination of the quantitative limitations poses some
special problems with respect to convertible securities. 222 If
during the appropriate six-month period only the convertible
security is sold, the limitation would be based on the amount
(percent of outstanding or relevant trading volume) of the
outstanding class of convertible securities. If the security is
converted and only the converted security is sold, the limitation
would be based upon the amount of the class of security into
which the security is convertible. One cannot, however, sell
up to the relevant limits treating the convertible and underlying
securities as two separate classes during the same six-month
period. This much appears clear. Beyond this, the rule as drafted
is ambiguous. Under a literal construction, if both convertible
securities and the securities into which convertible securities
are sold during the same six-month period, the amount of the
convertible securities sold are deemed to be the number of
shares (or other units) of the class into which they are convertible and the quantitative limits are based upon that class.
The rule, however, is not explicit as to whether the class
outstanding is increased for this purpose by the number of
shares underlying all outstanding conversion rights. In either
event, since the class of securities into which convertible
is often larger, by converting the restricted convertible securities as to even a few shares and selling such securities,
the selling security holder could effectively increase the quantitative limitations. Another (and in the light of the purpose of the provision, perhaps, more reasonable) reading of
this provision would be to impose a dual test and also determine whether the convertible securities sold exceed the
quantitative limit viewing the convertible security as a separate
class for this purpose.223 It is even conceivable that the con220See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.10(5).
221 R. 144 (d) (4) (B).
222 See S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
223

AND

RESTRICTED

SECURITIES

§

8.6[c] [1].
Since the text was written the staff has taken the position that the conversion of debentures into a few of
for the purpose of enlarging the
that can be sold under Rule 144, is
limitations and is not permissible

the underlying shares, which are sold
amount of the convertible security
a plan to circumvent the quantitative
under the Rule. SEC Securities Act

Release No. 5306, pt. VIII(c) (Sept. 26, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,000.
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version itself might be deemed a sale of the convertible security. 224 The foregoing problems arise not only in the context
of the selling shareholder selling both the convertible securities
and the securities into which convertible during the same sixmonth period, but also in combining sales made by such persons and others under the attribution and aggregation rules. 22 ,
The complexities of the problem do not appear to have been
thought out in drafting this provision.
Intrastate Offerings
The Commission has always talked in terms of the necessity
for securities issued in reliance on the intrastate-offering
exemption 226 to be found only in the hands of investors resident
of the single appropriate state upon completion of the distribution.227 Technically this is another way of saying that those
who purchase the securities must not be underwriters except
for the limited purpose of reselling to other residents of the
single appropriate state. The Commission has cautioned dealers
that to commence making a market in a security offered in reliance on the intrastate exemption shortly after the completion of the offering is virtually certain (particularly with respect to a "hot issue") 228 to destroy the availability of the
229
exemption.
Securities issued in reliance on the intrastate exemption are
not restricted securities and purchasers could not utilize Rule
144 in connection with their resale.2 3 0 An affiliate of such an
issuer having acquired his shares in reliance on the privateoffering exemption, conceivably could, after holding the shares
for the prescribed period, resell his shares in reliance on Rule
144.231 To do so he would have to avoid integration of his shares
C.

224 Compare with this the § 16(b) situation discussed at H. BLOOMENTHAL

228

§ 10.08.
See p. 321-26 supra.
For an extensive discussion of the intrastate-offering exemption, see
H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.04.
See id. § 4.08(2) (b) n.146.
For discussion of hot issues generally, see id. § 6.16.

229

Ruling on Intrastate Exemption, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4386

225
226
227

(July 12, 1961), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
T 76,774.
230This follows from the definition of restricted securities as securities
issued in transactions not involving a public offering. R. 144(a) (3).
See p. 311 supra.
231 While Rule 144(b) provides that a broker selling any securities of an
affiliate in compliance with the conditions of the rule is not an "underwriter," if the affiliate acquired the securities from the issuer and failed
to hold them for the required period, he would be an underwriter
with respect to the resale of the shares irrespective of the fact that
they were otherwise sold in conformity with the provisions of Rule 144.

See p. 308 at note 25 supra.
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with the public intrastate offering;232 in such event, he could
be in a better position than the public purchaser in this context.
All of the foregoing raises a question as to whether the Commission's new interpretation of the term "underwriter," as
3
espoused in conjunction with the adoption of Rule 144,23 will
be applied in the context of an intrastate offering. In the event
it is so applied, it will have the effect of indefinitely restricting
the trading market in such securities to the state in which
initially offered. While it remains to be seen as to what attitude the Commission will take in this context, one suspects
that as to companies concerning which Rule 15c2-11 information is available, 234 the coming-to-rest concept and the term
"underwriter" in this context will be construed in a manner to
permit the resale of shares acquired by members of the public
in an intrastate offering after a respectable interval of, for
example, one or two years. Certainly in the past, shares issued
pursuant to the intrastate-offering exemption have made their
way into the interstate market; in some instances, fairly rapidly
and probably in violation of the Securities Act, but in other
instances they have gradually seeped into the interstate trading
markets over a period of years. The Commission has, however,
established a basis for narrowly restricting trading in securities
offered in reliance on the intrastate exemption if it chooses
to do so. In limited situations such shares, if held for five years,
could be reoffered pursuant to Rule 237 which, unlike Rule 144,
is not restricted to shares issued in reliance on the private-offer23 5
ing exemption.
If reliance is being placed on the intrastate exemption, the
integration concept discussed in the following section must also
be taken into account.
D.

The Integration Concept
In a number of situations it becomes important to determine
whether securities are to be viewed as part of the same single
issue (offering); in the event they are so viewed, they are said to
be integrated. This question arises in the context of the privateoffering exemption since an issuer cannot separate portions of
the same issue into transactions exempt under the private-offering exemption and other portions either not exempt or exempt
232

233
234

235

See p. 361 & notes 351-52 infra. If the securities are integrated, they
have been sold in a public offering and are not restricted securities
under Rule 144(a) (3).
See p. 307-08 supra.

See p. 310-11 & notes 37-40 supra.
See p. 350-52 supra.
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under another exemption. 20" Thus, two exemptions (e.g., private
offering and intrastate offering) cannot be combined in this
context, and the issuer cannot avoid liability for the private
portion of an offering if the securities are part of a single issue
which overall constitutes a public offering. 237 The question of
integration arises in conjunction with the availability of the intrastate offering exemption in several situations. If the promoters include nonresidents, there is a question as to whether
their shares are to be integrated with the general public offering to residents and thereby destroy the availability of the
exemption.2 38 If an offeror is unable to successfully complete
an intrastate offering, to now offer securities publicly pursuant
to a registration statement may result in integrating the public
offering with the prior intrastate offering and destroy the availability of the intrastate exemption. 23 9 An issuer having failed
to comply with the intrastate exemption because of a sale to a
single nonresident may find that integration precludes him from
continuing the offering to residents, since if integrated with the
prior offering the exemption will not be available for the subsequent sales.2 40 An issuer relying on the intrastate-offering
exemption for the purpose of preliminary financing may destroy
the availability of the exemption by its subsequent public financing even if the latter offering is registered because of the
integration doctrine. 241 A Section 3(a)(9) exemption for certain
242
is
voluntary exchanges with the issuer's own security holders
also dependent upon the offering being exclusively in exchange
with its own security holders. Thus, if the issuer offers securities
for cash pursuant to a private-offering exemption or even if
the securities are registered, if they are deemed to be part of
the same issue offered in the exchange, the Section 3(a) (9) ex236

"It has been and is the Commission's position that an issuer or an underwriter may not separate parts of a series of related transactions comprising an issue of securities and thereby seek to esablish that a particular part is a private transaction if the whole involves a public offering
of the securities .... ." Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities
Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC.

L.

REP. 11

76,539.

Id.; Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436 (1958).
238 See Peoples Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960); Founders Preferred Life Ins.
Co., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (June 16, 1971), SEC. REG.
& L. REP. No. 106:C-1.
239 See Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958); Presidential Realty
Corp., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1971), [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,066.
240 See (Hillsborough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
241 Cameron Indus., Inc., SEC Securities Act Release No. 1459 (Nov. 1959).
Cf. Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958).
242 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.06; p. 355-57 supra.
237
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emption is not available for the exchange. 243 There are also potential integration problems with respect to the quantitative
limits of the Regulation A exemption, but these are provided
for by rules which resolve most potential integration issues in
244
this context.
The Commission has said that the question of integration is
one of fact to be determined by all of the surrounding circumstances.2 45 This means there are no objective standards for determining whether securities are part of the same single issue.
Although it appears to be a mixed question of fact and law
involving the application of general standards to usually acknowledged facts, some courts have viewed the issue as a disputed issue of fact precluding summary judgment. 246 The general criteria that the Commission has established as being appropriate for determining the issue of integration are as follows: 247
(1)

The fact that the secuities are of the same class tends to
suggest that the securities are part of the same single
issue.
(2) The fact that the securities are offered for the same purpurpose tends to indicate a single issue.
(3) The fact that the securities are offered on the same general terms tends to indicate a single issue. Offering securities at different prices is not offering them on different
248
terms.
(4) The fact that the securities are being offered in an uninterrupted program of financing suggests a single issue.
A general plan and/or uninterrupted program of financing may exist despite the fact there has been a lapse of
249
time between "offerings.
(5) Offerings to promoters are less likely to be integrated. 25 0

Viewed from the standpoint of avoiding integration, the
principal considerations are to separate the offerings in terms
243 Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 2029 (Aug. 8,1939), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2140.
244 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 5.09 nn.124-31. But see Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C.

436 (1958). Cf. Schertle Galleries, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action
Letter (July 15, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
78,372.
245 Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938); SEC Securities Act Release No.
4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2272. The Fifth Circuit has
held that as a question of fact, it is inappropriate for the court to decide

the issue of integration upon a motion for summary judgment. Jackson
Tool & Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1964).
246 Jackson Tool & Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1964).
247 Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814 (1948); Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618
(1938); Non-Public Offering Exemption, SEC Securities Act Release No.
4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2781-82.
248 See Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436 (1958).
249 Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958).
2 50

L. Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 689 (1961).

But see note 252 infra.
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of time; to offer different classes of securities; and to offer
securities to promoters and other insiders. In fact, one might
assume that an offering of securities of significantly different
classes to individuals who are promoters or other insiders, particularly if separated in time from a public offering, would be
conclusively presumed to be separate issues. There are some
indications, however, that in those instances in which reliance
is being placed on the intrastate-offering exemption, the Commission may view securities of a different class as being integrated 25 1 and securities offered to promoters and other insiders
to be integrated with the public offering if the effect is to
destroy the availability of the exemption. 252 Although in one
instance, the Commission convinced a district court to integrate
different classes of promissory notes having some but not substantial differences in their terms, 253 in another instance in the
context of the intrastate exemption a district court rejected the
integration argument finding 6 percent installment notes to be
a different issue from 7 percent notes payable upon a fixed
2 4
maturity date. 1
In the event reliance is placed on the private-offering exemption and the offering is not successfully completed, Rule 152
specifically provides that a subsequent public offering will not
destroy the availability of the exemption to the extent sales took
place in reliance on the exemption if it were otherwise availSee notes 253-54 infra. For the basic notion that securities of different classes are not part of the same issue see Opinion of General
Counsel of Commission, SEC Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8,
1939), CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 2140. However, in appropriate contexts,
other considerations may be more relevant. Thus, although fractional
interests in different oil properties would appeair to be clearly separate
securities, the Commission has indicated they may be integrated emphasizing the related-plan aspect. The Commission stated in this respect:
"Thus, in the case of offerings of fractional undivided interests in
separate oil or gas properties where the promoters must constantly find
new participants for each new venture, it would appear to be appropriate to consider the entire series of offerings to determine the scope of
this solicitation." Non-Public Offering Exemption, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. %2782. Conceivably, emphasis on the related nature of a series of separate offerings
might result in characterizing a series of separately negotiated acquisitions of properties for securities as a single offering. This contention
was raised and rejected by one district court which for purposes of
determining whether a preliminary injunction should be issued was
unwilling to find "any single plan of distribution" on the basis of a
series of acquisitions for stock made over a three-year period- Bowers
v. Columbia Gen. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1193,450 (D. Del. 1971). Other aspects of the Bowers case are discussed at H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.05(10) at n.108.
252 Peoples Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960) ; Founders Preferred Life Ins. Co.,
SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter, SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 106: C-1
(June 16, 1971).
253 Hillsborough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
254 SEC v. Dunfee, d/b/a Dunfee Say. & Lease [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,970 (D. Mo. 1966).
251
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able.255 There is no counterpart to Rule 152, however, with respect to the aborted intrastate offering. Further, with respect to
preliminary financing made in reliance on the private-offering
exemption, Rule 152 is of no assistance as it is applicable only if
the issuer subsequently decides to make a public offering and
in this context the issuer presumably has decided to make a
subsequent public offering at the time it undertakes its preliminary financing. It is not clear what the impact of Rule 152
would be in the event an issuer undertakes an offering in reliance on the private-offering exemption, but with a general
awareness that it may have to make a subsequent public offering. The question would turn on whether under such circumstances the decision to make a public offering is a subsequent
decision. Rule 152 precludes a subsequently decided upon unregistered public offering (for example, an intrastate offering)
from integrating the subsequent sales so as to destroy the private offering. However, in the same context, it does not operate
so as to preclude integration of the sales made in reliance on
the private-offering exemption with the intrastate offering so
as to destroy the availability of the intrastate exemption.
E.

A Suggested Procedure for Preliminary Financing and
Integration

The Commission's staff has applied the integration doctrine
in a manner that makes it unreasonably difficult for issuers to
raise limited amounts from reasonably sophisticated investors
preliminary to filing a registration statement. It is one thing to
apply the integration concept so that what starts out to be a
private placement does not expand into an unregistered public
offering. 256 It is another matter to apply integration so that no
exemption exists for transactions with a small group that is
capable of fending for itself merely because the issuer intends
to subsequently make a registered or Regulation A offering. On
the assumption that reliance on the intrastate exemption is to
be discouraged, there may be more justification for the strictness
of the integration concept in this context if the initial financing
is preliminary to a public intrastate offering.2 57 Hopefully, the
Commission's promised modernized version of the private-of255 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1972).
256 Cf. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.C., Inc., 463 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1972). An even more extreme suggestion is the speculation of the Fifth
Circuit that it may be necessary to show at the time of a claimed exemption that the issuer does not intend a future offering that may affect the
availability of the exemption. HiU York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1972).
257 Cf. Peoples Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960).
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fering exemption will also take into account the impact of the
current doctrines relating to integration. 258 While the integration
doctrine operates in a particularly harsh manner with respect
to preliminary financing, it also serves no purpose if applied
to a sale to institutional investors of the same class of security
as that being publicly offered made more or less contempor259
aneously with a public offering.
The principal problem other than assuring that the requirements of the private-offering exemption are met in connection
with preliminary financing is to avoid the offering from being
integrated with a subsequent public offering. A suggested format for accomplishing this would be to issue in connection with
the preliminary financing nonassignable convertible promissory
notes. Out of an abundance of caution an effort should be made
to rely on the intrastate exemption as well as the privateoffering exemption in connection with such issuance. The
promissory notes should be issued to promoters, organizers, officers, and directors, all of whom are in fact to be actively involved in corporate affairs and have access to the appropriate
information. The notes should be convertible into common stock
only during a specified period of time after the common stock
has been registered or covered by a Regulation A filing or
after such efforts have been abandoned. The promissory notes
are a different security from the common stock and, hence,
along with the fact that they are issued to insiders should not
be integrated with the common stock offered to the public. The
common stock underlying the conversion right is, of course,
identical to the common stock to be offered publicly, but under
the last sentence of the Section 2(3) definition of the term
"sale" and "offer" there is no offer of the underlying stock
until the conversion right becomes exercisable. 260 Accordingly,
there will be no offering of the underlying common stock until
a registration statement has become effective or a conditional
exemption available under Regulation A. The fact that some of
the offerees do not become actively involved would appear to be
primarily relevant to the availability of the private-offering
258

See p. 352 & note 203 supra.

2 9

Cf. Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH

5

SEC. L. REP. 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970). See also H. BLOOMENTHAL § 7.15(2) nn.241FED.

260

42. Cf. the staff view that it would raise no objection to issuance of
options not exercisable until the underlying shares were registered if
the options were issued without registration. Dayton Steel Foundry Co.,
SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Sept. 1, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,443.
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exemption. 261 Assuming that they are sophisticated investors
and can satisfy Ralston Purina, the outlined format would still
appear to be a reliable one; if, however, the offerees are in fact
large in number, relatively unsophisticated, and have only a
nominal association with the issuer, the private-offering exemption will not be available for the offering of the promissory
notes irrespective of any question of integration.
If the format outlined above is utilized and the noteholders
convert after registration, their holding period from the standpoint of Rule 144 would commence with the acquisition of the
promissory note. 26 2 Accordingly, if they are affiliates, as they
would be under the circumstances described, they could use
the earlier date to establish their holding period in the event
it should be necessary for them to rely on Rule 144 in connection with the resale of their shares. A variation of the foregoing format, and one that should largely avoid the integration
issue, would be to provide that the nonassignable convertible
promissory note cannot be converted for a period of two years.
In that event, the noteholders would be relying on Rule 144 as
the means of ultimately reselling a portion of their shares upon
conversion and their holding period would commence with the
acquisition of the notes as is discussed at section IV, B. Such
noteholders need assurance that the issuer will become a qualified company by registering under the Exchange Act. The
issuer also has an obligation to explain to them the special position that their shares will be in as is discussed at section IV, A.
Presumably, if they have the appropriate sophistication to satisfy Ralson Purina, their understanding in this regard will be
a knowledgeable one.
V.

CONTROLLIN SHAREHOLDERS AFTER RULE 144

Rule 144 is the dawn of a new day for the controlling shareholder. For the first time since the adoption of the Securities
Act, he has reasonably reliable guides for determining the extent and circumstances under which he can resell securities of
an issuer as to which he is an affiliated person. He can sell
restricted or other securities irrespective of his holding period
in transactions with purchasers meeting the requirements of
Ralston Purina.26 3 Irrespective of how long he has held the
securities, such a transaction will start a new holding period
261

263

BLOOMENTHAL § 4.05 (6) - (7).
See also p. 315 supra.

See discussion at H.

262R.

144(d) (4) (B).

15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970).

RULE 144

for his purchaser and the securities will be restricted securities
in the hands of the purchaser. 2 4 He can, within the quantitative limitations of Rule 144, sell securities (assuming a qualified issuer) in compliance with that rule and for the purpose of
determining the quantitative limitation he does not have to take
into account shares he has sold in reliance on the private-offering exemption. 265 He can make sales up to the Rule 144 limit
within successive six-month periods. 26 He can also utilize Regulation A if the issuer files an appropriate notification, but only
if the issuer has realized a net profit during one of its last
two fiscal years. 267 He caimot utilize Rule 237 for the sale of
26 8
his securities.
The extent to which Rule 144 permits controlling persons to
realize substantial proceeds from the sale of securities depends
in part on the number of outstanding shares and the current
market price. Given two issuers with approximately the same
number of shares outstanding, the amount that can be realized
within the quantitative limits during a six-month period is
directly proportionate to their relative market prices. Thus, with
a million shares outstanding and a market price of $1 a share,
the amount that can be realized under the quantitative limit
would be only $10,000, whereas for a company with the same
number of shares outstanding and a market price of $10 per
share, the amount that could be realized would be $100,000.
This will generally mean that for the most part controlling
shareholders in established companies with a history of earnings
can sell more under Rule 144 dollar-wise than a relatively unseasoned company, although conceivably in certain situations
speculative frenzy might drive up an unseasoned company's market price to a point where controlling shareholders could realize
substantial amounts in Rule 144 sales. In short, the greater
value the market places on the total value of the company
(outstanding shares multiplied by market price), the more substantial the amounts dollar-wise that can be offered by controlling persons (or others for that matter) in reliance on Rule
144. In certain situations, this fact could sorely test the notion
that Rule 144 is consistent with the needs of investor protection.
One situation not explicitly covered by Rule 144 involves
264
265
26

See p. 316 at note 64.
See p. 320-21 & notes 76-79 supra.

144(e) (1). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 10,
1972), under caption '"imitation on Amount of Securities Sold," [19711972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. %78,487.
267 See p. 352-55 supra.
268 R. 237 (a).
6R.
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shares purchased by a controlling shareholder in connection with
a public offering which is either registered or covered by a
Regulation A notification. Such shares are not restricted shares
since they were not acquired in a transaction not involving a
public offering. In an analogous context, the staff has made it
clear that the underwriter cannot utilize Rule 144 for the purpose of reselling shares acquired by it in connection with a
public offering. 269 However, Rule 144 is applicable not only to
restricted securities, but also to securities sold for the account
of an affiliate. The rule provides in this regard that a person
selling securities for the account of an affiliate shall not be
deemed engaged in a distribution and, therefore, is not an underwriter. 270 Accordingly, it would appear that an affiliate
could resell such shares under Rule 144 to the same extent
that he can resell shares purchased in the open market. It is
probable, however, that the staff would take the position that
while the selling broker may not be deemed an underwriter in
this context, the affiliate is, and no exemption is available to the
affiliate. In a comparable context prior to the adoption of Rule
144, the staff advised the controlling persons to either (1) file a
post-effective amendment to the registration statement covering
the reoffering of their shares, or (2) hold the shares for two
years and then sell them in accordance with Rule 154 which
was then in effect. 271 This appears to be an appropriate situation
in which to request a no-action letter.

VI.

NONQUALIFIED CoMPANiEs AFTm

RuLE 144

Discussion up to this point, except where otherwise explicitly noted, has been based upon the assumption that the securities were issued by a qualified issuer; that is, a reporting company or one which otherwise makes publicly available the
necessary information. 272 Shareholders who are affiliates of or
hold restricted stock in a corporation which is not a qualified
issuer are severely restricted by the Commission's new approach
to the sale of unregistered securities. To the argument that it
amounts to a virtual restraint on alienation, the Commission
has answered that shares of such issuer can be registered when
sold pursuant to Regulation A or after a five-year holding period
under Rule 237 or in reliance on the private-offering exemp269 See p. 313 & note 49 supra.
270 R. 144(b).
271 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 4.09.

272 See p. 309 supra.
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tion.273 The latter alternative appears to be a dubious one since
the purchaser would have to start a new five-year waiting period
with respect to his use of Rule 237.
It is, of course, always possible for the issuer to become a
qualified company, in which event Rule 144 would be available
for the sale of restricted securities and for sales by affiliates provided there is a market in the security. If a nonqualified company is to become a qualified one, it has the alternative of
voluntarily registering under the Exchange Act 274 or otherwise

making publicly available the necessary information. The latter
alternative leaves much to be desired as there is no established
method for making such information publicly available, and
there can be no assurance that the information made available
is adequate. 275 In some instances, companies which are not qualified companies in the course of time will become such either
as the result of a registered offering made under the Securities
Act 276 or the fact that they are compelled to register under the

Exchange Act because they now have 500 or more shareholders
277
of a class of equity securities and $1 million in total assets.
In any event, one acquiring securities from a nonqualified
issuer in a transaction subject to the private-offering exemption
would be well advised to obtain a contractual commitment from
the issuer to register under the Exchange Act and/or to file
a registration statement upon request. In most instances, such
transactions undoubtedly will occur during the initial stages
of the corporation's existence; accordingly, the implications of
Rule 144 for the future must be taken into account at that
stage if the shareholder is to be adequately protected.

273SEC

Securities Act Release No. 5223 n.5 (Jan. 10, 1972), [1971-1972

Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
274 See H. BLOOMENTHAL

§

3.04.

275 See p. 310-11 & notes 37-40 supra.
276 See H. BLOOMENTHAL § 3.11 (1).
277

See id.

§ 3.03.
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CORPORATE SILENCE AND RULE 10b-5:

DOES A PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATION
HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION TO
DISCLOSE?
By ALAN L. TALEsNIcK*

D

INTRODUCTION:

THE PROBLEM

ISCLOSURE represents the cornerstone of federal securities
regulation. The Securities Act of 1933 requires registration
and disclosure for a public offering.' Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires disclosure upon solicitation
of proxy material.- Section 16 of the 1934 Act requires disclosure of trading by officers, directors, and major owners of a
corporation's stock3 Section 13 of the 1934 Act requires disclosure at the end of certain fiscal periods. 4 Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b), requires disclosure of material
corporate information by one who is buying or selling an issuer's
5
securities.
Yet is there any requirement to disclose material corporate
information when none of the above situations exists? That is,
does a corporation have an obligation to disclose material information when it is not trading in its own securities, when
it is not in the formation or the process of a public offering,
when it is not soliciting proxies, when none of its insiders are
trading in its stock, when it has not reached the end of a
reportable fiscal period, and when there are no traders taking
advantage of undisclosed material information?
A key term in the question presented is "material information." An acknowledged standard for determining materiality
is "whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to the
fact] in determining his choice of action in the transaction." 6
With this definition in mind, the presence of materiality will
*Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; A.B., Harvard
College, 1967, J.D. Harvard Law School, 1972; M.B.A., Harvard Business
School, 1972.
'Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 6, 7. 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, f, g, j (1970).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970) [hereinafter cited as SEA].
3 SEA § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
4 SEA § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
6 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
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be assumed for the purpose of this article. Therefore, the issue
in question is the following: Assuming that a corporation possesses information which is material, does the corporation have
an affirmative obligation to disclose it?
An illustration of this issue is a mining company's discovery
of a significant mineral deposit. Certainly this discovery is a
fact to which a reasonable man would attach importance in
determining whether to sell his stock in the company. The
question then becomes whether, in the absence of insider trading, the corportation must disclose its discovery to the investing public. Throughout the text, this issue will be referred
to as the "principal question," the "hypothesized situation," or
the "issue in question." The terms "affirmative disclosure" and
"affirmative duty (or obligation) to disclose" will be a shorthand for referring to the requirement of disclosure of material
information by a corporation not involved in any of the aforementioned activities.
The disclosure requirements pertaining to public offerings,
proxy solicitations, and insider trading specifically concern
the activities to which they refer and are therefore inapplicable
to the foregoing definition of affirmative disclosure. On the
other hand, the periodic and current reporting requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are not so aligned to
particular events; they will be examined in this article to determine to what extent affirmative disclosure might be accomplished thereunder. This examination is followed by analysis of
the timely disclosure policies of the two major stock exchanges.
Analyzing the strengths and limitations of the stock exchange
policies will help to delineate the extent to which affirmative
disclosure exists in that setting as well as the extent to which
such policies may be used as a possible source for further imposition of a duty of affirmative disclosure. Following these
necessarily brief appraisals, the article focuses on rule 10b-5 as
the most probable source of an affirmative duty to disclose.
This consists of a detailed analysis of the text of the rule to
see if the words, on their face, provide a duty of affirmative
disclosure. The second look at rule 10b-5 is an analysis of some
of the pertinent case holdings, judicial reasoning, and SEC pronouncements to see if these authorities might provide a source
for a duty of affirmative disclosure. The final section of the
article deals with the consequences resulting from affirmative
disclosure: the advantages gained and the impracticalities confronted as a result of implementation.
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RULE 10b-5
I.

A.

PERIODIC AND CURRENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The Reports Required

Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
continuing disclosure (reporting) requirements for issuers
which fall into any of the following classifications: (1) An
issuer with a class of security registered on a national securities
exchange; 7 (2) an issuer with at least $1,000,000 of total assets
and at least 500 persons who are holders of record of a class
of the company's equity security; ' or (3) any issuer which has
filed a registration statement that has become effective pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 on or after August 20, 1964,
for at least one class of securities which is held of record by
300 or more persons.!' Pursuant to section 13(a) of the 1934 Act,
the SEC has the power to require registered companies to provide such information and reports as it may deem "necessary
or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security ....,"
The rules promulgated by the Commission under section
13(a) require the filing of annual reports (form 10-K),11 quarterly reports (form 10-Q), r 2 and current reports (form 8-K).13
The effectiveness of form 10-K in disclosing significant business
events is limited by two factors: the 12-month interval between
filings and the 4-month time lag allowed between the end of
the fiscal year and the submission of all data pertinent to the
14
10-K.
The same problems of infrequency and time lag are not as
serious with form 10-Q. It is filed quarterly and involves a
reporting time lag of 45 days.'' Form 10-Q fails as a vehicle
for current disclosure because its contents consist only of uncertified statements of profit and loss, earnings per share,
capitalization, and stockholders' equity. There are numerous
7SEA § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
S SEA § 12(g) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (1970). Section 12(g) (2) does
exempt certain companies within this classification, but such exemptions are not important to the discussion herein. Registration under §
12(g) (1) is no longer required if an issuer has fewer than 300 stockholders cf record at the end of a fiscal year.
!,SEA § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970). Companies registered under
the 1933 Act prior to August 20, 1964, are subject to the reporting requirements of § 15(d) only if they had expressed an undertaking at
the original registration to adhere to such requirements.
"'SEA § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970).
11 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1972).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1972).
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1972).
14 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ) 31,102 (1972).
15 SEC Securities Act Release No. 9004 (Oct. 28, 1970).
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material events which could occur but which would not be
reported in form 10-Q.
Form 8-K is a current, rather than a periodic, report. It
is to be filed "within ten days after the close of any month
during which any of the events specified in that form occurs
1;"6 It apparently is intended to elicit disclosure of mate....
rial business occurrences, but the actual requirements of form 8-K
prevent it from attaining this objective.1 7 The form's weakness
as a current disclosure device stems from the fact that only
items 1 through 11 are mandatory. Thus the corporation has
complete discretion to decide whether to report an occurrence
under item 12 if it does not fit into any of the specific categories.' 8 The significance of this corporate discretion is illustrated by noting that a mineral strike by the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company in Canada"' failed to necessitate a form 8-K
current report. Because the discovery constituted a material
event which was not enumerated within the general instructions to form 8-K, the corporation could decide whether to
report it under item 12 as "Other Materially Important Events."
Although it seems that such events should be required in a
form 8-K, the SEC has rejected the idea of mandatory current
reporting of all material events on the grounds that (a) the
standard is vague, (b) significant risks of corporate liability
would arise, and (c) determining the occurrence of material
20
events would be difficult.
Form 8-K fails as a current report not only because of its
optional item 12, but also because it need not be filed until 10
1617 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1l (1972).
17 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. T 31,003 (1972). The following company events
are included in a current report: (1) Changes in control of ,registrant;
(2) Acquisition or disposition of assets; (3) Legal proceedings; (4)
Changes in securities; (5) Changes in security for registered securities;
(6) Defaults upon senior securities; (7) Increases in amount of securities
outstanding; (9) Options to purchase securities; (10) Revaluation of
assets or restatement of capital share account; (11) Submission of
matters to a vote of security holders; (12) Other materially important
events.
18 Id.

11)See Section I. C. infra.
Proposals to make mandatory the current reporting of all material
events have been rejected in the past by the commission, apparently on the ground that compliance with this standard would be
very difficult because it is so vague; furthermore, it might expose
corporations to significant risks of liability. ...
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV.
1271, 1300 (1965).
Such a provision might also be difficult for the staff of the
commission to administer, as the staff would not ordinarily be in
possession of facts enabling it to determine whether a material
event had occurred.
Id. at 1300 n.133.
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days after the end of the month in which the reportable event
occurred.2 1 Nevertheless, the Wheat Report indicated that these
characteristics were not weaknesses because the SEC's current
reporting requirements "are not intended to . . . duplicate
'22
the timely disclosure policies of the self-regulatory agencies.
In considering the effectiveness of the reporting requirements as disclosure devices, one must realize that there is a
difference between filing a report with the Commission and
publicly disclosing that report by disseminating it to the public.
Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K, insofar as they require disclosure,
require disclosure into the Commission's files rather than into
the public's awareness. Furthermore, these disclosures do not
necessarily become available even for those members of the
public who take the initiative and the trouble to seek them out.
Section 24(b) of the 1934 Act provides that the issuer may
make a written objection to public disclosure of its SEC
filings. In this situation, the Commission will make such information available to the public only when it deems that "disclosure of such information is in the public interest. '23 If the
Commission fails to sustain an issuer's objection to public disclosure of its filed reports, both the Commission 24 and the
exchange with which the issuer is listed 21 shall make all information filed under sections 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the 1934 Act available for public inspection.
Thus the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 subjects those
issuers under its jurisdiction to a very limited obligation of
continuing disclosure. Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K do contain
valuable information, but they do not create an "informed"
26
market at any point in time.
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 13,002 (1971).
SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS 332 (1969)

21 2
22

(commonly referred to as The

Wheat Report). The Wheat Report's recommendations concentrated on
making the current reports more comprehensive in content rather than
on improving their timeliness.
2.3 SEA § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78x (b) (1970).
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.80 (1972).
2517 C.FR. § 240.24b-3 (1972).
26

Former SEC Chairman Cohen has described the situation quite well:
These reports provide a permanent record of the most important information about these corporations and a framework

within which other information can be assessed. But, the nature
and timing of these reports prevent them from serving as an
adequate medium fcr the rapid and widespread dissemination
of current material information to the investing public.
Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission before the Baltimore Security Analysts Society, Jan. 6, 1969,
in '67-'69 Transfer Binder CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,652 at 83,420.
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Sanctions for Violation of the Reporting Requirements
Violation of the reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 can involve sanctions in the form of civil
action by both private and public parties. Section 18(a) of the
Act provides recovery of damages to any person who reliedin the purchase or sale of a security - on a false or misleading
statement in a report filed under the Act.2" In order to recover
under section 18(a), the plaintiff must prove not only that a
statement in the report was false or misleading, but also that
the price of the security transferred was affected by the statement and that his disposition of the security was in reliance
upon the statement. Even if the plaintiff presents the requisite
proof, the defendant can still prevail upon a showing that in
making the statement, "he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading."
Proving both that the statement was misleading and that
the plaintiff's purchase or sale was made in reliance on the
statement are not without difficulties. Moreover, proving a
causal relationship between any single factor and the price of
an actively traded security is "an almost impossible task with
actively traded securities. ' 2 The fact that this significant barrier to recovery is followed by the availability of the goodfaith-and-lack-of-knowledge defense makes section 18 an extremely difficult and highly improbable means of penalizing
the presence of a misleading statement in a required report.
The Commission may take civil action for violation of the
reporting requirements pursuant to its authorization in section
15 (c) (4) ,21 15 (c) (5) ,3" or 19 (a) (4).31 Section 15 (c) (4) authorizes the Commission to order an issuer to comply with the
reporting requirements of the 1934 Act after notice and opportunity for a hearing. If the issuer persists in its failure to
comply, the Commission can then enforce its order in court. As2
3
of 1968, this procedure had been utilized fewer than 10 times.
Such infrequency was probably due both to the relatively large
time period involved in implementation and to the lack of deterrence imposed by the actual sanction.
Sections 15(c) (5) and 19(a) (4) authorize the Commission
to suspend trading in a security for a period not exceeding 10
B.

SEA § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MicH. L. REv. 607,
627 (1964).
29 SEA § 15(c) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (c) (4) (1970).
30 SEA § 15(c) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (5) (1970).
31 SEA § 19(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4) (1970).
32 SEC,supra note 22, at 387.
27
28
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days if "the public interest and the protection of investors so
require. 8' 3 They apply, respectively, to securities not listed on
a national exchange and to securities listed on a national securities exchange. (In addition, section 19(a) (2)34 authorizes the
Commission to suspend for up to 12 months, or to withdraw,
the registration of a security for failure to comply with the
Act.) The effectiveness of these sanctions against violation of
the reporting requirements should be considerable, for their
result is serious, perhaps even extreme. Furthermore, their
effectiveness is strengthened by section 21(e), which provides
the Commission with injunctive relief by authorizing federal
district courts to compel adherence to SEC orders pursuant to
35
the 1934 Act.
Finally, the Commission may initiate criminal action for a
willful violation of the reporting requirements pursuant to
section 32(a) of the 1934 Act.36 Under section 32(a) a defendant
can successfully defend himself upon showing that his conduct
was not "willful." Furthermore, he can avoid imprisonment,
although not the fine, by proving that he had no knowledge
of the rule which he allegedly violated. Nevertheless, neither
of these provisions has helped defendants significantly in the
37
past.
C. Summary of Reporting Requirements
The effectiveness of the reporting requirements in achieving continuing disclosure can be summarized by consideration
of two factors: (a) the substance of the requirements and (b)
the sanctions imposed for violations. Periodic disclosure is
achieved under the Securities Exchange Act in connection with
the general longer-range reports (form 10-K and form 10-Q),
but the form 8-K has not been effective in timely reporting
of specific material events. The principal limits to its efficacy
result from four factors: (1) The time lag involved: form 8-K
does not involve immediate disclosure; (2) The limited scope
of form 8-K: an issuer has complete discretion in reporting
a material event if it is not included within one of the 11
enumerated items for form 8-K; (3) The lack of dissemination
of form 8-K reports: they are filed with the Commission without further regard for public dissemination of their contents;
(1970); SEA § 19(a)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4) (1970).
34 SEA § 19(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (2) (1970).
35 SEA § 21 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
36 The maximum penalty under this section is a $10,000 fine and two years'
imprisonment. SEA § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).
37 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 10.3 (1971).
33SEA § 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(5)
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and (4) The limited number of companies required to file
form 8-K because of the limited applicability of the reporting
requirements: they apply only to those companies which are
subject to section 12(b), section 12(g), or section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A final evaluation of the
substantive content of these requirements depends upon
whether one believes that their primary purpose is to provide
information which is complete or to provide information which
is timely.
The sanctions available to the Commission are certainly
adequate for the present system of disclosure. Furthermore,
sections 15(c) (5) and 19(c) (4) appear to provide the discretion
and immediacy which would be necessary for a system requiring a greater degree of timely disclosure. On the other hand,
the private remedy under section 18(a) entails too many complexities of proof to be practical.
II. DISCLOSURE POLICIES OF THE MAJOR STOCK EXCHANGES
A. Requirement of Timely and Adequate Disclosure
Both the New York Stock Exchange and the American
Stock Exchange have policies of timely disclosure which require
the immediate public disclosure of material information concerning a listed company. The policies are designed to serve
two principal purposes: (1) public access to the information
necessary to make informed investment decisions and (2) maintenance of a fair and orderly securities market.38 Because the
policies are so similar, the description which follows will pertain to both unless otherwise indicated. 39
According to these policies of timely disclosure, the listed
company must make immediate public disclosure of any information which might reasonably be expected to affect the market for the company's securities. Such disclosure should be implemented in a manner to reach as many people as quickly as
possible. Thus, at a minimum, release to the press and to the
wire services is contemplated. 40 The exchanges note that for
38NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-28; AMERICAN STOCK ExCHANGE GUME §§
401, 402 [hereinafter cited as ASE GUIDE].
39 Secondary sources indicate that the National Association of Securities
Dealers also has a policy of timely disclosure, but I have been unable
to locate the NASD Manual. Milton H. Cohen indicates that Section 7 of
the NASD Manual stipulates minimum requirements of timely disclosure for all companies desiring to be included in the NASD over-thecounter national listing. Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1364, n.69 (1966). But this list includes only a very
small percentage of the numerous O-T-C stocks. Therefore, delisting
from this small group is not significant. Furthermore, many newspapers add issues which they find to be of particular interest to the list
suggested by the NASD.
40
NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-18, A-22; ASE GUIDE §§ 402, 403.

RULE 10b-5

certain corporate developments immediate disclosure might endanger the company's goals, provide information helpful to a
competitor, or provide a confusing impression of a development
whose status is to become more certain almost immediately
thereafter. When there is no doubt that such a situation exists,
a company may withhold material information until the excep4
tional circumstances no longer justify failure to disclose. ' Thus,
the disclosure policies of both exchanges. presume immediate
disclosure, but can be modified by a showing that in a particular situation, the unfavorable consequences of disclosure outweigh the favorable.
Despite this flexibility, the policies provide that there can
be no justification for withholding material information when
unusual price and volume changes are occurring in the trading
of any of the company's securities. Under such circumstances,
the company will usually be requested by the exchange to
42
If further
make any undisclosed information public at once.
are afwhich
rumors
of
existence
the
indicates
investigation
is recompany
the
fecting trading in the company's securities,
43
rumors.
such
correct
quired to clarify, confirm, or
Both exchanges recommend an "open door" policy for dealing with security analysts, financial writers, stockholders, and
others with an investment interest in the company. No individual or group should be given any-information concerning material corporate developments before there has been complete
4
1
public disclosure and dissemination of such information.
Impact of the Stock Exchange Policies
The disclosure policy described above is included in the
listing agreement between the issuer and the exchange. Yet
the rules of the exchange are not enforced so rigorously that
each minute violation will result in a suit or penalty against
45
If a solution to the particular problem
the violating company.
is unavailable or impractical under the exigencies (usually
time) present, the exchange may suspend trading in the securB.

NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-22; ASE GUIDE § 403.
42 NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-18; ASE GUIDE §§ 402-03.
43NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-23; ASE GUIDE §§ 402-03.
41

§ 403.
"[T]he Exchange looks for strict observance of the listing agreement.

44 NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-20; ASE GUIDE

45

However, it is realized that, occasionally, conditions will arise which
make literal compliance with one, or another, of its requirements difficult, if not impossible. In such a case the Exchange is inclined to
place the emphasis upon the spirit, rather than upon the letter, of the
agreement, and will endeavor to work out with the company some way
of relieving the difficulty, while preserving the purpose of the agreement." NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-28.
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ities of the company or companies involved. If this sanction
is not sufficient, the exchange may delist the securities in46
volved.
Temporary suspension of trading could prove effective as a
means of assuring that the market was adequately informed
of the material information. However, its effectiveness as a
deterrent against nondisclosure depends upon a company's concluding that the adverse effects of a suspension of trading,
modified by the probability that such nondisclosure would be
detected, are prohibitory. Delisting, on the other hand, is an
extreme sanction - so extreme that it cannot be used merely
to encourage or even force compliance with the timely disclosure policy.
The force of the stock exchange disclosure requirements
has been upheld in court. In Intercontinental Industries, Inc.
v. American Stock Exchange,47 the Fifth Circuit upheld the exchange's decision to enforce timely disclosure by delisting the
company involved. Yet, the Supreme Court recently held that
48
such rules are not binding upon the courts.
Thus, each of the two major exchanges has a timely disclosure policy with virtually all of the stipulations of affirmative disclosure. Furthermore, the courts have upheld the exchanges' right to delist as the ultimate sanction. Yet there are
still two significant drawbacks to these policies as a source
of affirmative disclosure: (1) The policies apply only to those
companies which are listed on the two major exchanges, and
these tend to be the relatively large companies about which
more is known anyway; (2) A company can choose to be
exempt from these disclosure policies by not being listed on
either of the major exchanges.

III. RuL. 10b-5
Having examined the extent of disclosure resulting from
the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act and the timely
disclosure policies of the major exchanges, it is necessary to
consider whether rule 10b-5 imposes an affirmative duty to
disclose. The text of rule 10b-5 is reproduced below for con49
venience.
46

NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-29 (NYSE Rule 499); ASE GUIDE § 1002.
See also § 12(d) and Rule 12d2-1 (17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-1 (1972)) of

SEA.
F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971).

47 452

"[A] policy of the New York Stock Exchange, although entitled to considerable respect, cannot bind the Commission or the Courts." Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
49 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
48

of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
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The first question which arises is whether a literal interpretation of the words of the rule would show that failure to
execute affirmative disclosure violates its express or implied
provisions. The section on textual analysis, which follows,
attempts to ascertain such a literal interpretation.
A. Textual Analysis of Rule 10b-5
1. Introductory and Final Clauses
Clauses (1), (2), and (3) of rule 10b-5 describe the prohibited activities, while the introductory and final clauses provide additional elements which must be present in order for
the rule to apply.
The introductory clause stipulates the jurisdictional means
which must be used, "directly or indirectly," if rule lOb-5 is to
be applicable. Ascertaining whether a corporation has used
"any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange"
is pragmatically difficult where neither the corporation nor its
insiders are trading. By its very nature, the act complained
of - silence - involves the use of nothing. Therefore, a narrow interpretation of the necessary jurisdictional means would
present a significant obstacle.
However, the courts have interpreted the jurisdictional requirement rather broadly. It is not necessary that the fraudulent representations be made through the mails.50 It is sufficient that the securities transactions connected to the allegedly
unlawful acts or omissions otherwise involve use of the jurisdictional means. 51 Thus, a lOb-5 suit against a nonpurchasing,
nonselling corporation for failure to disclose material facts does
not present a problem of finding jurisdictional means which is
peculiar to an allegation of nondisclosure; as long as the securities transactions indirectly connected to the corporation's nonor of any facility of a national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2)
to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any

person,

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1972). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission on May 21, 1942, pursuant to authority granted
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15
U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1958).
5
oSee SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968) (dictum).
51 See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); SEC v. Midland
Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968).
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disclosure involve the proper jurisdictional means, the rule's
jurisdictional means are satisfied.
The final clause of rule lOb-5 stipulates that the alleged
violation must occur "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." The question raised here is whether such
clause is an attempt to require the strict privity of contract
required by common law fraud. Such an interpretation certainly would exclude application of rule 10b-5 to a corporation
which was not involved in trading, issuing, or exchanging its
shares: "literally, the 'connection' requirement seems not to be
satisfied when neither the company nor insiders are buying
or selling any securities. ' 52 Furthermore, although the relatively early case of Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television
Corp.53 dismissed a complaint in which the plaintiffs did
not buy the stock until 2 weeks after the defendant insiders
had ceased selling, on the basis that at least "a semblance of
privity" is required under 10b-5, subsequent cases indicate no
reluctance to find violation of the rule even when the defendant is not a purchaser or seller. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
Co.,54 despite the corporation's noninvolvement in purchasing
or selling its securities, Judge Waterman held that the "in connection with" clause was satisfied because the alleged violation
by the corporation was "of a sort that would cause reasonable
investors to rely thereon, and . . . so relying, cause them to
purchase or sell a corporation's securities." This reasoning was
corroborated in Heit v. Weitzen,-' where the court found no
need for the defendant to be purchasing or selling the securities involved as long as the alleged violation had an impact
on the market. Thus, a showing that a corporation's lack of
disclosure has an impact on the market for its securities will
satisfy the "in connection with" requirement of rule 10b-5.
After having established the applicability of rule 10b-5 in
regard to the jurisdictional means and the "in connection
with" phrase, one must look to clauses (1), (2), or (3) to establish a violation of the rule.
2. Rule 10b-5, Clause (1)
Clause (1) need not be dealt with
not only similar to but also subsumed
(1) makes it unlawful "to employ any
fice to defraud," whereas clause (3)
521

A.

BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW

at length because it is
by clause (3). Clause
device, scheme or artiproscribes engaging in

§ 7.2(2) (1969).

F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
54 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
55 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968).
5399
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"any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Clause
(3) includes all conduct falling under clause (1) in addition
to some which does not for the following reasons: First, "to
engage in any act, practice or course of business" [clause (3)]
is certainly broad enough to include all conduct covered by
"to employ any device, scheme or artifice" [clause (1)]. In
fact, the term "course of business" should be broad enough to
permit consideration of the cumulative effect of a series of acts
of which none would be fraudulent by itself. 56 Second, clause
(3) includes deceit as well as fraud as an indication of a violation; clause (1) includes only the latter. Third, inclusion in
clause (1) of the infinitive phrase "to defraud" implies the
requirement of intent.5 7 Employment of a "scheme . . . to
defraud" necessarily involves the actor's state of mind. On the
other hand, the language of clause (3) -i.e., an "act . . .which
operates or would operate as a fraud . . . . "- is concerned
with the difficulties of proving anything about the actor's state
of mind. Accepting the above reasoning that everything that
falls within clause (1) also falls within clause (3) and fortified
by Professor Bromberg's concurrence, 58 one can proceed to an
analysis of clause (3).
3. Rule lOb-5, Clause (3)
In order to find a violation of clause (3) by a corporation
which has failed to disclose material information but which is
not purchasing or selling its shares, the allegations must satisfy
two requirements: (a) the corporation's failure to disclose must
be construed as an "act, practice or course of business," and
(b) the corporation's failure to disclose must "operate .. .as a
fraud or deceit."
Classifying a corporation's failure to disclose material information within a phrase so broad as "any act, practice or
course of business" should not be difficult. Although one could
argue that total inaction is not an "act," it is more reasonable
to assume that failure to disclose or silence itself would be
construed as an act. An even more persuasive argument is that
a corporation's failure to disclose material information constitutes a "practice or course of business," since such conduct has
a definite effect on a company's creditors, competitors, and
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 2.6(1) (1967).
Note, Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REV.
824, 826 (1965).
58 "Nothing comes to mind that would be in clause 1 but not in clause 3."
1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 56.
56 1
57
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shareholders and is therefore part of the ordinary conduct of
the corporation's business.
Further substantiation for the contention that silence can
be construed as "an act, practice or course of business" is provided by administrative and judicial authority. The SEC
has contended that an accountant's failure to disclose his discovery that financial statements which he had certified 6
months earlier were false is an "act or course of business"
under rule lOb-5(3). 59 By the same token in Speed v. Transamerica Corp.6 ° the court stated that nondisclosure can constitute a violation of clause (3), thereby implying that failure
to disclose must be an "act, practice or course of business."
Although the Speed case and others 61 found nondisclosure to be
a violation of clause (3), these cases involved trading or some
other sort of advantage gained by the nondisclosing parties.
Rather than detracting from the force of the argument that
failure to disclose constitutes an "act, practice or course of business," these holdings merely emphasize the importance of showing that the hypothesized situation "operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit."
Assuming then that a corporation's failure to disclose material information in the absence of insider or corporate trading
qualifies as an "act, practice or course of business," one must
show that such conduct "operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit." Such proof entails determining what constitutes
conduct which operates as a fraud or deceit. A careful examination of the language of clause (3) reveals that a literal interpretation would not require involvement of the common law
element of fraud in proving a violation, but rather that the
only requirement of clause (3) is that the conduct in question
have the same effect - "would operate" - as that of a fraud
or deceit upon any person. Thus, under this interpretation any
conduct which has the same effect as a fraud or deceit- that
of misleading a reasonable but unsuspecting and relying individual - would fall within clause (3).
Textual analysis of this part of the rule is particularly
difficult because "the courts have traditionally refused . . .to
define fraud with specificity. '62 Nevertheless they have arrived
at an interpretation similar to that above by taking the vague
59 Id. § 7.4(2) at 167 n.103.7 citing brief for SEC as amicus curiae, Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
60 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
61 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961).
62 3 L. Loss, SEcuarriEs REGULATION 1436 (2d ed. 1961).
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position that "the use of 'fraud' in rule lOb-5 (3) cannot be
interpreted in its narrow common law sense," 63 or that "the
fraud provisions in the SEC acts . . . are not limited to circumstances which would give rise to a common law action
for deceit. '64 Although proof of common law fraud is not
necessary, there must be allegations of deception to support a
10b-5 action.65 Therefore, a corporation's failure to disclose
material information will qualify as a fraud or deceit under
rule 10b-5 (3) if the nondisclosure operates to deceive the allegedly injured party.
The above analysis indicates that the words of rule lOb-5 (3)
could provide a source of an affirmative duty to disclose material facts only when failure to disclose would result in the
deception of a reasonable investor. Such deception arguably
occurs in three types of situations. In situation A, the company is subject to the timely disclosure policy of one of the
national exchanges or the NASD (see section III concerning
disclosure policies of exchanges). As a result, it is under
a duty to disclose. Silence in the place of such a duty would
certainly amount to the deception66 of an investor who reasonably expected the corporation to adhere to the obligations incurred in the listing agreement. 67 Situation B involves
the contention that a corporation's continued silence since its
last public announcement may have reasonably led an investor
to believe that nothing had changed in the interim. If in fact
the corporation had experienced a major discovery but the
shareholder had sold his stock in reliance on the corporation's
silence indicating no change from its already declining position,
the shareholder in situation B would have been deceived by
the corporation's failure to disclose and would have a claim
within the literal meaning of rule 10b-5(3). Situation C concerns a corporation which has pursued a policy of immediate
disclosure of all material events. It would be reasonable for an
investor to rely on the corporation's continuing such a policy
63 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing denied,

404 U.S. 1064 (1972).

3 L. Loss, supra note 62. The statement is made in indicating the general
position of the courts on the matter. Often cited cases, in addition to
Texas Gulf Sulphur, include Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir.
1965), and Ell-is v. Carter, 291 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1962).
65 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Entel v. Allen, 270 F.
Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25
(D) Md. 1965).
66 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (4th ed. 1971).
6
7Even this duty to disclose is subject to an exception based on the rea64

sonable business judgment of the corporate decisionmakers.
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of timely disclosure. If the corporation violated this policy
and failed to disclose a major occurrence, and if the investor
purchased or sold the corporation's stock to his detriment by
relying on the traditional disclosure policy so as to conclude
that the company's prospects had not changed, then he would
be able to claim deception in an action against the corporation
for failure to disclose.
The key difference among these three situations is the persuasiveness of the allegation that the investor acted reasonably
in being deceived, for it is necessary to establish a causal
relationship between the lack of disclosure and the injury
suffered, 68 and in order to do so, the plaintiff must show that
he was reasonable in relying upon the corporation's silence:
[T]he duty to speak which is implicit in Rule [X-] 10B-5 arises
in those circumstances . . . where there is a justifiable expect-

ancy of disclosure or reliance upon the superior knowledge of
another .... 69
Of the three situations, the strongest for arguing that the
corporation's failure to disclose violated clause (3) is situation
A, which involves a company whose stock is listed on one of
the two major exchanges. As indicated above, pursuant to its
listing agreement, the company in situation A is under an
obligation to make timely and adequate disclosure of all material information. 70 An investor who is aware of this obligation
is certainly acting reasonably in relying on his expectation
that the company will adhere to it. Silence on the part of
one who has a duty to speak is very close to common law
71
deception.
Situation C, in which the investor relied on the corporation's silence as an indication of "no change" because of the
company's policy of making immediate public disclosure, is not
quite as strong a case because the corporation had no explicit
obligation to disclose. Nevertheless, given that the corporation
had always disclosed material information immediately, and
that all recent disclosures had been consistent with a future
trend in one direction, then the corporation's failure to disclose
material information which indicated a modification of this
trend could be held to be "deception" in violation of rule
10b-5(3). Of course this holding under situation C could be
68

Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Barnett v. Ana-

69

conda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d

70

685 (6th Cir. 1960).
This discussion assumes that the "business judgment" exception is not
applicable.

71 W.

PRossER, supra note 66.
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valid only if an investor had relied on the silence - in conjunction with the past disclosure policy- to indicate no change
in the recent trend.
Situation B presents the weakest of the three arguments.
Yet it may still have a chance for vindication under clause (3)
because the investor can claim that his deception resulted from
the corporation's failure to inform him of material information
which was inconsistent with the general impression resulting
from earlier disclosures. But the argument is weakened significantly by the contention that a reasonable investor in situation B would not have been deceived by the corporation's
silence, since there was no reason to think that the corporation would immediately disclose any material information.
The difficulty in finding a violation of rule lOb-5 (3) under
situation B emphasizes the problem of applying 10b-5 (3) to the
general hypothetical posed in this article. The strongest argument in favor of applying rule lOb-5 (3) to situation B is that
the investor was deceived. As a result he could attempt to sue
for deception because the nondisclosure involved information
indicating a change in the corporation's business fortunes. Yet
all undisclosed material information does not involve a change
in the company's business, and therefore situation B cannot be
applied to the general question of affirmative disclosure. In
fact, the material information withheld might be consistent
with the business trends indicated in the company's most recent
disclosures. In this situation, the above analysis indicates that
the plaintiff must show that his deception resulted from reasonable reliance on the corporation's silence. But absent a
specific obligation such as a stock exchange listing agreement
or a definite company policy to make immediate disclosure, a
reasonable investor would not rely on a public corporation to
disclose all material facts at once. The corporation's silence
regarding material facts cannot constitute deception unless a
reasonable investor could expect disclosure of such facts.
Absent required periodic reports and special factors similar to
those noted, there is no reason to expect that the corporation
will disclose. 72 Thus, under these circumstances, a reasonable
investor would not rely on the corporation's silence.
From a relatively strict construction of the words of
there were corporate trading or insider trading of which the nontrading top executives were aware, then the investor could reasonably
expect the corporation to disclose the material facts. The application of
rule lOb-5 to instances when those trading have unequal information

72If

or to other situations in which the nondisclosing party takes unfair advantage is not discussed because of its exclusion from the question at

hand.
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clause (3), one must conclude that corporate silence does not
"operate as a fraud or deceit" in the general case of a material
nondisclosure. This conclusion renders the words of clauses (1)
and (3) inapplicable to the situation posed.
4. Rule 10b-5, Clause (2)
Clause (2) appears to be more conducive to a literal interpretation because the terms do not have common law connotations such as those which cause so many problems with clauses
(1) and (3) .73 The first phrase of clause (2), "to make any
untrue statement of a material fact" does not apply to the
general situation posed because in a situation of nondisclosure
there is no statement made. However, the alternative conduct
proscribed by clause (2)74 requires further analysis.
A corporation's failure to disclose material information certainly qualifies as an omission to state a material fact. The real
question of the applicability of clause (2) to a corporation's
failure to disclose is whether such omission is "necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . .,75
If as in the situation presented the corporation said absolutely
nothing, then there were no statements made and clause (2)
by its very words - is inapplicable. Indeed, there is substantial authority to the effect that clause (2) cannot apply
to a complete failure to disclose because there has been no
76
statement made.
Yet even on their face, the words of clause (2) leave some
question about their applicability to corporate silence in response to a material occurrence. The clause proscribes omissions of material facts which, if disclosed, would prevent "the
statements made" from being misleading. There is no indication of the time period involved during which an omission to
state a material fact must be coupled with a misleading "statement made" in order to constitute a violation of clause (2).
Unless the omission and the statement made pertain to the
same specific transaction, delineation of such a time period
would be extremely difficult. This is because a failure
73 The term "material" has been assumed for the purposes of this paper.
See INTRODUCTION supra.
"[T]o omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading .... " 17 C.F.R. § 240 lOb-5 (1972).
75 Id.
76 Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 767 (D. Colo.
1964) ; Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. '1962).
See also 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 56, § 2.6(2); 3 L. Loss, supra note
62, at 1439.
74
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to disclose often cannot be pinpointed to have occurred
at any particular time. Of course if the omission and the
statement made involve facts concerning the same transaction, then the omission actually occurred when the statement
was made. But if a corporation becomes aware of favorable
material information (such as an important mineral strike)
one week, and aware of specifically unrelated unfavorable material information (such as a foreign government's intention to
expropriate the company's valuable mine in that country) the
next week, then its disclosure of the latter and silence concerning the former raise certain questions.
Presumably an investor could prove that it was very misleading for the company to disclose the intended expropriation
without disclosing the discovery of the previous week. If this
is true, then the corporation could be liable for violating rule
lOb-5 (2) because disclosure of the mineral discovery was necessary in order to make the announcement of the intended expropriation not misleading insofar as the company's expectations
for the future are concerned. According to this construction
of clause (2), a corporation can be found within the proscribed
conduct if it has failed to disclose material information at the
time at which it discloses other material information having
inconsistent implications. The principal question regarding
the acceptability of this interpretation is whether the courts
will allow a claim in which the omitted material fact and the
statement made do not pertain to the same specific transaction
or information. At this point, there is no such indication.
Nevertheless, in a release dated October 15, 1970, the SEC indi77
cated its intention to pursue such a holding.
A more appropriate situation for applying rule lOb-5 (2) to
corporate silence concerns the relation between timely disclosure and the reporting requirements. A corporation's quarterly report (form 10-Q) requires relatively little data, and is
concerned mainly with revenue, income, per-share earnings, etc.
The figures to be presented in this report could show a significant downtrend, but at the time of disclosure of the report there
could be material undisclosed information existing which is so
favorable to the company that the current operating figures on
the form 10-Q are misleading. Assuming that this material in77

"Corporate releases which disclose personnel changes, the receipt of new
contracts, orders and other favorable developments but do not even suggest existing adverse corporate developments do not serve the public
needs and may violate the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Securities Act Release No. 5092, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8995, Investment Company Act Release No. 6209
(Oct. 15, 1970).
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formation does not fit within one of the mandatory categories
of the form 8-K, then the corporation need not disclose it. This
situation also would seem to fit the words of clause (2) because
the statements made on the form 10-Q certainly are misleading
unless the more recent information is disclosed.
Even if the above arguments are accepted, the words of
rule lOb-5 (2) still cannot be said to apply to the general case of
a corporation's failure to disclose material information. They
have merely been found to apply to special fact situations,
similar to those mentioned above.
5.

Summary of Textual Analysis of Rule lOb-5

In summation, a literal interpretation of rule lOb-5 leads
to the conclusion that the rule lacks the substance to provide
an adequate basis for a general corporate duty to disclose material information relevant to its operations, except in the case
of the special fact situations enumerated earlier within this
section. Clause (2) would impose such a duty only during
those periods in which the corporation might be making other
public statements and in which full disclosure would be necessary to avoid misleading impressions upon reasonable investors.
A literal interpretation of clause (3) would impose such a duty
only if an investor reasonably could expect such disclosure and
if, in acting under such expectation, he was misled to his
detriment. Nevertheless, as indicated in the following section,
the courts thus far do not seem to have been strictly inhibited
by rigorous interpretations of rule lOb-5,78 and it is in such
court decisions that a stronger basis for an affirmative duty
of disclosure must lie.
B.

Rule 10b-5: Judicial Holdings and Rationale

The literal interpretation suggests that the words of rule
lOb-5 do not provide an adequate basis for imposing an affirmative obligation of corporate disclosure of material information
when there is no insider or corporate trading. At this point,
one should look to the case law to determine whether the
courts have utilized the "flexibility" prescribed by the Supreme Court for construing anti-fraud securities legislation.
The SEC suit against Texas Gulf Sulphur Company is an
excellent place to begin.7 9 In this factual situation, the com78

"Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed
like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding
frauds,' [footnote omitted] not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate its remedial purposes." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).

79

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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pany had begun drilling for minerals at a Canadian site in
November 1963. After 5 days, drilling was suspended to ascertain results of a chemical assay. The results of this assay persuaded the company to purchase or secure options on the land
without any further drilling. On March 31, 1964, the drilling
resumed.80 By April 11, rumors concerning the magnitude of
the strike were circulating, and the following day the company
issued a press release to discount the rumors. The Commission's suit claimed that the company had violated rule lOb-5
because the press release created a misleading and deceptive
picture of the drilling progress as of the date of its issuance.
The Commission claimed that the company had favorable facts
which should have been disclosed in the release. In an en banc
opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that if the
press release were found to be misleading, then its issuance by
the corporation constituted a violation of rule lOb-5. 1
In applying Texas Gulf Sulphur to the question of affirmative disclosure, one must remember that in Texas Gulf Sulphur
the corporation was not held liable for the failure to disclose
its discovery, but rather for the misleading nature of its statements. The court held that once a corporation decides to speak,
only then must it be responsible for the truth and accuracy of
its disclosures. 8 2 The thrust was not toward an affirmative duty
to disclose. Indeed, in a footnote to the opinion, Judge Waterman stated:
We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immediately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the corporate officers entrusted with the management
of the corporation within the affirmative disclosure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC.83
Moreover, the cases indicate that in order for nondisclosure

to constitute a violation of rule lOb-5, there must also be evidence of manipulation,8 4 disregard of a duty to speak created
80

1n the interim, corporate insiders had been purchasing shares and calls
on the corporation's stock, and the SEC suit also concerned this insider
trading. However, insider trading is outside the topic of this paper and

this aspect of any of the cases will only be mentioned where central
to that portion of the court's holding or reasoning cited.
81 401 F.2d at 863. Upon remand the District Court found that the release
was misleading; therefore the company had violated rule 10b-5. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

82401

F.2d at 861-62. But see Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d

90, 110 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), rehearing
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).

83 401 F.2d at 850 n.12. Although this statement explicitly denies an obli-

gation of affirmative disclosure, its mention of the exchanges and the
SEC does allow for inferences to the contrary. See Section III, B, infra.
84 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42 (D. Colo. 1970); Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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by a special relationship,8 5 or some other form of deception or
unfair behavior through which the undisclosed information was
taken advantage of. 86 Absent such special facts, there are no
cases holding that a corporation has a general affirmative
obligation to disclose material information. In fact, in Wessel v.
Buhler,87 the Ninth Circuit seemed to rule out such a possibility.
Therein the complaint alleged that an independent auditor, by
failing to disclose his knowledge of a corporation's deficient financial records, had aided and abetted the corporation in violating
rule 10b-5. The court replied that "[w] e find nothing in rule
10b-5 that purports to impose liability on anyone whose conduct
consists solely of inaction."8 Nevertheless, Wessel should not
influence determination of a corporation's affirmative duty to
disclose for the following reasons: first, the suit was not against
the corporation, but was against a remote agent who had no
relation to the public; secondly, as indicated in the textual
analysis, if failure to disclose is to be covered by clause (2)
or clause (3) then such nondisclosure cannot be considered to
consist solely of inaction - it will need to be of a misleading or deceptive nature; finally, the holding in Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. directly contradicted
Wessel.89
Despite the above indications, the issue is not at all settled.
There are a least four recent cases which have mentioned, but
have expressly left unanswered, the question of whether a
corporation has an affirmative duty to disclose.90 Furthermore
there is a considerable amount of judicial language implying
the possibility of such a duty. In Judge Waterman's Texas Gulf
Sulphur opinion, there are several phrases which imply an
objective of full disclosure: a clause criticizing "the hiding and
secreting of important information;" an indication that a public
85 See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147

(7th Cir. 1969); Rothschild v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D.
Ill. 1971); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
(2d Cir. 1967);
86 See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393
Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
87437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
88 Id. at 283.
89 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966). The district court's holding that silence and inaction might violate rule 10b-5 as aiding or abetting was noted approvingly by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in deciding the appeal of the case
on its merits. However, such approval was only dictum. Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
90 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 99 (10th Cir. 1971);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 n.1 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 879 (1965); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp.
548, 562 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 90 (1971); Astor v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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corporation should not have a general "right to secrecy;" the
stated objective that the markets should be "indices of real
value." 91 In addition, in the earlier-quoted footnote, Judge
Waterman indicated that the court would abide by the disclosure requirements of the exchanges.92 In fact, by referring
to the corporate purpose served by the nondisclosure as a
justification for the nondisclosure, the court strengthened the
inference that it considered the timely disclosure policy of the
New York Stock Exchange to be applicable.' 3 If so, Texas Gulf
Sulphur can be said to require affirmative disclosure according
to the rules of the exchange upon which a company's securities are listed. Nevertheless, even assuming this interpretation the case could not be said to apply an affirmative disclosure obligation to unlisted companies.
In a successful suit by former shareholders against Texas
Gulf Sulphur for damages resulting from reliance on the April
12 press release, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the following:
[T]he duty to disclose facts when they become material has
not been altered by this decision . . [W]hen the material
information is available and ripe for publication, the difficulties
inherent in formulating a release cannot overbear the accuracy
94
of the statements contained therein.

Although the court does not define "available and ripe," the
context from which the above quote is taken is conducive to the
inference of an affirmative duty of disclosure.
Another judicial statement implying an affirmative duty
to disclose was made by the Supreme Court when it asserted
that a fundamental purpose of the Act was "to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor." 95
Notwithstanding the above, there is also some judicial
language which implies that a corporation may withhold material information as long as no one is taking advantage of it.
91 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1968).
Nevertheless, when considered in context it is difficult to argue that
these phrases are meant to apply to anything other than misrepresentations.
92 "We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immediately;
the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the
corporate officers entrusted with the management of the corporation
within the affirmative disclosure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968).
93The New York Stock Exchange policy of timely and adequate disclosure allows withholding material information in order to further a
proper corporate purpose.
4Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100 (10th Cir. 1971).
95 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
Also quoted in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970).
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A prime source is Judge Waterman's Texas Gulf Sulphur
opinion:
Thus anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public . . . or [if] he chooses
not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
96
securities concerned ....
Clearly, if the insider may "choose" not to disclose, then there
could not be a corporate duty of affirmative disclosure.
In a Second Circuit opinion by Judge Friendly, the court
stated that a corporation has no duty to correct rumors started
by others:
While a company may choose to correct a misstatement in the
find nothing in the securities
press not attributable to it . . . we
97
legislation requiring it to do so.
The implication here is that if a corporation is not required to
correct a rumor concerning material information, then it would
not be required- under the same legislation - to affirmatively
disclose material information.
Thus the existing judicial precedents under rule 10b-5 do
not impose a corporate duty of affirmative disclosure, yet they
do not deny it. Although there is judicial language which might
imply such a duty, there is also language which implies the
contrary. The situation is ambiguous. In search of classification, one can refer to the actual policy and reasoning pursued
by the courts in individual rule 10b-5 cases. There are two
lines of rule lOb-5 violations which are particularly relevant:
(1) violations for a misleading corporate statement in the
absence of trading by the corporation and its insiders, (2) violations for nondisclosure of later discovered facts which render
previously made statements false. The analysis which follows
each issue includes a discussion of its relevance to the establishment of an affirmative duty of disclosure.
1. Corporate Liability for a Misleading Statement in the
Absence of Trading by Insiders
In its en banc Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion,9s the Second Circuit Court of Appeals erased any remaining doubt that a corporation (or individuals) could violate rule lOb-5 although not
engaging in related securities transactions or otherwise acting
96 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)
(emphasis added).
97
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
949 (2d Cir. 1969).
98 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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with wrongful motives.9 9 The court reasoned that insofar as
the congressional purpose of investor protection is concerned,
its holding- which rendered insider trading and ulterior motives unnecessary - was consistent because the investing public may be harmed just as much by a statement whose inaccuracies are caused by negligence as by a statement whose
inaccuracies are created intentionally in furtherance of a
wrongful purpose. Secondly, the possibility of wrongful purpose is not eliminated merely because there has been no insider
trading. The misleading statement could have failed to affect
the market sufficiently to encourage insider trading, or the
purpose could have been something other than beneficial trading. Therefore, finding a violation for misleading statements
regardless of any evidence of wrongful intent fulfills the
primary purpose of investor protection without necessarily
punishing innocent intentions.
Nevertheless, the issue was not completely settled either
by the Second Circuit's opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur or by
the district court's actual finding upon remand that a rule
lOb-5 violation did exist, based upon the misleading nature of
the press release, the lack of due diligence by the issuers of
the statement, and the use of due care by the injured investors. 100 Because this case involved merely an injunctive
action by the Commission, it still had to be determined whether
a private action for damages could be sustained by alleging
that a company had made a misleading statement without
alleging the existence of any corporate or insider trading.
Two months after the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the Second
Circuit decided Heit v. Weitzen,'0 ' applying the same Texas
Gulf Sulphur reasoning to find a private right of action for
damages for a misleading statement in the absence of insider
trading under rule 10b-5. In Heit, the corporate defendant failed
to disclose that a substantial amount of its income for the 1964
fiscal year was derived from various overcharges on government
contracts. The court held that plaintiffs who purchased securities of the defendant corporation in reliance on the misleading
information in the press release were entitled to relief under
rule lOb-5 despite the lack of any evidence of corporate or
insider trading.
99 "There is no indication that Congress intended that the corporations or
persons responsible for the issuance of a misleading statement would
not violate the section unless they engaged in related securities transactions or otherwise acted with wrongful motives." Id. at 860.
100 SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
101 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

Although Heit v. Weitzen establishes a private right of
action for a misleading statement in the absence of trading by
the issuer of the statement, the facts do not necessarily justify
a private right of action as broad as the injunctive right established in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Because the corporate defendant in Heit was trying to conceal the source of its profits from
government officials, the misleading statements may be said
to have been motivated by a wrongful purpose. Therefore, the
case can be distinguished from a holding that insider trading
or other wrongful motives are not necessary for a violation
of rule 10b-5 (2). Heit v. Weitzen thus establishes that a violation of rule 10b-5 (2) in private suits can be found in the
absence of insider trading, 10 2 but, in that the corporation was
aware of the statement's misleading nature, it cannot be said
that this case negates the possibility of such a violation where
no wrongful purpose exists.
Thus, although the Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit cases may
stand for the principle that a violation of rule 10b-5 (2) can
occur by a corporation not trading in its securities and not
otherwise acting for wrongful puposes, it cannot be said
whether the same factors are sufficient to sustain a private suit
for damages. Furthermore, given the fact that a corporation
need not be trading in its own securities in order to violate
rule 10b-5 through a material misstatement, the courts are
not in agreement as to what - if any - degree of knowledge
or intent (i.e. wrongful purpose) on the part of the corporation
is necessary to sustain a private suit for damages.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion held that proof of negligence in issuing a misstatement was sufficient to sustain an
action for injunctive relief under rule 10b-5 (2), but declined to
decide whether mere negligence was sufficient in a private suit
for damages. 10 3 The Heit court held that an allegation of actual
knowledge of the falsity was a sufficient pleading to sustain
the action even if a strict scienter test were ultimately
applied.10 4 In its 1969 Globus decision, the Second Circuit again
indicated that something more than negligence, although less
than an actual intent to mislead was necessary in a private suit
for damages:
(S.D.N.Y.
1968).
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968). In fact,
a majority of the court indicated that they would require some sort of
scienter in a private suit for damages. See concurring opinion of Judge
Friendly joined by Judges Kaufman and Anderson, 401 F.2d at 864; and
dissenting opinion of Judge Moore, joined by Chief Judge Lumbard, 401
F.2d at 870.

102Id.; Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376
103

104

402 F.2d at 914.
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[The jury must conclude that defendants] knew the statement
was misleading or knew of the existence of facts, which if dis1 05
closed, would have shown it to be misleading.

On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit has stated explicitly that
mere negligence is enough for lOb-5 liability in a private suit
against the maker of a misleading statement.10 6
Similarly, in a suit by former shareholders of Texas Gulf
Sulphur claiming that the April 12, 1964, press release violated
rule lOb-5 because of its allegedly misleading nature,' 0 7 the
Tenth Circuit seems to be adopting the negligence standard as
well. In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the court held that
the corporate defendant would prevail only if it sustained the
burden of proving that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the
corporation could not have known that the statement included

08
a misrepresentation or an omission.
It is thus uncertain to what degree the corporate defendant
must intend or know of the misleading nature of its statements
in order to be liable in a private suit for damages under rule
lOb-5(2). Nevertheless, the reasoning of the Second Circuit has
prevailed: the application of rule lOb-5(2) to misleading statements does not depend upon contemporaneous trading by the
corporation and its insiders nor does it depend upon the existence of an ulterior motive in the issuance of a misleading press
release.
In holding that rule lOb-5 can be violated by issuing a misleading statement, despite the violator's failure to take advantage of his statement, the courts have moved away from some
of the traditional premises identified with rule lOb-5. Former
SEC Chairman Cary had defined the duty of disclosure in his
In re Cady, Roberts & Co. opinion. 1 9 In Cary's view it was not
until an insider attempted to take advantage of the information
that a violation of rule 10b-5 occurred. This rationale had continued and was repeated as recently as the original district court
proceeding against Texas Gulf Sulphur. 11 0

105 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290 (2d Cir. 1969).
106 City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.

1970).
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
108 Id. at 102. The Mitchell court cites City National Bank v. Vanderboom,
422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970) and Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961), for holding that scienter is not required to maintain a private
10b-5 damage action.
109 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
110 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In
fact, on the basis of the lack of any attempt by the corporate defendant
to take advantage of the misleading press release, Judge Bonsal held
that the company had not violated rule 10b-5, 258 F. Supp. at 294. As
noted in the text, the Second Circuit reversed this issue. 401 F.2d at

107 Mitchell

860-62.
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A second premise rendered inconsistent by the "taking
advantage is not necessary" holding was set forth in a 1951
opinion of the Delaware Federal District Court, Speed v. Transamerica Corp., when the court asserted that equalization of
bargaining position was the goal of rule lOb-5.11' Of course,
this reasoning was modified in order to apply the expansion of
rule 10b-5 to impersonal transactions on open-market exchanges,
and a modified version was restated in the Second Circuit
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur:
The core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the
rewards of participation in securities transactions . . . that all
members of the investing public should be subject to identical
market risks ....
The insiders here were not trading on an
equal footing with the outside investors.1 12
The contention here is not that such equal access to material information is no longer a goal of rule 10b-5, but rather
that by holding that taking advantage of material inside in-

formation is not necessary for a violation of rule 10b-5, the
courts are recognizing policy objectives in addition to the two
stated in Cady, Roberts and in Speed. If a corporation is held
to have violated rule 10b-5 by issuing a misleading press release
of which the company did not attempt to take advantage, then,
(1) the courts are no longer saying that it is the use of the

material information which constitutes a violation of rule
lOb-5, 1 3 and (2) enforcement of rule 10b-5 involves objectives
other than equal access to material information, because in the
case of the false financial statements in Heit (and theoretically
in the case of the misleading press release in Texas Gulf Sulphur) all of those trading had equal access to the false information and no access to the correct information: In other words,
the courts are pursuing the objective that the investing public
be accurately informed.
As indicated above, some courts have pursued an implicit
policy that investors be accurately informed. Other courts,
however, have made this policy explicit. In fact, several courts
have stated unequivocally that the congressional policy was,
and that the judicial policy is, to assure investors the continuous receipt of accurate information. In his Texas Gulf Sulphur

opinion, Judge Waterman indicates that the dominant purpose
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the promotion of free
M'Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).

112 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
11

Cases cited notes 109 & 110 supra, in addition to Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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and open securities markets. He then underscores the importance of a policy oriented toward accurate information by
quoting from a house committee report on the bill which eventually became the 1934 Act:114 "There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity." Later in the opinion, Judge
Waterman repeats what he considers to be the overriding concern in cases involving inaccurate corporate publicity:
Of even greater relevance to the Congressional purpose of
investor protection is the fact that the investing public may be
injured as much by one's misleading statement containing inaccuracies caused by negligence as by a misleading statement
115
published intentionally to further a wrongful purpose.

If Judge Waterman had considered the sole policy of rule
10b-5 to be equality among investors, then his statement quoted
above would have been inappropriate.
Given the fact that the courts, under rule 10b-5, are holding
companies responsible for the accuracy of the information they
issue even when they are not taking advantage of its inaccuracy, the question arises whether this policy includes holding
these companies responsible for complete disclosure of all material information. In other words, does a policy which requires
that all publicity be accurate and not misleading in effect require that the publicity be complete? Can a corporation's public
statements be totally accurate and not misleading if there is
material information which the corporation has not stated or
will not state when it becomes known? One cannot say
that a corporation's public statements are accurate unless such
statements include all material information available to the
corporation.
This position has been corroborated by judicial pronouncements which proclaim that the congressional purpose of investor protection can only be obtained by pursuing accurate
and complete disclosure for the investing public. One of the
most direct statements of this argument was made by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in a 1970 opinion:
The [Securities Exchange] Act was designed to eliminate deceptive and unfair practices in security trading and to protect the
116
public from inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information.

The court then proceeded to explain that, by protecting the
public from "inaccurate, incomplete and misleading informa401 F.2d at 858.
115 Id. at 860.
116 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970).
114
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tion," the investing public is given the opportunity "to make
knowing and intelligent decisions" in trading securities. 117
An equally recent opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals also indicates that disclosures must be complete as well
as accurate in order to carry out the purposes of both the
1934 Act and rule lOb-5:
Congress meant to afford investors a reasonable opportunity to
make knowing, intelligent decisions regarding their purchases
and sales of securities . . . and the loss resulting in connection
with purchases and sales made without benefit of such an opportunity is the type of injury section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
seek to prevent.'1 8
Thus, the courts seem to be arriving at the conclusion that
responsibility for the accuracy of disclosures, (regardless of the
motives for issuing them) entails responsibility for the completeness of disclosures. When considered in regard to an investor's attempt to make a rational investment decision, this
conclusion becomes inevitable. An investor who lacks knowledge of some undisclosed material information is theoretically
no more able to make a rational investment decision than one
possessing information which is somewhat untrue. Lack of
knowledge of such facts as a recently executed lucrative contract or a rich mineral strike may leave the investor just as
uninformed as if he had received an understatement of the
company's earnings. In either case he possesses inaccurate information. Therefore, if the courts desire to protect investors
from inaccurate information, they should require corporations
to disclose all material information.
2. Liability for Failure to Disclose Information which
Renders Previous Statements False
In Fischer v. Kletz,119 a New York federal district court
held that a company's independent auditors could be liable to
open-market investors under rule 10b-5 for a failure to disclose
newly acquired information that the company's published financial statements, certified by defendants, were false. The helpfulness of the holding in finding support for the affirmative
duty of disclosure described above is limited by the court's failure to mention which clause of the rule would be applicable.
120
Such a lumping of the clauses of rule 10b-5 is not unusual.
117 Id.
118 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970).

119 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
120

Most of the earlier rule lOb-5 cases are not concerned with distinguishing the clauses. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 56, § 2.6(3); Note, supra
note 57, at 826-27. Although many of the more recent cases do refer
to a particular clause or clauses, in the opinion of the author, this is

still not a predominant practice.
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The amicus curiae brief filed by the SEC in Fischer v.
Kletz indicates the Commission's view that the accountants'
failure to disclose constituted a violation of clause (3):
Failure by an accountant to disclose that financial statements
of a company which it has certified are false when it has become aware of that fact is, under Rule lOb-5 (3), an act or course
of business which operates as a fraud on persons in connection
121
with the purchase or sale of securities of that company.
If the court agreed with the Commission and was thinking of
clause (3) in upholding the action based on the accountants'
failure to disclose, its reasoning would be consistent with that
expressed in Cochran v. Channing:
Fraud may be accomplished by false statements, a failure to
correct a misleading impression by statements already made or
at all when there is a duty to come
...
by not stating anything
122
forward and speak.
The interesting question which emerges from this language is
why the nondisclosure operates as a fraud under rule 10b-5 (3):
Is it because the accountants failed to corrrect the misleading
impression made by the original financial statements or because, as certified public accountants, they had a special duty
of disclosure to the public?
The answer should not be clear and simple. It probably
involves a combination of the facts that (a) the defendants'
certification of financial statements is for investor protection
and (b) their earlier certification had become unwarranted.
Although the case emphasizes the special duty of an independent
auditor to the public, such emphasis was necessary in order to
distinguish the case from all available precedent which at that
time indicated that a violation of rule lOb-5 could not occur
unless the misleading or undisclosed information were somehow used to benefit the defendant. 12 3 Nevertheless, the important point is that the court found a violation of rule 10b-5
by the accountants' failure to disclose newly acquired information that the earlier statements were false. The court, and the
SEC, are saying that an investor can be defrauded by this failure to disclose. But the "fraud" does not involve any "cheat121

Brief for SEC as amicus curiae, Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) quoted in 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW § 7.4(2)

n.103.3 (1968).

211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
123 Even in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the lower court had followed
precedent by saying that there could be no violation of rule lOb-5 for
issuing a misleading press release unless those responsible, including
the corporation, somehow took advantage. SEC v. Texas Gulf ,Sulphur
Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals later reversed Judge Bonsal on this issue. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1968).
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court
ing" or unfair advantage taken by the accountants -the
the
does
Nor
any
gain.
receiving
not
they
are
that
recognizes
fraud involve unfairness between any two transacting or negotiating parties. Rather, the court is saying that the nondisclosure
operates as a fraud upon the public because they are dealing
with inaccurate, although not unequal, information.
The above reasoning is prescribed as a basis for holding a
corporation liable for failure to disclose material information
in the absence of corporate and insider trading. In both situations, nondisclosure does not confer any unfair advantages to
any parties. In both situations, the fraud involved is the misleading nature of the information possessed by the public.
This argument-that nondisclosure results in the same use
of misleading information by the investing public as does false
disclosure- parallels the argument made in the previous section concerning misleading statements.
However, the Fischer case represents the use of clause (3)
and therefore the taking of one additional step by the courts.
The Fischer court recognized that nondisclosure itself can operate as a fraud even when no one is taking advantage of the
fraud. 124 The Texas Gulf Sulfur and Heit cases stated the same
conclusion but with respect to misleading statements rather than
to nondisclosures.
Even if the Fischer case can be said to hold that a nondisclosure operates as a fraud when no one is taking unfair
advantage, the facts still present two variations from the hypothesized situation. First, the nondisclosure involved correction of a statement previously made. On this basis one could
argue that the court did not recognize an initial affirmative
duty to disclose, but rather a duty based only upon the former
misleading statement. Although this distinction may be theoretically accurate, its significance is questionable. In a normal business setting, a corporation continually makes certain disclosures. 125 When a material event occurs but is not disclosed,
earlier statements made by the corporation become misleading
to the extent that they are relied upon by investors. Thus, imposing an affirmative obligation to disclose material information
in the hypothesized setting serves to avoid misleading impres124

125

As stated earlier, this assumes that the court was looking to clause (3).
There is the remote possibility that the Fischer court was concerned
with clause (2). However, application of clause (2) would necessitate
an argument that there is absolute liability for a false statement even
though no one has taken unfair advantage of it. Thus denial of even
the defense of due diligence seems extremely unlikely, particularly at
the time of the Fischer decision.

See Sections I & II supra concerning corporate reporting requirements.
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sions created by previous disclosures just as does the imposition
of a duty to correct previous statements known to be false. The
only difference is that in the former situation, the subsequent
disclosure might not pertain to the specific topics dealt with
in the original disclosure.
The second distinguishing factor in the Fischer case is the
fact that the nondisclosing party was an independent certified
public accountant whose task was to certify the financial statements for the protection of public investors. It might be argued
that there is a unique relationship between an independent auditor and the public which might impose a "duty to come for12 7
ward and speak. '126 Indeed, in Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co.,
the court cited Fischer in emphasizing the special position of an
independent auditor. But the court's purpose in holding that
"[t]he issuance of a financial statement by an independent
128
auditing firm is not the same as the issuing of a press release"'
was to establish that independent auditors, as opposed to other
corporate insiders, could be held liable for misstatements which
they had caused even if they did not benefit from them. As
indicated earlier, after the appellate decisions in Texas Gulf
Sulphur and Heit, such a showing was no longer necessary. In
fact, the Heit court, with essentially the same facts as the
Drake court, found a cause of action to exist under rule lOb-5
without an allegation of a special relationship between an inde129
pendent auditor and the public.
Even if one includes Fischer within the "duty to come
forward and speak" category, a corporation's duty to disclose
material information should also be included within this same
category. It seems artificial to argue that there is more of a
special relationship between an independent auditor hired by
corporate management and the investing public than there is
between corporate management and the very shareholders by
whom they were elected. A duty arising from this latter relationship is recognized in SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. 30
In that case, the president of a corporation had issued an accurate press release on February 6. Within 2 weeks, unfavorable
developments rendered the release misleading, but the company
made no announcement of the changed circumstances until May
12. The court's initial reaction was that:
126 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
127 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
128 Id. at 105.
129 Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
130 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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The public had the right to know that negotiations were no
longer concluded . . . [because these] facts . . . would have put
investors on notice that the February 6th release was no longer
13
worthy of reliance. '
Speaking of the corporation, the court found that "[i] ts silence
in the face of such knowledge is inexcusable." 1 3 2 Although the
corporation was held not to have violated rule lOb-5 because
there was no showing that it derived any benefit, the language
of the court makes it clear that such a violation would have
been found under the "no gain is necessary" doctrine which was
subsequently accepted in Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit. Thus the
Shattuck court found that the corporation's relationship to its
shareholders obliged it to disclose the falsity of previously made
statements. Therefore, although in light of Heit the Fischer holding does not depend upon the "unique" relation of an independent auditor to the shareholders of the corporation,' 33 any argument supporting the significance of this relationship would have
to acknowledge Shattuck's determination that the relationship
4
between management and the shareholders is equally special.1
Thus once more, the courts are utilizing rule 10b-5 to insure
dissemination of complete and accurate information in order to
enable investors to make intelligent investment decisions. In so
using rule 10b-5, the courts have indicated that failure to dis,close material information to the investing public operates as
a fraud upon investors. As expressed above, this policy cannot
be pursued effectively unless companies are compelled to make
timely disclosure of all material information.
C.

Position of the SEC

In addition to the holdings and implications of past cases,
the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission is likely
to be an important determinant of whether rule 10b-5 provides
an affirmative obligation to disclose. It is noteworthy that the
Commission did not claim that Texas Gulf Sulphur's failure
to disclose its discovery was itself a violation of rule 10b-5.
Indeed, this has been taken by some to indicate that, at least
in 1966, the Commission felt that a corporation had a right to
withhold material information as long as it was not trading in
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 476.
133 Any obligation emanating from the relationship between corporate
management and the corporation's shareholders is immediately expanded to apply to the public. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
913-14 (1961).
134 See also Rothschild v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
in which the Court dismissed a 10b-5 action for nondisclosure, but implied that the cause might be valid if defendants occupied a management-shareholder relationship with plaintiffs.
131

132
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its stock. 135 On the other hand, the publication of two relatively
recent releases indicates that the Commission is taking a more
aggressive stand.
In a 1970 release, the Commission directly stated that corporations should be making "prompt disclosure . . . of material
corporate developments, both favorable and unfavorable" in
36
order to maintain investor confidence in the securities market.'
The statement asserted that a company "has an obligation to
make full and prompt announcements of material facts regarding the company's financial condition" in addition to compliance
with the statutory reporting requirements. In a statement especially relevant to this article, the Commission asserted the
following:
Not only must material facts affecting the company's operations
be reported; they must also be reported promptly. Corporate
releases which disclose personnel changes, the receipt of new
contracts, orders and other favorable developments but do not
even suggest existing adverse corporate developments do not
serve the public needs and may violate the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... 137

These quotes tend to indicate that the SEC believes that publicly held corporations have an affirmative obligation to make
timely disclosure of material corporate developments and that
failure to do so involves a violation of rule 10b-5. Nevertheless,
the Commission's statement involves somewhat special facts
and is not necessarily applicable to the hypothesized case.
The SEC's position concerning a corporation's affirmative
duty to disclose material information is corroborated by a
subsequent 1971 release concerning mandatory disclosures in
registration for a public offering:
Disclosure of factual information in response to inquiries or
resulting from a duty to make prompt disclosure under the antifraud provisions of the securities acts.., at a time when a regis'35

136
137

Address by David Ferber, Solicitor, SEC, Before the New York Society
of Security Analysts, Feb. 17, 1966, p. 4-5. (Text furnished on loan
basis by Mr. Ferber's office).
Furthermore, in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970), the Commission contended in its amicus
brief that neither Bangor Punta nor Piper Corporation was obligated
to announce a material agreement between them as long as there was
no trading by those privy to the information. (Dissenting opinion of
Chief Judge Lumbard, 426 F.2d at 579). The significance of this position is difficult to assess because of its self-serving nature for the Commission: The suit claimed that Bangor Punta had violated § 5 of the
1933 Act by disclosing an estimate of the value of the agreement. The
defendant contended that it had an obligation to disclose the material
fact. Such obligation had to be denied in order to support this action
for violation of § 5 of the Securities Act.
Securities Act Release No. 5092, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8995, Investment Company Act Release No. 6209 (Oct. 15, 1970).
Sources cited note 136 supra.
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tered offering . . . is . .. in process ....
should be effected
in a manner which will not unduly influence the proposed
38

offering.1

Thus, the SEC appears ready to require affirmative disclosure
by corporations not trading in their stock. At the present time,
however, they have not yet done so. As with the issues in
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Commission will probably wait for
arrival of the right facts and circumstances in order to enhance
its chances of success.
D. Summary of Rule 10b-5 as Source of an Affirmative Duty
In the search for a source to provide an affirmative corporate obligation to disclose, a brief tour through the extensive world of rule 10b-5 leaves one with many possibilities but
no actualities. The words of the rule provide hope, particularly
in certain "special" - but not extraordinary -circumstances.
But under a strict or literal construction, the words require the
following interpretational help from the courts: (1) Can failure
to disclose material information as it becomes available be misleading because it modifies a statement made some time previously? (2) Is a former shareholder being "reasonable" in
assuming that nondisclosure indicates the absence of any material developments?
The cases provide no explicit help. Several courts have
reached, but have not touched, the question of affirmative disclosure. The holdings have repeatedly avoided the issue. Nevertheless, the tools are presently available for an ambitious court,
desiring to take advantage of them, to rule on the issue. From
its recent statements, the SEC appears ready -either
as a
plaintiff or as an amicus- to argue for affirmative disclosure.
Furthermore, the courts have made policy statements concerning
the legislative objectives of investor protection which seem rationally to justify an affirmative obligation to disclose. For example, judicial pronouncements have focused on the importance
of the following: (a) integrity and honesty in securities markets, (b) accurate and complete information to investors, (c)
investor confidence in the securities markets, and (d) sufficient
information to make rational and knowledgeable investment
decisions. In addition, most courts agree that the anti-fraud
provisions are to be interpreted flexibly in order to realize the
congressional purpose of investor protection.
Finally, and most importantly, among the tools available
are the rationale and policy objectives expressed by the courts
138

Securities Act Release No. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971).
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in reaching past decisions. The policy goal of protecting investors
from misleading statements or from failure to disclose the subsequently discovered falsity of a previously issued statement
cannot be attained without protecting the investor from material
nondisclosures. The effect of each is the same.
In conclusion, under present law rule lOb-5 does not impose
a general affirmative obligation for a corporation to disclose
material information. Yet, given the words of the rule, the
judicially acknowledged congressional purpose, the posture of
the SEC, and the reasoning and policy behind the existing judicial precedent, rule lOb-5 provides the tools and material for
formally constructing such an obligation.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF AFFIRMATiVE DIscLOsURE

The preceding sections of this article have attempted to
locate authority for imposing an affirmative obligation to disclose upon a publicly held corporation. At this point, the focus
shall shift to an examination of the advantages gained and the
practicalities encountered in implementing such an obligation.
A.

Advantages Resulting from Affirmative Disclosure
Full and immediate disclosure of material information eliminates the possibility that insiders will take unfair advantage
of their proximity to inside information. Not only would timely
disclosure significantly reduce unfair trading by insiders and
their tippers, but it would also prevent the unfair trading
which is made possible by inevitable leaks of information to
those not even employed by the particular corporation. 139 This
result would increase the opportunity for all traders to have
equal access to material information concerning publicly held
corporations. As a result, the Second Circuit's objective of
"equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions" 140 would be greatly enhanced.
'39

This idea was reaffirmed in informal individual interviews held in
April 1972, with two portfolio managers in Boston. In spite of their
different perspectives, they reacted to the idea of affirmative disclosure
with surprising similarity. Each of the portfolio managers felt that the
most important consequence of affirmative disclosure would be the
virtual elimination of insider trading. The two portfolio managers
interviewed had quite different outlooks. One is involved in eliciting
full and nontraditional forms of disclosure from publicly held corporations. He is particularly concerned with disclosure regarding a corporation's policy toward minority employment and environmental issues.
He immediately suggested that his views not be regarded as typical
because of his personal commitment to full disclosure. The other portfolio manager is a more traditional financially oriented analyst. Both
individuals are employed by nationally prominent financial institutions.
Because of his company's very rigid policy, the name of one of the portfolio managers must be withheld. For the sake of uniformity, the name

of the other will be withheld as well.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1968).

140 SEC v.
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The current state of the law presents a second advantage
which would result from affirmative disclosure. At the present
time, even in the absence of insider trading, a corporation will
be held responsible for the misleading nature of its statements
once it has decided to speak.1 4 1 But if the corporation decides
not to disclose, it does not risk liability. Under these circumstances, a corporation is encouraged to adhere to a policy of
nondisclosure. However, if an affirmative duty of disclosure were
imposed upon the corporation, it would then be forced to speak.
Thus, a steady stream of corporate information would flow
into the securities markets.
A third group of advantages to be gained from full disclosure concern those accruing to the investing public. The SEC's
Special Study of Securities Markets reported that "[t]he deliberate withholding of news by companies can be as harmful
to investors as the release of inaccurate or overoptimistic
news.' 1 42 Given more timely and complete information, investors will be able to make more rational and knowledgeable
decisions. They will have more confidence in the securities
markets, and should be better able to compare the value of one
security with that of another. As a result, investors could buy
securities at a more accurate price and would be less prone
to "uneconomic" investments.
Finally, and closely related to the advantages for the investing public, are the advantages gained by the securities markets themselves. If a policy of affirmative corporate disclosure
were adopted, the consequence of a continuous and timely
flow of corporate information would help to bolster investor
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets. In all
likelihood, this increased confidence would give rise to a constant or even increased level of investor participation. Increases
in both investor confidence and participation are important
because of the crucial role which the securities markets play
in financing business.
The economy also gains from full disclosure because of
the resulting improvement in the allocative efficiency of the
capital markets. 143 With full and timely disclosure, investors
will make more rational investment decisions, and more funds
141

Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
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U.S.
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92 (1963).
Id. at 16. See also Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate
Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 565, 577
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will be channeled into the more efficient and productive companies. However, normal trading between investors (i.e., on the
exchanges or over-the-counter) has no direct effect on the
allocation of capital resources because the companies receive
nothing. But when a company later comes out with an offering
of securities to raise more capital, investors will use the additional information to determine if this particular issue represents a more efficient use of their funds. This improved allocation of capital resources represents a long-term gain for the
national economy.
B.

Practical Problems of Implementation

Given the above advantages realizable from a corporation's
duty to affirmatively disclose all material information, there
are .definite problems presented by the implementation of such
a duty. The first major problem is determining what should be
disclosed. Corporate management will be forced to make continual determination of what is material. This is certainly not
a new problem because determinations of materiality have already been necessary to comply with various provisions of the
securities acts.1 4 4 Yet, because of the existence of an affirmative duty, the number of such determinations will increase.
There is certainly information which an investor might find
to be material at the moment it first appears, but which would
not be considered material if disclosed with a good deal of other
information at the end of a 30-day or 90-day period.
If in doubt concerning what should be disclosed, management would tend to "play it safe" by disclosing everything.
This leads to two undesirable consequences. First, the investing
public will be flooded with disclosures. Rather than being able
to use the information most rationally, there is the danger that
they will be confronted with an unmanageable amount and
tend to ignore it altogether. Secondly, by disclosing everything,
directors will become more vulnerable to liability for disclosures which are misleading because they were made prematurely.
The problem of what to disclose is real but not overwhelming. Although there would undoubtedly be more determinations of materiality, after a short time a corporation should
be able to handle them almost mechanically. In general, the
type of information would ordinarily fit into recurring patterns.
Should the public begin to ignore certain kinds of disclosures
144 E.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12, 17(a), -15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77g(a) (1970);

SEA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
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because of their continual appearance, it would seem that the
test for materiality could be accommodated to exclude those
types of information which a reasonable investor would not
utilize. 145 Finally, a careful corporate management could avoid
undue liability for premature disclosure by qualifying its initial statements with honest indications of the possibility of contrary developments.
Related to the problem of materiality, the question arises
as to whether a duty of affirmative disclosure would result in
a flood of litigation overflowing the courts. For example, an
investor who purchased a company's common stock on June 1
might realize a loss by selling the stock on July 8 in the wake
of the company's timely disclosure that its June operations
were subpar. If he later found that the company had taken
some undisclosed action in May, such as firing one of its 25
vice-presidents, it is conceivable that he could sue for failure
to disclose on the basis that he would not have purchased had
he known of the intervening action. If such suits were permitted to prevail, the courts could conceivably be inundated
with them. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the
courts would be able to avoid this problem by a few initially
strict holdings concerning proof of materiality and actual reliance. Knowledge of such precedent should be effective in
discouraging further frivolous litigation.
Another major problem area concerns dissemination. Assuming that all of the proper information is disclosed, how
can it be circulated to everyone equally? Even if it were agreed
that publication in the Wall Street Journal would satisfy the
obligation of equal dissemination, the problem would not be
ultimately solved since any single newspaper cannot be expected
to have room for all such disclosures requested by diverse corporate managements. It is likewise doubtful that the financial
wire services have the capacity to carry all such disclosures.
Notwithstanding the above, it must still be admitted that dissemination is a difficult problem for the smaller publicly held
companies even under present disclosure requirements. The financial media have space limitations and are not likely to print
news concerning relatively few people or dollars. Yet, an increased number of disclosures would aggravate this problem
considerably.
A suggested solution to the dissemination problem is to
compel a mailing of the disclosure to each shareholder. But this
145

See definition of materiality in INTRODUCTION supra.
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is not only extremely expensive, it also presents problems of
timing and, most objectionably, gives an unfair advantage to
shareholders over nonshareholders. For smaller regional companies, dissemination might be accomplished by publication of
disclosures in newspapers located in areas of stockholder concentration. Although there are no entirely satisfactory solutions to the dissemination problem, it must be recognized that
this problem exists under existing disclosure requirements and
is therefore not unique to affirmative disclosure.
Affirmative disclosure entails a third major problem area:
the possible negative effects of disclosure on the corporation's
business or competitive position. The courts have been quick
to recognize the urgency of this problem, and have justified
a company's failure to disclose on the basis of a valuable corporate purpose 146 or competitive reasons 147 without having declared nondisclosure by itself to be improper.
If the corporate purpose doctrine or competitive position
theory were allowed to justify nondisclosure in a situation
compelling affirmative disclosure, the latter duty would be
considerably undermined. A corporation desiring not to disclose
something could theoretically find some corporate purpose by
which to justify its silence. The problem of setting standards
for judging the existence of a proper corporate purpose is an
extremely perplexing one. In the end, such standards would
have to place tremendous reliance and pressure upon the courts.
Judicial rejection of a defense of proper corporate purpose would
entail detailed examination of the operations of the business
involved. Furthermore, corporate management would be left
with few objective criteria by which to plan its future disclosures. Although there is little doubt that over time the
courts could develop adequate doctrines and standards for
applying the "corporate purpose" exception to affirmative disclosure, the difficulties, ambiguities, and numerous litigation
certain to arise represent significant costs in implementing an
affirmative duty to disclose.
In addition to the above advantages and disadvantages resulting from affirmative disclosure, one must also consider what
sanctions to impose upon the corporation for violation of such
a duty. There are numerous issues to be considered in determining when and why an individual should be able to recover from
a corporation which has not derived any benefit from the im146 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968).
147 Doglow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1971).
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proper disclosure.14 But most of these issues are also encountered in cases of misleading statements made in the absence of
corporate trading and are therefore not unique to the situation
being considered.'4 9
As indicated in the discussion of pertinent case law herein,
the various circuits differ as to whether mere negligence is
sufficient to sustain an action for private damages under rule
10b-5.150 In the Second Circuit, although actual knowledge of
151
the falsity of a statement is enough to sustain the action,
something more than mere negligence is required. In the Tenth
Circuit, failure to exercise due care is sufficient for allowing
private damages. 1 52 Therefore, if affirmative disclosure were
required, a private action for damages for failure to disclose
would involve no new problems in the Tenth Circuit. Upon a
showing that the defendant had abrogated his duty to disclose
and that the plaintiff had relied to his detriment, the outcome
would depend upon whether defendant's failure to disclose resulted from a lack of due diligence.
On the other hand, in the Second Circuit, the plaintiff
would have to show that the defendant possessed some degree
of scienter. 1 53 But in a case in which the defendant has been
completely silent and has derived no benefit from this silence,
scienter - even of a minor degree - could be extremely difficult
to prove. In Heit v. Weitzen15 4 the scienter requirement was
fulfilled by defendant's knowledge of the falsity. Analogously
in a suit for nondisclosure, one would have to establish the
defendant's knowledge of the materiality of the information
withheld. In the absence of any statement by defendant regarding this information or of any benefit to defendant for withholding it, such knowledge would seem very difficult to prove.
In the Globus case' 55 the court seemed to apply a less
demanding standard. The scienter requirement was satisfied if
defendants were aware of facts which, if disclosed, would have
made the statements in question misleading. Applying this standard to an abrogation of affirmative disclosure, one would have
148

See, e.g., Note, supra note 57.

Other such questions include the huge potential liability and whether
innocent shareholders should have to pay indirectly.
150 Texas Gulf Sulphur held that mere negligence could sustain an action
for injunctive relief.
151 Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
152 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
153 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir.
1969).
154 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
149

155 418 F.2d at 1290.
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to prove that defendants were aware of undisclosed facts which
would be considered material. This standard seems easier to
prove in the case of a nontalking, nondealing corporate defendant
than is the standard in Heit. Nevertheless, it is much more difficult to prove the state of knowledge possessed by a silent defendant who is making no use of the undisclosed information.
Therefore, in a jurisdiction requiring more than mere negligence to establish private damages under rule lOb-5, a plaintiff's chances of success may be lessened as a result of the
difficulty of proving even a limited degree of scienter. In other
words, if some degree of willfulness is necessary to establish
damages in a suit for failure to disclose, then the vast majority
of such suits may be forced to limit recovery to injunctive
relief.
On the other hand, in a jurisdiction requiring only negligence for recovery under rule 10b-5, the imposition of an affirmative obligation to disclose will raise the usual objections concerning fairness to the innocent shareholder and the enormous
156
potential liability to the corporation.
Conclusion and Proposal
Given the foregoing consequences of an affirmative obligation to disclose, the net gains to be realized would be maximized
if the civil sanction resulting from all violations of affirmative
disclosure were limited to injunctive relief. The injunctive
measures available should include the suspension of trading
of the securities involved as well as ordering compliance with
the requirement of affirmative disclosure. 1 7 Limiting the civil
sanctions to injunctive relief of this nature will allow realization of the advantages of affirmative disclosure: (1) insider
cheating is still deterred; (2) a steady flow of information to
the securities markets is maintained; and (3) investors are given
the advantage of full disclosure. On the other hand, some of
the major disadvantages of an affirmative disclosure requirement are avoided: (1) spurious, court-clogging suits are eliminated; (2) management is not forced to waste time and resources in over-disclosing as a means of "playing it safe;" and
(3) innocent shareholders avoid indirect liability. Most importantly, the objectives of the 1934 Act including those of general
fairness are satisfied simultaneously. Investors are provided
maximum information by a requirement of full disclosure, but
C.

156See concurring opinion of Judge Friendly. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968).
157 These remedies are presently available for violation of the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
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they are not given windfall profits for losses sustained in dealing
at arm's length with someone who had no more access to corporate information than they.
By limiting actions for nondisclosure (when there is no
corporate benefit) to a remedy of injunctive relief, the plaintiff
need only establish negligence on the part of the corporate
defendant. Therefore, the difficulties inherent in proving some
degree of scienter by a silent, nondealing corporation are eliminated. Nevertheless, a private party may still recover damages
for nondisclosure involving willful conduct if he can prove a
claim either of manipulation or deception, '5 or of aiding and
abetting." 9 The SEC may also sue for willful nondisclosure
through section 32(a) of the 1934 Act.160
V.

SUMMARY

The issue of whether a corporation has an affirmative
obligation to disclose material information has been presented
by many sources but remains unresolved. The reporting requirements of the 1934 Act succeed as periodic reports but fail as
current disclosures. They fail to achieve timeliness, and they
lack the dissemination necessary to inform the investing public.
The disclosure policies of the major stock exchanges are also
insufficient. They qualify substantively but are inadequate because of their limited applicability.
Rule 10b-5 is the most promising basis for affirmative disclosure. Yet a literal interpretation of this rule does not provide
sufficient authority for a general obligation to disclose. The
cases treating rule 10b-5 have also failed to address the question
directly. Nevertheless, they offer logical reasoning and judicial
policy which are consistent with an obligation of affirmative
disclosure. Given these precedents and the position of the SEC,
a progressive court could reasonably find an affirmative duty
of corporate disclosure.
The prospective consequences of a duty of affirmative disclosure suggest that the availability of an action for private
damages would create many problems without significantly
increasing the benefits. For this reason, it is submitted that
the rationale of rule lOb-5 should be extended to impose an
affirmative corporate obligation to disclose material information
and the sanction for violation of such obligation should be
limited to injunctive relief.
158

See cases cited notes 84-86 supra.

159 See note 89 supra.

160 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).

PUBLIC UTILITIES AND STATE ACTION:
THE BEGINNING OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
By ROGER S. HAYD0CK*

Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co. represents the first case
in which a federal court of appeals found sufficient state action
to hold a privately owned public utility to constitutional restraints. Specifically, the court found that in threatening to
terminate utility services to subscribers,a privately owned public
utility acted within "color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. Mr. Haydock, the attorney of record who successfully argued the Ihrke position in this decision, advances in the
following article a number of arguments which are designed to
demonstrate that all privately owned public utility companies
should be held subject to the principles of state action.
It is our job to see to it that you are given a chance to
live. If utilities will help, it is our job- our duty- to

provide them.
We believe a public utility has great public obligations.
We want to build brighter lives for all of us.
-A

Public Utility Advertisement

TILITY subscribers have attempted to hold utility companies to their stated obligations and responsibilities.' Consumers in many states have questioned the propriety of rate
U

increases sought by utility companies. 2 Subscribers in other
states have appeared before numerous governmental public utility commissions calling for the revision of rules regulating utilities. National welfare rights organizations have organized local
opposition to utility operations which discriminate against the
*

Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul,

Minnesota; formerly Chief Counsel with Legal Assistance of Ramsey
County, St. Paul, Minnesota; A.B., St. Mary's College (Minnesota),
1967; J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 1969; Reginald Heber
Smith Community Lawyer Fellow, University of Pennsylvania, 1970.
1 Senator Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer in their book OVERCHARGE (1967)
describe in detail the practices of public utilities and offer a blistering
attack on the failure of utility companies to live up to their public
obligations.
2 See In re Tuscon Gas & Elec. Co., 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 769 (Apr. 1972);
In re Public Serv. Co., 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 206 (Dec. 1969); Consumers Educ. & Protective Ass'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 206

(Dec. 1969).
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poor. 3 Environmental groups have demanded that utility companies preserve and protect natural resources which are now
being so heavily exploited.
Amidst all these challenges, the utility companies have
emerged relatively unscathed and continue to operate in the
ways of the past.4 While consumers have petitioned courts and
administrative agencies for redress of grievances allegedly caused
by utilities, such forums have been slow to respond. However,
recently within 3 months of one another, two federal circuit
courts and three federal district courts ruled on the question
of whether certain collection practices of privately owned utility companies constituted state action. Three courts held in
the affirmative; two held in the negative.
State action, the constitutional issue before these courts,
concerns the safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States which prohibit the deprivation of individual rights by those who act under governmental authority,
sanction, or direction. 5 To recover in such an action, the complaining party must show that (1) the actions of the party
complained of constitute governmental or state action and that
(2) such actions violate certain of an individual's rights, privileges, or immunities as defined by the Constitution. The successful application of this formula, as accomplished in three of
the above decisions, greatly enhances the consumer's ability to
challenge the operations and activities of privately owned public
service companies in a judicial forum. To that end this article
specifically focuses on the first of the two elements of the constitutional equation by demonstrating that the actions of privately owned public utility companies constitute governmental
or state action. This focus establishes a basis for suits asserting
that constitutional rights- such as due process and equal protection - should be applied to restrain utility companies.
In demonstrating that the actions of privately owned utilities constitute state action, the first part of this article will briefly analyze the five recent decisions mentioned above. Part II
will then present five separate areas of analysis, each of which
3 See, e.g., Carbondale W.R.O. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 5

CLEAR-

REv. 333 (Oct. 1971).
4 While this article will later argue that the government has subjected
utility corporations to heavy regulation, such regulatory commissions
have not included representatives of consumer groups, minority organizations, or environmental groups. Often such regulation has served and
advanced the needs of the utility companies themselves, largely ignoring the public trust.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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is sufficient in itself to demonstrate that privately owned public
utilities are subject to state action concepts.
A.

I.
The Ihrke Decision

RECENT DECISIONS

In Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 6 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that this privately owned public utility,
in threatening to terminate gas and electric services to a subscriber, acted within color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. Northern States Power (Northern) threatened to
terminate utility services to the Ihrkes for failure to pay a past
bill and a utility security deposit. The Ihrkes disputed paying
this bill and deposit and, on behalf of a class of subscribers,
sought judicial relief by way of a declaratory judgment and
an injuction, alleging that the collection practices of Northern
violated their due process rights. The Ihrkes alleged that Northern routinely terminated gas and electric services without
affording subscribers timely notice and an opportunity to be
heard in opposition to such termination.
After granting the Ihrkes an initial temporary restraining
order, the federal district court found that Northern had no
constitutional obligation because the utility company was simply
a private corporation going about the business of selling utility
services. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding it "abundantly
clear" that Northern's activities constituted state action. After
reviewing the extensive regulatory scheme within which the
utility operated, the Eighth Circuit found Northern to be so
entwined with governmental control as to render the public
utility a state actor:
Federal courts have generally recognized private conduct as
"color of law" or "state action" when it performs a "public"
7
function and is subjected to "public" regulation.

B. The Palmer Decision
The day before the Eighth Circuit decided Ihrke, the federal
district court in Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co.8 held similarly
that the privately owned public utility acted under color of law
in terminating services to utility subscribers without notice or
hearing. Ohio regulated this and other similar utilities by a
myriad of state statutes and through the jurisdiction of the
Ohio Public Utilities Commission. After noting the monopolistic
6 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (Oct. 10,
1972).
7 Id. at 569.
8 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
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status of the Columbia Gas Company and the specific statutes
authorizing the utility to terminate gas service for alleged nonpayment of a bill, the court held:
Clearly these statutes, particularly the latter one, show that
the governmental relations with the defendant are far different and far greater than the mere provisions for enfranchisement of ordinary business enterprises. The state's thumb
is indeed heavy upon the scales ....
When the defendant's collectors enter upon private property
to carry out the procedures necessary to shut off a customer's
gas, they are acting in a governmental capacity, and exercising the police power of the state .... 9
The Stanford Decision
Following the lead of the Ihrke and Palmer courts, the
federal district court in Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 10 held a
privately owned public utility to be existing and operating
under color of state law. The court relied on several factors
for its conclusion: the "extreme regulation" by the State of
Kansas over the gas company's right to and method of business,
the "complete monopoly" enjoyed by the company in furnishing
an "essential commodity," and the "public function" performed
by the company in the "public interest." These activities, the
court concluded, lost any "private character" and consequently
subjected this utility to constitutional restraints."
C.

The Jackson Decision
In a departure from the three previous decisions, the district court in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. held that a
privately owned public utility did not act under color of law
in terminating utility services to a subscriber.' 2 The court
adopted the utility company's argument that in order for state
action to exist the state must be involved not simply with the
institution whose activity is alleged to have inflicted the injury,
but that the state must be involved with the activity that
caused the injury. This state action concept has not been arD.

' Id. at 245-46.

10 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972).
11 Id. at 722.
12

348 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1972).

The court did not consider the

state's indirect involvement with the utility's collection practices, which
could affect the state action question. See United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 750 (1965). States, including Pennsylvania, do not require

utility companies to file tariffs for frivolous reasons, but rather to overview the operation of the companies and regulate activities taken under
those tariffs. Upon accepting such tariffs, a state deems the tariff
to be reasonable and places a governmental imprimatur on such rules.
A state does not accept responsibily for the filing of unreasonable tariffs,
but would require the utility to modify such tariffs and make them reasonable. The court in Jackson did not consider these involvements of

the State of Pennsylvania.
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ticulated in any previous Supreme Court decision, and its narrow application stands in conflict with many Supreme Court
decisions expanding state action. The predominant thrust of
the decisions will be discussed in the second part of this article.
E. The Lucas Decision
In a case with a result similar to that in Jackson, the Seventh Circuit in Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. 1 3 held that
this privately owned public utility did not operate under color of
law in threatening to terminate services to the plaintiff subscriber. The Seventh Circuit in several previous decisions involving similar activities of public utilities found state action
absent. Not surprisingly perhaps, the court reaffirmed those
decisions. 4
However, that portion of the Lucas opinion which concerned
itself with state action failed to present a complete, convincing
argument and disregarded the similarities in the above three
cases which supported a finding of state action. Specifically, the
decision largely ignored the facts of the case, disregarded the
history of public utilities, failed to consider their public function
and service to the public interest, and summarily dismissed their
monopolistic status. 15 Because state action decisions turn primarily on such facts as the above, 1 the court's failure to deal with
these vital circumstances casts suspicion on the validity of
17
this decision.
In its footnotes, used primarily to distinguish other state
action cases, the court concerned itself with the recent decision
of Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.1 The court improperly relied
on this decision to support its holding. Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Moose Lodge found no state action be13 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
14 In Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 846 (1969), the Seventh Circuit found no state action in the
conduct of a privately owned public utility where that company terminated commercial telephone service to a subscriber. The court found
that the telephone company had only filed its own regulations with the
state and that the state did not benefit from, encourage, request, or
cooperate in the suspension of service. Subsequently, in Particular
Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1972),
the court again found the state not sufficiently involved in the utility
company's practice of charging security deposits to convert such conduct into state action. Though a regulation issued by the Illinois Commerce Commission specifically permitted the company to charge a
security deposit, the court held that the regulation did not enlarge the
company's right in the absence of statute or regulation to charge deposits, but rather limited such deposits to reasonable amounts.

15 466 F.2d at 641-44.

16 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), quoted
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).

17 See 466 F.2d at 641-44.
1s 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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cause: (1) the private club was not open to the public, (2)
the club did not serve a public function, (3) the lodge did not
have a monopoly on liquor licenses, and (4) the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board did not establish or enforce the discriminatory club policies. In Lucas, on the other hand, each and every
one of these criteria were fulfilled: the privately owned public
utility (1) served the public, (2) performed a public or governmental function, (3) had a monopoly and (4) was subject
to governmental regulations to establish and enforce its policies.
Moose Lodge sets down criteria defining lack of state action.
At the other end of the spectrum, direct action by the government constitutes the most obvious example of state action.
Privately owned public utilities do not resemble the state action
concepts espoused in Moose Lodge but rather closely resemble
the function, interests, and authority of a governmental unit.1 9
F.

The Lucas Dissent

The dissenting opinion in Lucas analyzed the facts and applied the principles of state action as found in the Ihrke, Palmer,
and Stanford decisions. 20 Judge Sprecher in his dissent began
with the historical common law distinction between a private
business and a public utility concluding that, at the time of
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, "pervasive regulation by the state was limited
to the natural monopolies, public utilities which enjoyed extensive public privileges and to which citizens were compelled to
19 In fact, with regard to public utility cases, Moose Lodge stands as prece-

dent for declaring such privately owned utilities subject to constitutional requirements due to inherent state action. The Court in Moose
Lodge did find color of law in the club's compliance with a state regulation reading: "Every club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions
of its Constitution and By-laws." Id. at 181. The private club in discriminating against blacks followed its by-laws. The Court concluded
that action taken under such by-laws, action which was in turn sanctioned by the state through this requirement, constituted state action.
The above liquor regulation closely resembles state regulations
promulgated by public utility commissions or enacted by state legislatures requiring utility companies to adhere to their practices as set out
in their filed tariffs. These tariffs, for instance, detailing such things as
collections operations, resemble the by-laws of the Moose Lodge and,
accordingly, the enforcement of such tariffs by the public utility constitutes state action under the holding in Moose Lodge.
20 State action within the scope of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution bears the identical meaning with "color of state law"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970). United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1965). The Court therein cited as support: Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th
Cir. 1964); Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Hampton v. City of
Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962);
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Kerr
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945).
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resort. 2 1 Judge Sprecher then listed in detail the extensive governmental, statutory, administrative, and municipal supervision
of Wisconsin Electric and concluded that the company enjoyed
a "state-bestowed, state-protected and state-regulated natural
monopoly ....
'"22 These factors, added to the performance by
the company of a "public function," rendered the company a
"thoroughly state-integrated government-substitute .... ,,23
II.

THE

PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITY AS STATE ACTOR

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the principle that each state action case must be considered on
its own facts and circumstances. The Court has stated:
Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attrib24
uted its true significance.

In conformity with this general test, the remainder of this
article individually analyzes five separate areas pertaining to
utilities and demonstrates that any one of these areas sufficiently subjects privately owned public utilities to state action
limitations. These areas include:
A. action under governmental authority,
B. action subject to governmental regulation,
C. performance of a governmental function,
D. direct financial benefit to the government, and
E.

monopolistic status.

25

21 466 F.2d at 661.
22 466 F.2d at 663. The court voted 6-2 to affirm the district court judgment in favor of the utility company. C.J. Swygert joined in the dissent
with J. Sprecher.
23 466 F.2d at 665.
24
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), quoted
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
25 Judge Kerner, in a concurring opinion in Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 407 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1969), suggested seven characteristics peculiar to a public utility that may be indicative of state
action:
[I]t may be possible to demonstrate that a privatelyowned publicly-regulated utility or carrier or similar entity
has a sufficient nexus with or dependence on a state as to make
some of its actions under color of law. Some of the factors
which should be considered are whether 1) the entity is subject to close regulation by a statutorily-created body (such as
the Illinois Commerce Commission), 2) the regulations filed
with the regulatory body are required to be filed as a condition of the entity's operation, 3) the regulations must be approved by the regulatory body to be effective, 4) the entity is
given a total or partial monopoly by the regulatory body,
5) the regulatory body controls the rates charged and/or specific services offered by the entity, 6) the actions of the entity
are subject to review by the regulatory body, and 7) the regulation permits the entity to perform acts which it may not otherwise perform without violating state law. There may be
other factors to be considered besides those here enumerated.
The enumeration here of particular factors means that less than
all may be sufficient to show color of law in some cases and
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Governmental Authority

The Supreme Court has held that state action occurs where
private individuals take action under the authority given them
26
by the state. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co.
the Court held that a labor organization operating under the
authority of a federal statute as an exclusive bargaining representative acted as a state actor in representing employees of a
particular craft. In a subsequent union case, American Communications Association v. Douds, the Court reaffirmed the
"authority" doctrine:
But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales,
the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely
akin, in some respects, to its exercise by the Government
27

itself.

Further, in Nixon v. Condon,28 the Court declared that private
individuals clothed by statute with power ordinarily reserved
for the state (the determination of qualification for voters)
acted as "representatives of the state to such an extent and in
such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set
29
limits to this action.
Actions taken by municipalities and other political subdivisions, including the enactment of ordinances or promulgation of orders or regulations, constitute state action. 30 In Boman
that nothing less than all may be required in other cases.
Each case will depend on its facts.
The Eighth Circuit in Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d
566, 569 (8th Cir. 1972), considered the above formula and found state
action after measuring the extent of governmental involvement in the
following seven areas. (1) the City of St. Paul's granting to Northern an exclusive franchise to furnish gas and electric utility services;
(2) the City's permission allowing Northern to use all public property
to provide such necessary services; (3) the payment by Northern to
the City of 5% of Northern's St. Paul gross earnings in consideration;
(4) the City Council's right to review, revise, or reject the operating
procedures, rate changes, schedules, contracts, agreements, rules, and
regulations of Northern; (5) the City Council's explicit right to review,
revise, or reject the collection and termination policies of Northern; (6)
Northern's required filing with the City of schedules, contracts, agreements, rules, regulations, and financial statements; and (7) the dependence of Northern upon the City for prior approval of many of its
operations in the City.
26 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
27339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950).

28286 U.S. 73 (1932).
In a subsequent voter discrimination case, Smith v. All29Id. at 89.
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), the Court also found requisite governmental authority constituting state action where a political primary
operating pursuant to a state statutory system directed the selection
of party officers and the election procedures.
30 Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1968) ; Robinson v. Florida,
378 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1965).
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v. Birmingham Transit Co., 31 an ordinance of the City of Birmingham permitted the privately owned public transit company
to issue regulations for bus seating. The plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the enforcement of the transit company's
regulation ordering segregated seating. The court found that
the transit company's action taken pursuant to the city's ordinance constituted state action. In Kissinger v. New York
Transit Authority,32 a private advertising company operating
under authority derived from the municipally owned transit
authority which, in turn, was created and regulated under a
state statute, refused to accept an anti-war advertisement. The
court traced the line of governmental authority and found color
of law in such refusal.
In the Palmer case, the State of Ohio enacted statutes which
authorized utility companies to terminate services to subscribers
for nonpayment of bills and specified the manner and time of
such terminations. The court quoted the language from American
Communications Association v. Douds, adding:
For whatever the reason, the Ohio Legislature in its infinite
wisdom decided to bestow upon the gas company a right to
terminate the furnishing of gas to those customers who refused
to make payment. Action brought pursuant to that statute
33
is action under color of state law.

These cases, which have found state action because of the
governmental authority granted, are directly analogous to utility companies which find themselves subject to a myriad of
34
statutes and rules directed toward regulating their operations.
Specifically, in the United States the right to engage in the
public utility business, unlike most other business, exists only
with the permission of public authority. Such public authority
may be conveyed, depending upon the state, by (1) charter,
(2) license (permit), (3) certificates of convenience and necessity, or (4) franchise. Utility companies in most states must not
only obtain a charter of incorporation to do business in the state
(or a corporate authorization to do business) but must also
obtain a charter as a public service corporation. This latter
charter subjects the utility company to various restrictions and
imposes duties different from those of an ordinary business corporation. In addition, various state agencies of a particular state
31280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
32 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
33 342 F. Supp. 241, 245 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
34 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 49 (Page 1954), as amended, (Supp.
1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 196 (West 1957), as amended, (Supp. 1972-
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may be empowered to grant licenses and permits to utility
companies which allow the companies to use certain state land,
to have access to certain highways, and to otherwise utilize
public property. Further, some states grant certificates of convenience and necessity which allow utility companies to monopolize the furnishing of services in a geographic area. Finally,
those municipalities which regulate utilities grant franchises
by ordinance or by contract which allow the utilties to operate
a monopoly within the city and to use the public streets and
thoroughfares to that end. Regardless of the type of governmental regulation employed, utility companies operate monopolies under governmental authority, subject to the rules of
various state and local departments and agencies.
The statutes and regulations conferring governmental authority on public utilities also give rise to three additional factors
indicative of state action. First, such legislative and administrative enactments cause the utility companies involved to become
so "entwined ' 3 5 with the governmental powers and policies as
to become a "joint participant 0 or an "agent 3 7 of the state.
In effect, the states, in bestowing upon these utility companies
the powers, privileges, and responsibilities of the government,
make the utilities instrumentalities of the state for the purpose
8
of furnishing services to the public .
35

Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). The
Court reaffirmed this "joint participant" factor several years later
in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1965), holding:
Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the
prohibited action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute. To act "under color" of law does not
require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is
enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents.
The Court further elaborated on the necessary extent of the state's
participation in a companion case, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 755-56 (1965), stating:
[T]he involvement of the State need [not] be either exclusive
or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found state
action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal
Protection Clause even though the participation of the State
was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative forces leading to the constitutional violation.
37 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958).
This agency consideration differs from traditional master-servant law as the Court noted
in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932):
The test is not one whether the . . . [defendants] are the
representatives of the State in the strict sense in which an
agent is the representative of his principal. The test is
whether they are to be classified as representatives of the
36

State to such an extent . . . that the great restraints of the

38

Constitution set limits to their action.
These benefits establish that a private lessee of governmental property
operating a public facility acts as an instrumentality of the state and,
thus, under color of law. Earlier federal cases first articulated these
doctrines. In Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956),
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Second, these same statutes and regulations "foster" and
"encourage" the specific activities of the utility company. In
Moose Lodge the Court noted that the regulations there did
not foster or encourage the racially discriminatory policies of
the private club.3 9 But, specific regulations delineating a private
utility's policies, conduct, and relations with consumers clearly
promote such actions by the government's express sanction of
such activities.
Third, these governmental enactments confer on private
utilities several of the police powers of the state. Specifically,
the government expressly permits private utilities to use public
land and to trespass or enter private land in carrying out their
function of providing services. The exercise of this extraordinary
privilege- the entering of the lands and dwelling of a consumer at will- dramatically portrays the governmental power
possessed by utility companies. Judge Sprecher in his dissent
in Lucas recognized that the utility company's use of this power
clearly constitutes state action. 40 And Judge Young relied on this
41
factor in Palmer.
In summary, these statutes and regulations governing the
utility company's furnishing of services to consumers will turn
42
such resultant conduct into state action.
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957), the court held that a lessee acted
as an agent for the state in operating a restaurant open to the public
located in the city's courthouse and constructed with public funds.
In Department of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956), the federal court found state
action in Discriminatory acts by a privately owned bathing facility
which leased shoreline on a seashore owned by the state. Anid
in City of Greensboro v. Simpkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957), the
Fourth Circuit found state action where a lessee of a golf course
owned and constructed by the city discriminated on the basis of race.
In addition, state action has been found where private concerns significantly participated or became involved in state owned property.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant
leased from municipal parking authority and located in authority's
parking garage); Muir v. Louisville Park Theat. (Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) (private lessee of city-owned amphitheatre); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (racial zoning laws); Smith v. Holiday Inns of
America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964) (motel on land purchased
from housing authority in redevelopment project promoted with public
funds).
39
40
41
42

407 U.S. at 176-77.
466 F.2d at 664.
342 F. Supp. at 246.
Four Supreme Court cases offer closely analogous fact patterns where
the Court found clear state action. The nature of the state action by
utility companies is not significantly different than the nature of the
state action found to exist in Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135
(1964). In Griffin an arresting officer acting under the "authority of
a deputy sheriff" enforced the private racial segregation policies of a
public amusement park by taking a number of blacks into custody. A
public utility acting under the authority of a state in enforcing its own
policies (i.e., those of a privately owned public service corporation)
parallels the extent of the state action in Griffin.
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B.

Governmental Regulation
In Public Utility Commission v. Pollak,43 the Supreme Court
held a privately owned public utility to be a state actor primarily
because the conduct of this activity had been reviewed and
approved by a governmental administrative body. In Pollak a
private bus company piped radio programs into buses. Several
commuters, complaining of first amendment abridgments, challenged the constitutionality of this conduct. While holding that
no specific constitutional invasion resulted, the Court did conclude that governmental action existed:
We find . . . a sufficiently close relation between the Federal
The nature of public utility state action does not differ from Pennsylvania v. Board of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1956), in
which the Court held that, where a state undertakes an obligation to
enforce a private policy of constitutional deprivations, state action
results (Girard College was maintained as a private segregated boys
school by a board of directors, acting as trustees, as expressly authorized
by an 1869 Pennsylvania statute). Most states undertake an obligation
of expressly approving or reviewing, sub silentio, the policies of utility
companies. Such undertaking may enforce a policy of constitutional
deprivation based upon state action.
The extent of the governmental authority over utilities equals the
state action quotient in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963). The Supreme Court found requisite state action where police
officers arrested a group of blacks at a luncheon counter in a private
restaurant. A city ordinance forbade desegregation. The Court stated:
When the State has commanded a particular result, it has saved
to itself the power to determine that result and thereby "to a
significant extent" has "become involved" in it, and, in fact, has
removed that decision from the sphere of private choice. It
has thus effectively determined that a person owning, managing, or controlling an eating place is left with no choice of
his own but must segregate his white and Negro patrons. The
Kress management, in deciding to exclude Negroes, did precisely what the city law required.
Id. at 248.
All states have removed from utility companies any decision to deal
or not to deal with certain subscribers by requiring the companies to
deal with all subscribers without discrimination. States have effectively
determined by charter, license, and regulation that utilities will operate
in a certain manner. Thus, utilities have no choice but do precisely
what state or municipal regulations require.
The Court in Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964), found state
action where a state regulation requiring segregated restaurants was
replaced by a regulation merely allowing a manager to remove any
person whom he considered "detrimental" to serve. The regulation
neither ordered segregation nor specifically approved of it. Looking
past the form of the state action, the Court held:
While these Florida regulations do not directly and expressly
forbid restaurants to serve both white and colored people together, they certainly embody a state policy putting burdens
upon any restaurant which serves both races. . . . [W]e conclude that the State through its regulations has become involved to such a significant extent in bringing about restaurant
segregation that appellants' trespass convictions must be held
to reflect that state policy and therefore to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 156-57.
Many states leave certain decisions to utility companies- such decisions as collection practices, repair service, internal company policies,
and others. That very leave granted to utilities by the states significantly involves the state in such actions.
43 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

PUBLIC UTILITIES AND STATE ACTION
Government and the radio service ....

We do .

.

. recognize

that Capital Transit operates its service under the regulatory
supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District
of Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress. We
rely particularly upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to
protests against the radio program, ordered an investigation of
it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation
dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and
44
convenience were not impaired thereby.

The bus company's policies and conduct, expressly reviewed
and sanctioned by a governmental agency, resulted in govern45
mental action.
The regulatory scheme in Pollak exists in nearly all states.
Public utility commissions have the power to review, approve,
modify, or impose regulations and rules of conduct on utility
companies, and in particular on conduct involving relations with
consumers. The court in Ihrke noted that the regulatory body
had the power to approve and revise Northern's regulations
regarding collection practices. 46 In Palmer the court noted that
the public utility commission, upon a complaint by a person,
must hold a hearing and determine whether the challenged
practice of the utility company is unreasonable. 47 In Lucas,
the dissent noted that the Wisconsin Public Service Commission
had held hearings in 1932 and had investigated collection practices. 48 These hearings, never referred to in the majority opinion,
resulted in the issuance of rules and in the express approval of
the very termination practices challenged in Lucas. The majority holding in Lucas, then, stands in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court's decision in Pollak.
In addition, the actions taken by governmental regulatory
commissions in reviewing and approving utilities' conduct
and policies fall within the affirmative support factor sug44 Id. at 462 (footnotes of the Court omitted).

See Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971), where the court
found no state action because of insufficient state involvement with
the operations of a private school. But the presence of a state statute
requiring private schools to perform a certain act may lead to conduct
stemming from that performance being deemed state action. Coleman
v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970). Bright, and other
school cases, have been used by courts to avoid finding state action in
several similar fact situations, including public utility cases. E.g., the
majority opinion in Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638,
657 n.47 (7th Cir. 1972). But these cases have little precedential value
to utility cases because: (1) the facts differ significantly, (2) private
schools do not have a monopoly on education, and (3) the state has not
reserved the power to control, approve, review, or modify school rules
dealing with expulsion or disciplinary problems, or for that matter,
many other problems.
46 459 F.2d at 570.
47 342 F. Supp. at 245.
48 466 F. 2d at 667.
45
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gested by Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Moose Lodge.4 .
While a utility company may prepare and file its own regulations with a utility commission, the commission's acceptance,
review, or approval of those rules constitutes ratification and
governmental sanction of conduct performed pursuant to those
rules. Such affirmative support, under Justice Rehnquist's
analysis, clearly renders such conduct state action.
This general regulatory scheme, held sufficient in the above
cases to evidence state action, equally applies to every privately owned public utility company in the United States
not only because each of these utilities operates under the
regulation of an administrative agency, commonly a public utility commission,5" but also because several other governmental
entities, such as state legislatures, local governmental units,
and the federal government, subject these utilities to regulation.
The following paragraphs discuss local and federal government
regulation of these types of utilities after briefly tracing the
development of state regulation into the present-day public
utility commissions with their resultant powers and jurisdictions. The discussion shows that the nature and extent of these
regulations clearly subject privately owned public utility companies to the concept of state action.
Public control of utilities has focused principally upon
state regulation by state legislatures. In the early part of this
century, state legislatures enacted specific statutes which directly regulated the operations of utilities. 51 Such regulation
was necessary because of the unsavory conditions that developed
in utility organization and management during the latter part
of the 19th century. The states regarded the utility services
furnished as basic to the health, safety, and welfare of the
public and recognized a sovereign right to legislate with respect
49 See 407 U.S. at 175-77; Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d

638, 656 (7th Cir. 1972).

50 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 49 (Page 1954), as amended, (Supp.

1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 196 (West 1957), as amended, (Supp. 197273). Forty-six states have public service commissions with statewide
jurisdictions over privately owned gas and electrical utilities. Those
states that have other forms of regulatory control include: (1) Minnesota has delegated regulatory control over utilities to municipalities
and other governmental units. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 412.331 to .391,
451.07, 454.041 to .042 (West 1958), as amended, (Supp. 1972-73);
(2) In Nebraska, all electric utilities are owned by local governmental
subdivisions; (3) South Dakota has authorized local towns and cities to
regulate utility companies; (4) And in Texas, a state regulatory commission has jurisdiction only over wholesale rates charged by privately
owned public utilities. SUBCOMIrrEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

OF THE COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS,

COMMISSIONS,
51 J. BAUER & P.

STATE UTILITY

S. Doc. No. 56, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
COSTELLO, PUBLIC ORGANIZATION OF ELECTRIC POWER
BAUER & COSTELLO].

(1949) [hereinafter cited as
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to this public interest. Initial regulations attempted to place
controls on the financial manipulation, franchise consolidation,
52
excessive rates, and other abuses prevalent in the industry.
With the birth of administrative agencies and the growing
complexity of utility regulation, state legislatures enacted general legislation creating public utility commissions with the
power to promulgate detailed rules. 53 Forty-six states have
4
public utility commissions regulating privately owned utilities.
Not all such commissions have the same powers or the same
scope of jurisdiction. A commission, depending on the state, may
have control over numerous utilities including electricity, gas,
water, steam, telephone, telegraph, bus, rapid transit, motor
carriers, pipelines, and railroad companies. 55 In addition, such
commissions, again depending on the state, may have jurisdiction
over many facets of the utilities' operations including: (1)
certificates of convenience, (2) leasing rights, (3) mergers and
consolidations, (4) reorganizations, (5) securities, (6) dividends,
(7) budgets and expenditures, (8) loans, (9) major property
additions, (10) customer relations, (11) service, (12) construction, and (13) reasonable and just rates enabling the utility to
50
Furearn a fair return on the fair value of property used.
ther, such commissions through formalized procedures review
the books and records of utility companies, investigate consumer complaints, grant informal and formal hearings, and
make determinations, particularly on rates, which closely affect
57
the practices of utility companies.
In addition to the administrative regulatory scheme on the
state level, several states presently allow local governmental
units to regulate privately owned public utilities. Municipalities
within these states have the right, expressed in or implied from
state constitutions and statutes, to grant franchises giving utilities the right to use the public streets and to attach to these
58
franchises conditions regarding rates, services, and operations.
In some states, such municipal regulation takes the place of
any state regulation; in other states, both the state and municipalities regulate specific operations of utility companies. Municipalities involved in a local regulatory scheme have in turn
52

Id.

53THE

TWENTIETH

CENTURY

FUND,

ELECTRIC

POWER

AND

GOVERNMENT

POLICY 52 (1948) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND].
54 L. METCALF & V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE 28 ('1967).
55 E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILrrIES 407 (1950).
56 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND at 53-54, 254.
57 Id. at 65-66.
58 BAUER & COSTELLO at 34-35; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND at 106-11.
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established administrative commissions at the local level which
operate in a fashion similar to state public utility commissions.
In addition, many municipalities own and operate utility companies which furnish services, particularly water, to residents
of the municipalityFinally, the federal government controls various interstate
practices of utility companies. The Federal Water Power Act
of 1920 provides the federal government with jurisdiction over
all power sites in navigable streams of the United States and
otherwise authorizes the Federal Power Commission to develop and control water as a utility.59 The Federal Power Act
of 1935 provides the Federal Power Commission with jurisdiction over the transmission of electrical energy at wholesale
prices in interstate commerce.6 ° Similarly, the Natural Gas Act
of 1938 provides the Commission with jurisdiction over the
interstate transportation and sale of wholesale natural gas."1
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 delegates to
the Securities .and Exchange Commission powers over the public organization of utility companies which include registration,
sale and purchase of securities and assets, restriction of intercompany loans, restriction of dividend payments, and prescription of accounting and record procedures. 62 The Federal Power
Commission's jurisdiction over electric and gas utilities includes
ratemaking functions and activities, control over accounting and
financial matters, control over the purchase and sale of properties, responsibility for the publication of reports concerning
the power resources and needs of the country, responsibility
for studying costs of plant construction and plant operation,
and responsibility for distributing information to state and
63
municipal utility commissions.
In summary, at least some aspects of the state, local, or
federal regulations apply to every privately owned public utility, and it is these regulations which subject the utilities to
state action concepts.
C. Governmental Function
The Supreme Court has held that a private organization
which assumes operating, managing, or supplying a governmental function takes such action under color of law. In Terry
v. Abrams,64 the Court concluded that the delegation by the
59 16 U.S.C. §§ 791 to 825r (1970).
60 Id. § 824.
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 171 to 171w (1970).
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z (1970).
63
BAUER & COSTELLO at 45-47; TWENTIETH
64345 U.S. 461 (1953).

CENTURY FUND

at 67, 73-76.
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state of governmental powers (control of the electoral process
for public officials) is the delegation of a state function and as
such renders the private party's actions state action. Subsequently, the Court explicitly held in Evans v. Newton:
When private individuals or groups are endowed by the State
with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to
its constitutional limitations. 65

And in the earlier case of Marsh v. Alabama,66 the Court had
established this doctrine by finding state action where the state
merely permitted a private corporation to undertake the governmental function of operating a town and furnishing municipal
services. The Court held that the town fulfilled governmental
functions and therefore lost its identification as purely private
property even though it was privately owned and controlled.
Several federal courts have also found state action in the
nature of the function undertaken by private corporations. 6 7 In
65 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). In Evans, the City of Macon, Georgia operated
a public park on a segregated basis pursuant to the terms of a will bequeathing the park to a trust. Subsequently, to continue these segregationist policies, the public trustees resigned and private trustees took
over control of the park. The Supreme Court found that the private
trustees' operation of the park still resulted in state action despite
the fact that formal control had passed from the City's hands. The
public function of the park and the past relationship of the City with
the park rendered the acts of the private trustees state acts. The Court
stated:
Mass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public
domain....
[W]e cannot but conclude that the public character of this park
requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the
command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who
now has title under state law. Id. at 303.
The Court here found the operation of a city park to be a governmental
function though the facilities of the park itself were not publicly
owned, and did not provide necessities of life to the public as utility
services do.
The Court first extended the reach of Marsh to
66 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
cover a denial of first amendment rights in a shopping center parking
lot by analogizing the public character of such a lot to the municipal
area in Marsh. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). But recently the Court retreated from the
apparent positions established in Marsh and Logan Valley by limiting
the free speech rights of demonstrators in a private shopping center
to dissemination of material directly connected with the operation of the
center itself or with one of the businesses in the center (and not to
anti-war literature). Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
67 Several other courts have found state action in two related public function areas. In United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
and in United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), the courts found that private process servers who falsified affidavits of service (popularly called "sewer service") engaged in an inherently governmental function and acted with government authority
pursuant to the state statute permitting them to act as substitute process
servers. And in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), the court
found state action where a private landlord seized a tenant's personal
property pursuant to a state statute authorizing such enforcement of
landlords' liens because such entry and summary seizure was inherently
and historically a state function.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.,68 the city granted a bus
franchise to a private bus concern. In declaring the existence of
state action, the court stated:
The issuing of such a franchise by the City of Birmingham is a governmental function, controlled and authorized by
the constitution of Alabama ...
It is, of course, fundamental that the justification for the
grant by a state to a private corporation of a right or franchise to perform such a public utility service as furnishing
transportation, gas, electricity, or the like, on the public
streets of the city, is that the grantee is about the public's
business. It is doing something the state deems useful for the
public necessity or convenience. This is what differentiates
the public utility which holds what may be called a "special
franchise," from an ordinary business corporation which in
common with all others is granted the privilege of operating
in corporate form but does not have that special franchise of
using state property for private gain to perform a public
6
function. 9.

In Farmer v. Moses, the court found the privately owned promoter of the New York World's Fair to be a state actor declaring: "[T]he New York World's Fair, although operated by a
private corporation, is a matter of public concern, for the pub' 70
lic good and for the general welfare of the state.
Judge Theis in Stanford found the Gas Service Company
supplying an "essential commodity to the citizens" and "beyond
question" performing "public functions."71 The dissent in Lucas,
after tracing the development of public utility law from English history, concluded that utility companies clearly perform
state-delegated functions. 72 And the Eighth Circuit in Ihrke
declared the issues before the court were not moot because
such issues presented "recurring questions of public interest."
The court's recognition of the public interest inherent in such
cases offers further proof of the vital function such services
73
provide.
68 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
610Id. at 434-35. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Boman proposition in two
subsequent cases. In Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir.
1961), the court stated: "When in the execution of that public function
it is the instrument by which state policy is to be, and is, effectuated,
activity which might otherwise be deemed private may become state
action .... ." And in Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320,
322-23 (5th Cir. 1962), the court again stated: ."We noted that when a
state authorizes a city to grant a franchise for public transportation to
a local bus or street car company, such transportation service is performed by the franchise holder as a service performed for the benefit
of the people of the state. The private company is, to that extent, exercising a part of sovereignty in that it is performing a state function."
70 232 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
71 Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Kan. 1972).
72 466 F.2d at 665.
73 459 F.2d at 571.
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The following discussion demonstrates that public utility
companies perform a governmental function because government delegates and regulates utility services; the furnishing
of such services requires the exercise of governmental powers;
and utility services, such as electricity, gas, and water, are
74
necessities of life.
Utility services have historically been considered to be
public and governmental functions. In medieval England, private guilds operated public services. The rules and operating
regulations of these guilds were declared void by local courts
if such were inconsistent with the public use. The feudal regime in England gradually replaced these guilds, and manorlords granted the first franchises to private individuals to supply public services. The royal courts of England overviewed
innkeepers and ferrymen because of the nature of their service
to the public. 75 Against this backdrop, public service law began
to evolve. Parliament in England began to regulate the rates of
public service corporations which were granted monopolies in
certain services. In addition, the English lawmakers and courts
imposed certain duties and obligations on public service organizations: "The characteristic thing as now was the legal
imposition of an affirmative duty of proper actions upon those
7' 6
who openly professed a public employment.
During the development of this country, colonial governments similarly granted franchises and regulated rates and
operations of those performing a public function. Early courts
recognized this function as governmental in nature:
Men set up systems of government in order to subserve certain public ends, and reach advantages that could not otherwise be made available. The state is clothed with the trust
of answering these ends. It is not to be limited to the mere
duty of governing the people by the exercise of its police
power, but it has a higher duty,-to promote the educational
interests of the people, encourage their industrial pursuits,
develop its material resources, and foster its commercial interests, by providing all reasonable facilities demanded by a
prudent regard for the growth, development, and general
prosperity of a free people .... 77

In furtherance of these ends of government, states enacted
statutes delegating to public service corporations the privilege
74

B.

WYMAN,

PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS

4

(1911).

Id.
76 Id. at 5.

75

77

City of Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. 111, 116, 90 N.W. 312, 315
(1902) (court's citations omitted).
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of furnishing utility services to the public. 78 In addition to such
delegation, the states retained control over these companies
through regulatory commissions and reserved the power to review, approve, or modify the policies and operations of such
utilities.79 Today, utility companies perform a governmental
function because they must exercise governmental powers, delegated by the state, to provide their services. The governmental
authority section of this article discussed at length the governmental powers bestowed upon utility companies by the state,
such as the power of eminent domain, police powers, and the
privilege of using public property. The very delegation of such
powers can only be made to a public and not a private concern.
"No business can be granted a privilege under our constitutional system unless public in character."8 0 Utility companies
have long been considered to be public and governmental in
nature. Electric lighting is an example:
Electric lighting is universally recognized as a public enterprise, in aid of which the right of eminent domain may be
invoked. Corporations organized for the purpose of furnishing
electric light to the public are quasi public corporations, and,
under government control, must serve the public on terms and
conditions common to all without discrimination. The same
rule has been applied to corporations organized to supply the
inhabitants of cities with natural gas for heating and lighting
purposes. .

.

. The control of the state over the manner in

which such companies shall deal with the public is implied.
The generation of electrical power for distribution and
sale to the general public on equal terms is a public enterprise, and property so used is devoted to a public use.8 1

Furthermore, the fact that the company may be privately owned
does not remove it from the sphere of government control,
governmental function, and public use. The United States Supreme Court established this proposition in Olcott v. The Supervisors:
Whether the use of the railroad is a public or private one
depends no measure upon the question who constructed it or
who owns it. It has never been considered a matter of any
importance that the road was built by the agency of a private
corporation. No matter who is the agent, the function performed is that of the
State. Though the ownership is private
82
the use is public.
78 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.49 to .50 (West 1957); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 300.03 (West 1969).
79 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 49 (Page 1954), as amended, (Supp.
1971); WIs. STAT. ANN. ch. 195 (West 1957), as amended, (Supp. 197273).
80 B. WYMAN, supra note 74, at 42.
81 Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 450-51,
107 N.W. 405, 413-14 (1906) (court's citations omitted).
82 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 695 (1872).
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Utility companies can also be said to perform a governmental function because utility services, such as electricity,
gas, and water, are necessities of life. The court in Palmer
recognized this:
The lack of heat in the winter time has very serious effects
upon the physical health of human beings, and can easily be
fatal. A sudden withdrawal of heating fuel can also result in
severe damage to property, both real and personal. . .. [A]
much more
person can freeze to death or die of 8pneumonia
3
quickly than he can starve to death.
And the court in Stanford concluded: "It is not open to question
that food, clothing, and shelter are considered necessary to
sustain life. . . . [U]nheated shelter affects life itself.
Nothing is more basic to the American system of values, indeed
'8 4
Utility
mankind, than the continued existence of life itself.
services furnish consumers with heat, warm meals, refrigerated
food, hot water, lights, gas supplies, electric current, and a
habitable and decent home. Without such life generating and
life sustaining services, urban man could not exist.
Additionally, if privately owned utility companies did not
furnish these vital services, the government would have to
furnish them. In fact, statutes in all states permit municipalities
or other governmental subdivisions to own and operate a utility
company.85 In one state, the government owns and operates
all electric utility services.86 In other states, some governmentally owned utility departments furnish utility services to

designated geographic areas. However, outside of those limited
areas, privately owned public utilities assume the governmental
role and provide services.
Thus, in all states, the government has allowed privately
8 7
owned utility companies to perform governmental functions.
83
84

342 F. Supp. at 244.

346 F. Supp. at 719-20, 721.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.05 (West 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
196.57 (West 1957).
86 Nebraska. See NEB. REv. STAT. ch. 18, art. 4 (1970).
87 These governmental functions may be services of a "public character,"
"inherently governmental" actions, or acts exercised as part of the "sovereign power" of the state. See respectively, the cases cited in notes

85 See, e.g.,

65, 67, and 69 supra.
Certain functions may be more related to governmental responsibilities
than others, but nevertheless, a private party who assumes the operation of a public or governmental function, whether such function
stems from an inherent power of the state, from its sovereignty, or
from past historical connections, performs as a state actor in satisfying
a public need or interest. In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), the Court found that the private trustees
of a library acted under the color of law because the city financed the
library's budget and because the maintenance of the library, though
not an essential function, was a proper and usual function of the state.
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This creation goes far beyond the granting of a corporate charter. Through the delegation of police powers, the granting of
the privilege of eminent domain, and the continual regulation
and approval of utilities' operations, the states have created
the utility companies as instrumentalities to carry on the
utility functions of the government. For these privileges and
for performing a governmental service, utilities in turn become
subject to constitutional restraints through state action principles.
Direct Financial Benefit to the Government
The government financially benefits from the operations of
public utilities. In addition to levying normal taxes, statutes
in many states require each utility company to pay for the privilege of obtaining a monopoly and for the extensive use of
8
These statutes require each utility to pay
public property.1
the state a certain percentage of its gross revenue earnings.
Through such payments, governments receive many millions of
dollars which ostensibly reimburse the state for the costs of
the regulatory commission, its staff, its investigations, and its
hearings. However, regulatory commissions rarely cost that much
to operate. Thus, many states gain additional monies which are
used as general revenue funds to defray other costs of government and to help balance the state budget.
This economic relationship between a state and a public
utility has great significance for purposes of state action. The
9
Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
stated that the financial connections between a governmental
agency and a private company are further indicia to state action.
D.

[S]tate responsibility [has been] interpreted as necessarily
following upon "state participation" through arrangement,
management, funds, or property....
[T]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence .

.

. that it must be recognized as a joint

participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account,
cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to
9o
fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Burton, the government owned parking authority relied, in
part, on the lease income from a privately owned coffee shop.
This financial arrangement benefited the parking authority and
consequently further involved the state with private actions.
88 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 7a.5 (Smith-Hurd 1966); St. Paul, Minn.,
Ordinances 11761, 11762, Jan. 1972. But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 115-2-14 (1963); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.85 (1957).

89 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
90 Id. at 722, 725.
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The Eighth Circuit in the Ihrke decision more directly relied
on the financial relationship between the City of St. Paul and
the Northern States Power Company. Under the municipal
franchise, Northern was obligated to pay to the city 5 percent
of the gross earnings it received in St. Paul.9' This amounted
to several millions of dollars, but more importantly, constituted
over 5 percent of total revenues raised for the city's budget.
The city used the money collected to offset municipal expenses
in lieu of raising revenue by way of additional taxes on the
public. Northern thus contributed huge sums of money essential to the economic functioning of the city. The Eighth Circuit
recognized this factor:
It is thus apparent that 5% of every dollar collected by
Northern for gas and electricity sold in St. Paul is paid to the
city. While the city does not participate in Northern's collection procedures, it does reserve the right to approve or even
revise Northern's regulations relating 92thereto, and it is obviously the direct beneficiary of them.

Thus, because of the gross earnings fee payment, the city's
financial benefit from Northern's operations in St. Paul further
entwined the city with Northern's activities. Similar beneficial
economic ties between the government and public utilities provide additional links between state action and allegedly private
93
conduct.
E. Monopolistic Status
Many entities act under governmental authority and find
some of their conduct regulated by public agencies. Other companies perform public functions and pay fees to the government
for such privilege. What, then, conclusively brands utilities as
state actors? Their monopolistic status in providing necessities
91 This is an obligation imposed by the city and is not in lieu of any sales
or use tax imposed on businesses other than utilities.
92 459 F.2d at 570.
93 Federal courts have relied on financing arrangements to declare conduct
taken by schools state action. In Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F.
Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965), a group of blacks challenged Virginia's practice of awarding tuition grants to parents for reimbursement of their
children's education in private schools. Though the schools were neither
controlled by nor connected with the state, the court declared the practice unconstitutional because the state aid was the dominant method
of financing segregated schools. And, in Doe v. Hackler, 316 F. Supp.
1144 (D.N.H. 1970), the court found state conduct in the actions of a
private school which contracted with the governing bodies of five townships to educate high school aged children in exchange for tuition payments. The court declared that because of such financing the school
acted as a governmental actor. The Doe case did not involve racial
discrimination, but rather a student's right to wear long hair. And even
where a state makes little or no financial contribution to an institution,
the existence of official control by state officials will cause private
school conduct to become state action. See Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270
F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), alf'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 921 (1968).
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of life. The operation of a monopoly by a utility will, even in
"close" cases, render those operations governmental or state
action. Monopolies have always been abhorred by our system
of government. 94 Yet, most utilities operate as monopolies which
do business only with the express permission of the government
which continually regulates their practices. Governments license
and franchise these monopolies as a substitute for direct governmental provision of the particular necessities. To assure
these necessities, states have often permitted private utilities
to monopolize a certain geographic area and have guaranteed
such companies a "fair" rate of return in consideration.
Often, gas, electric, and water utilities operate natural
monopolies. The scarcity of the natural resources, the limitations placed on discovering, producing, and distributing such
services, and the large capital expenditures necessary to operate a utility result in the creation of this natural monopoly.
Sometimes utilities gain a virtual monopoly in an area simply
by being there first, by having the use of all the necessary
public property, and by having invested huge sums of money
in such things as poles, wires, conduits, and other utility
apparatus. In addition, states have conferred a statutory monopoly upon utility companies. Upon accepting a franchise from
the government, the utility also gains complete freedom from
competition in a geographic area for a period of years.95 Such
statutes and franchises prohibit any other utility from supplying
services to consumers in that area.
Such monopolistic statutes may impose tremendous hardships on consumers. Unlike any other choice for the purchase
of necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter, a consumer
has no choice but to apply for and accept service from one
utility company. States guarantee captive customers for the
utility company. Hardships result particularly where the consumer disagrees or disputes billing practices, collection procedures, deposit requirements, or otherwise has poor relations
with the utility.96 Though validly disgruntled, the consumer has
nowhere else to turn for such services.
.14

See 0.

POND, LAW OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (4th ed. rev. 1932); H. SPURR,
1 GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION (1924); A. WEBBER,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION

(1941); B.

WYMAN, SPECIAL

LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (1911).
95 See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 196.495 (West Supp. 1972), amending WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 196.495 (1957).
96 In Jackson v. Northern States Power Co., 343 F. Supp. 265 (D. Minn.
1972), the federal district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the utility company from continuing to terminate service to
five named indigent plaintiffs. The utility had terminated service to
two subscribers who had disputed the amount of their bill; one of these
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Courts have recognized the monopolistic characteristic of
utility companies as an important element of state action. In
Ihrke,97 and in both the Palmer8 and Stanford9 decisions, the
courts looked to the utility companies' monopolistic positions as
a controlling state action factor. And the Lucas dissent, after
reviewing the history of public utility law, concluded that the
monopolistic characteristic isolates utility companies from all
other types of private businesses and results in state action. 10 0
Furthermore, in Moose Lodge, both the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court stated that monopolistic
status is a factor to be considered in finding state action 10 1
In addition, privately owned public utilities themselves
have declared, at least for purposes of antitrust laws, that
their conduct constitutes state action. This position has been
adopted by the courts in deciding that antitrust laws do
not apply to public utilities. 1" 2 The Fifth Circuit in Gas Light
Co. v. Georgia Power Co. held that the practices of electric
parties (a family with six children) went without electricity for six
weeks because they were not able to pay the alleged bill. The company also terminated service to two tenants who did not owe anything,
but whose landlord failed to pay past accrued bills amounting to over
$400. And the utility threatened to terminate service to the fifth plaintiff, an epileptic woman, who was deaf in one ear, 90 percent blind, a
mother of two children, pregnant with her third child, and recently
deserted by her husband, for a]leged nonpayment of a $54 back bill. In
the Ihrke case, the Thrkes faced termination for their failure to pay
a $24 back bill and a $100 security deposit without being afforded an
opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the deposit. In Palmer,
the utility company's particularly arbitrary and grievous collection practices prompted the court to conclude: "The evidence as a whole revealed a rather shockingly callous and impersonal attitude upon the
arct of the defendant, which relied uncritically upon its computer,
ocated in a distant city, and the far from infallible clerks who served
it, and paid no attention to the notorious uncertainities of the postal
service." 342 F. Suipp. at 243.
In large metropolitan areas, many consumers find themselves at the
mercy of utility collection agents who have the power to affect their
lives like no other creditor has, save, perhaps, the Internal Revenue
Service. For a further survey of the hardships inflicted on utility consumers, particularly the poor, see Note, The Shutoff of Utility Services
for Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor, 46 WASH. L. REV. 745 (1971);
Note, Public Utilities and the Poor: The Requirement of Cash Deposits
from Domestic Customers, 78 YALE L.J. 448 (1969).
97 459 F.2d at 570. The Ihrke court relied on a recent First Circuit decision
involving state action and a private monopolistic situation. In Lavoie v.
Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (lst Cir. 1972), the court found a trailer park sufficiently immeshed in state activity because of a city ordinance granting
that park a monopoly over trailer sites within the city.
98 342 F. Supp. at 245.
99 346 F. Supp. at 722.
100 466 F.2d at 663-65.
101 407 U.S. at 177, 182.
0
1

2 In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court held that

the Sherman Act did not cover actions by governmental instrumentalities, but only individual private actions. Thus, any company that
can show that its conduct constitutes state action remains immune from
antitrust laws.
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companies, which were alleged to be conspiracies to eliminate
natural gas as a competitive source with electricity, were immune from antitrust attack. 0 3 Electric companies successfully
argued this immunity and stated that though they were monopolies, their actions were "state actions" and thus properly
anticompetitive. The Fifth Circuit concluded:
Defendants' [electric utilities'] conduct cannot be characterized
as individual action when we consider the state's intimate involvement .... Though the rates and practices originated with
the regulated utility, Georgia Power, the facts make it plain
from the Commission as products of the
that they emerged
104
Commission.
And the Fourth Circuit, in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., declared that the offering of free underground electric service lines to new home builders in return for
all electric installations did not violate antitrust "tie-in" prohibitions because such conduct by the utility companies constituted
state action. 10 5 Accordingly, privately owned utility companies
should not be allowed to be constitutional chameleons. The Fourth
and Fifth Circuits' findings of state action in these cases should
mirror a finding of state action in other cases which deal with
privately owned public utilities.
In summary, privately owned public utilities operate monopolistic enterprises. The monopolies have sometimes arisen as
natural monopolies and sometimes as statutory monopolies. In
either instance, the government has become thoroughly entangled with the utilities in providing consumers with necessities of life. The logical conclusion that utility action is state
action is virtually inevitable. The utility companies themselves
have successfully used this argument - to promote their own
self-interest. Accordingly, a utility with a monopolistic status
must consistently be considered a state actor.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that under any one of five concepts the conduct of privately owned public utilities constitutes
state action. Specifically, such utilities act under governmental
authority and statutes, find themselves extensively regulated by
administrative agencies of the government, perform necessary
governmental or public functions, provide direct financial benefits to the government, and operate monopolies replete with
captive customers and guaranteed profits. These factors con103 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
104

Id. at 1140.

105 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
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clusively show public utilities to be state actors. In turn, this
showing more realistically renders privately owned public utilities subject to ultimate regulation through judicial action.106
Now, subscribers who have been left out of the political
process and who find no viable representation on public utility
commissions will have a forum in which to voice their grievances. Perhaps subscribers will force such agencies to be more
responsive to issues posed by modern urban life. Perhaps even
the utility companies themselves will now be motivated to
fulfill their obligations and responsibilities to the consuming
public.
Several courts have held residential utility services to be
"entitlements" afforded constitutional protections.10 7 Without
question, utility services such as gas, electricity, and water are
necessities of life. Without such life generating and life sustaining "commodities" urban consumers could not maintain their
life, liberty, or property.'}' 8 Consumers will be able to protect
such vital necessities by challenging, before impartial courts,
the practices and policies of utility companies. Among the targets of such challenges are the allegedly private business decisions of utility companies, the propriety and need for rate increases to maintain high profits and salaries, 10 the unilateral
imposition of deposit requirements not actually related to credit
ratings," 0 the self-serving collection practices of terminating
services without affording the consumer timely notice or an
opportunity to be heard,"' a host of latent environmental is106 Not all activities of a public utility will be brought under constitutional

scrutiny. In Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971), the court there found no
state action in a, challenge to a utility company's internal management
operations. But, clearly, a utility's dealings with consumers involves
activities always subject to review or approval by a regulatory commission if, in fact, not already sanctioned by that body.
107 Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Davis v. Weir,
328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
lo0 The Supreme Court has declared many similar rights, privileges, entitlements, and interests protected by constitutional due process and
equal protection: welfare assistance (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970)), wages (Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)),
reputation (Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)), driving
licenses (Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)), access to courts (Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)), and the continued possession and
use of personal property (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
109 See consumer interventions in rate hearings cited in note 2 supra.
110 See Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia Pub. Serv. Co.,
5 CLEUARNGHOUSE REV. 770 (Apr. 1972); Parsons v. Central Ill. Pub.
Serv. Co., 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 333 (Oct. 1971); Hall v. Central Ill.
Pub. Serv. Co., 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 333 (Oct. 1971).
111 Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972); Davis
v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Palmer v. Columbia Gas
Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Jackson v. Northern States
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sues, and a broad spectrum of arbitrary and capricious actions
taken by utility companies.
Our constitutional system provides no haven for the exercise
of arbitrary power by the government or its agents. Privately
owned public utilities exert a great deal of influence on the
day-to-day living conditions of this nation's citizens. Although
the government has previously failed to effectively control the
utilities' enormous power, perhaps consumers can now significantly augment that control through private causes of action
in the courts. These consumers ask only that the courts declare
what should have been obvious all along-since utilities perform such conclusively public functions, they must be held to
state action standards and safeguard individual rights accordingly.
POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the completion of this article, two federal
district courts rendered decisions on the public utility-state
action issue. In Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., Judge
Tyler found state action declaring:
In the relevant legal sense, Con Ed is by no stretch of the imagination a purely private enterprise. The State of New York,
by extensive statutory and regulatory scheme, has circumscribed almost every aspect of the utility's activities, and has,
by the same means, granted it powers not available to a typical
1 12
private concern.

And in Hattell v. Public Service Co.,"13 Judge Winner followed
the lead of Ihrke and Stanford and held this public utility subject to state action concepts. In both cases, the courts sustained the claims of the plaintiff consumers seeking relief from
certain collection and termination practices by the respective
utility companies.
In addition, another recent federal court decision, Lamb v.
Hamblin,114 found unequivocally that utility consumers have a
constitutional right to be afforded notice and an impartial
hearing prior to the termination of utility services. This decision represents one of the first cases which ensures the due
process rights of consumers by ordering a utility (a municipal
water department) to establish a hearing procedure.
Power Co., 343 F. Supp. 265 (D. Minn. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co.,
346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Andress v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., No. 3-72-185 (D. Minn. June 27, 1972); Lamb v. Hamblin, No. 3-72115 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1972).
112 Civil No. 72-3037 at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1972).
113 No. C-4206 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 1972).
114 No. 3-72-115 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1972).

NOTE
THE COLORADO CAPTIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY ACT
I.

THE CAPTIVE CONCEPT

A ganized
captive insurance company is an insurance company orby a business or manufacturing concern to insure
the risks of that concern, its branches, and affiliates.1 The true
captive (hereinafter referred to as captive) is a wholly owned
subsidiary that insures only the risks of its parent. Certain
insurance companies located in the United States are sometimes
confused with the captive facility, but they are distinguishable
in that their coverage of the parent is simply an adjunct to
the sale of insurance to the general public.2 There are true captives owned by American firms, but they are off-shore captives
located mainly in the Bahamas or Bermuda. 3 The passage of
the Colorado Captive Insurance Company Act 4 has made it possible for the true captive to be incorporated as a domestic cor1 Burge, Foreign Risks and the Captive Insurance Company, THE PRICE

WATERHOUSE REVIEW, Autumn 1970, at 38. For an explanation of the
types of captives see Hare, Have You Ever Thought of Your Own Insurance Company, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1967, at 56-57:

Within the framework of captive insurance companies, there
are two basic types. The first type, which is the more common,
provides coverage backed by reinsurance; the second provides
coverage which is funded. The first category - coverage
backed by reinsurance - would insure liability for which
coverage can be obtained in the insurance market. The second
category - funding - provides insurance normally unavailable
because of the type of loss or amount of liability. In funding,
two very basic elements must be looked at carefully: tax problems that can arise and structural problems and requirements
that must be satisfied.
2 Some examples of so-called domestics and their owners are as follows:
Insurance Company
Corporation
Allstate Insurance Company
Sears Roebuck
Motors Insurance Corporation
General Motors
Safety Casualty Company
Mobil Oil
National Turkey Federation Property Owners Mutual
Insurance Co.
Hare, supra note 1.
3 Wall Street Journal, May 26, 1971, at 34, col. 1; Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 5. An example of an off-shore captive is Oil
Insurance Ltd., incorporated in Hamilton, Bermuda, to insure against
pollution liability. Its owners are Atlantic Richfield Co., Cities Service
Co., Gulf Oil Co., Signal Cos., Standard Oil of Cal., Marathon Oil Co.,
and Union Oil of Cal. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 17, 1970, at 8, col. 3.
4 Act of March 9, 1972 (H.B. No. 1041) (to be codified as CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 72-36-1 to -30 (1973)). [Provisions of the Act will hereinafter
be cited and referred to as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (1973).]
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poration. This Act is the first law passed in the United States
specifically designed to enable the captive to be so organized. 5
A great deal of confusion seems to surround the concept
of the captive. Some of the confusion arises from the belief
that the captive is primarily a means of tax evasion. As will
be later demonstrated, this belief is incorrect. Another factor
contributing to the widespread misunderstanding is
the erroneous belief of some financial executives that, by
establishing a captive insurance company, the corporation is
recklessly abandoning outside insurance and is taking all risks
upon itself. This is a complete misunderstanding of how a
captive operates. A captive reinsures all the risks which the
group deems prudent to insure in the conventional insurance
market. But, in addition, the captive insures any risk which
the group is now bearing itself through deductibles and selfinsurance and all manner of specific trade risks for which there
is virtually no commercial coverage. Thus, basically, the captive is a vehicle for formalizing self-insurance, although it
may be much more. 6

Colorado, in passing an act to encourage domestic captives,
demonstrated an understanding of the advantages of the captive
as well as a knowledge of the potential benefits accruing to a
state permitting this form of insurance.
The concept of the captive is today becoming increasingly
popular with American corporations. The reason for the rise
in popularity is the difficulty these corporations are experiencing in obtaining adequate coverage on their facilities; or, if
coverage is available, the insurance companies are charging
excessive rates with unreasonable deductibles. The causes of the
difficulty are complex and are probably equally attributable to
insurers and insureds (improper planning, failure to comply
with loss prevention plans, inadequate premiums to risk, etc.).
II. GEzSis OF THE CAPTIVE
During the 60's and 70's, severe losses were sustained by
insurance companies from catastrophies such as the Torrey
Canyon wreck, the Union Oil Company incident off Santa Barbara, the Los Angeles earthquake, and the destruction caused by
hurricanes Betsy in 1965, Celia in 1970, and Agnes in 1972.7 It
has been suggested that coverage of these losses was not "un5 The author has been advised in interviews in Denver, Colorado, with
Charles H. Groves, president of Frank B. Hall Management Co., and
Frank J. Bucher, account executive for Transport Underwriters Association, on June 20, 1972, and July 21, 1972, respectively, that states such
as Louisiana, Illinois, New Jersey, and perhaps others, are considering a
bill much like the one passed in Colorado.
6 Burge, supra note 1, at 38.
7 See, e.g., Why You Can't Buy The Insurance You Need, BUSINESS WEEK,

Nov. 7, 1970, at 65.
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derwritten with the expectation that in any single instance losses
of this magnitude could occur."8 The reason that these facilities
were underwritten at all is because "there had been a failure
in the development of accurate engineering estimates of probable (or possible) maximum loss."'9
A lag in premium rates has prohibited underwriters from
recouping their losses, and thereby has reduced the willingness
of underwriters to commit capital to risk." Premiums adequate
to recoup adverse experiences and to protect against prospective
losses are inevitably resisted by the insured public and particularly by those corporations which have not been exposed
to catastrophic loss.
Over the past decade, the concentration of value in insurable
facilities has increased drastically, e.g., airplanes, tankers, and
plant equipment are becoming larger and more expensive each
year.1 ' Increased inventories and spiralling prices due to inflation make it more likely that insurance companies will sustain
a substantial loss.1 2 Equally important in the past decade has
been the development of new insurance hazards such as the
wide application by the courts of the legal doctrine of strict
liability. 13 The application of the strict liability concept to such
things as pollution of the environment and products liability
claims has substantially increased the risk of loss for the in14
surance company.
The exaggerated claims experience of many insurance
companies, because of the new and higher risks, has necessitated
an adjustment on their behalf. They have generally raised rates
while forcing corporations to accept high deductibles. In some
instances the insurance companies have even refused coverage
of corporate facilities.' 5 Corporations, faced with increased cost
for decreased coverage, have begun to consider alternate insurance programs. One of those being considered is the captive.
III. ADVANTAGES OF THE CAPTIVE
The central advantage of the captive is the ability of the
parent to design an insurance plan tailored to its own specific
needs. The corporate management has an excellent understandsGroves, Using a Captive Insurer to Insure Hard-to-Place Risks,
REVIEW, June 1972, at 78.
9 Id. at 18.
10 Id. at 20.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.

Id.
15 Id. at

14

78.

BEST'S
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ing of the inherent hazards of the industry. Management, working in conjunction with insurance experts of the same corporation, can develop a better contract for the parent than can
an outside insurer. Because of the elimination of the overhead
and profit of the outside insurer, lower insurance rates are
available. These lower rates may be substantial and are certainly one of the large moneysavers for the captive. 16
Another important feature of operating a captive is the
parent's ability to insure hard-to-place or otherwise uninsurable
risks. Acts of war, strikes, and expropriation losses may be cov17
ered by a captive when no other insurer will cover them.
The captive is most advantageous in an insurance market where
premiums are rising and adequate coverage is becoming difficult to obtain. In such a market the captive can handle the
risks of the parent more efficiently and inexpensively than an
outside insurer. 18
The economic advantages of the captive are manifold. One
often cited advantage is the tax saving it will provide to the
parent. The Colorado Act imposes a 1 percent tax on all premiums paid to the captive. 19 This rate is small when compared
to the 2 4 percent levied on standard Colorado insurers, 20 and
the 4 percent federal excise tax levied on premiums paid to
off-shore captives.2 1 Further savings accrue from the federal
income tax deductions available to the parent for premiums
paid to the captive. 22 This deductibility is in contrast to the
nondeductible tax treatment of reserves established under selfinsurance plans. 23 Because of the high premiums and large quantities of insurance purchased by corporations, the tax saving
may be quite substantial.
Another major source of savings is derived from first hand
Hare, supra note 1, at 58.
Burge, supra note 1, at 38, 41.
18 Groves, supra note 8, at 20.
19 COLO. REV. STAT. § 72-36-28 (1973).
16

17

20

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-14 (1963).

21

A tax is imposed on each policy of insurance, indemnity bond, annuity
contract, or policy of reinsurance issued by any foreign insurer or reinsurer at the following rates:
four cents on the dollar of the premium charged on the policy
of casualty insurance or indemnity bond. .

.

. one cent on each

dollar .. . on the premium charged on the policy of reinsurance
covering any of the contracts which are subject to the four
cent tax on the original policy.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4371.
22
23

Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (1964).
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2 (1964).
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negotiation of reinsurance. 24 Reinsurance will almost certainly
be the captive's single largest expense, and, because of the
volume involved, a considerable saving can be obtained from
a relatively small percentage reduction in cost. The reduction
is possible because of the elimination of certain broker and
negotiation fees usually included in premiums quoted by outside
insurers.
Other equally important, but smaller, cost reduction features attend the use of a captive. Premium payment and dividend return between parent and captive can be structured to
best facilitate the needs of each, 25 as opposed to the advance
payments required for coverage by outside insurers. 26 Further,
money paid to the captive, not used for the purchase of reinsurance, may be invested in the parent or in facilities to lease
to the parent.27 The effect of such a program is not only to provide a return on investment but to provide additional capital
or services to the parent. In another area, claims and settlements can be more efficiently and realistically handled as an
in-house operation.2 As may be seen from these few examples,
the captive offers immediate and substantial savings to the
parent. The question then is not how to set up the captive
in order to reduce costs, but rather which captive form best
suits the purposes of the individual parent.
There are two differing conceptions of the captive as an
economic entity. The first views the captive as a moneysaver
-a
near-department of the parent whose primary function is
the procuring of the best possible coverage at the lowest possible rate. The second sees the captive as a profit-center- a
semi-autonomous company seeking to produce additional revenue
for the parent. Either concept could be attractive to a particular
company under differing circumstances.
Those who view the captive as a moneysaver rather than
as a moneymaker present attractive arguments for its implementation. The captive is seen as having a single function: the
24For a general discussion of reinsurance see Ingray, Reinsurance Values
in U.S. and Possible Ways of Making a Profit, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 10, 1965; Factors to Weigh in Selecting a Proper Reinsurance Program, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Oct. 29, 1965; A. Deters,
The Captive Insurance Company, Its Feasibility and Operation, June
4, 1966 (unpublished thesis in University of Louisville Iibrary).

25 Hare, supra note 1, at 57.

Id.
27 Groves, supra note 8, at 79.
2
sTransport Underwriters Association, So You Want Your Own Captive
Insurer?, 1972 (pamphlet of limited circulation that may be obtained
from Transport Underwriters Association, 3670 Wilshire Boulevard, Los
26

Angeles, California 90010).
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reduction of insurance cost. The captive would receive no overcost premiums from the parent, nor would it be designed to
make any profit. The idea behind this concept is to provide
more working capital for the parent so that the parent can
increase its earnings. Proponents of this format argue that a
separation of investment funds between two entities simply
lowers return rates. Another advantage achieved by retaining
the captive in a simple form is a reduction in operating costs.
If the parent treats the captive as a profit-center, premiums
will be paid to the captive in amounts sufficient to cover reinsurance, reserves for self-insurance, expenses, and profit.
These payments are tax deductible to the parent. 29 The captive
will then use the self-insurance and profit portion of the premium for investment in an attempt to further increase profits.
The captive's year-end profit would serve two functions: (1)
it would augment the parent's profit thereby enhancing the
corporation's profit-loss statement, and (2) it could be used to
build revenues in order to insure an increased percentage of
the parent's risk in the future. This latter reserve would, of
course, further increase profit potential, thereby establishing
a reserve capable of underwriting a major portion of the parent's
risk. As of the writing of this note, the Internal Revenue Service has made no determination of the tax consequences of
either concept, but in the long run that decision may determine
the survivor.
The captive provides certain intercompany advantages as
well. The president of an insurance company, even when a
wholly owned captive, has more authority in the implementation of loss prevention engineering plans than the safety manager of a corporation. 30 Equally important is the captive's access
to the knowledge and experience of the parent's safety engineers
which it may use to formulate the best possible loss prevention
plan. A successful loss prevention plan may reduce the cost of
insurance to the parent, thereby making the captive an even
greater source of savings.
Three apparently significant disadvantages are frequently
cited to discount the captive's importance as an economically
advantageous form of insurance. On closer examination, however, these apparently fatal disadvantages are found to be of
little consequence. Opponents of the captive usually begin by
29Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (1964). See also Peter Theodore, 38 T.C. 1011
(1962).
30
Burge, Captives: Bermuda, Colorado, taxes and beyond, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Apr. 1972, at 47.
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discussing the expense of starting a captive. They mention the
feasibility study, corporate start-up costs, and reinsurance negotiation expenses as examples. But these costs are minuscule
when compared with the truly substantive savings the captive
can provide.31 Secondly, critics point to the lack of expertise and
operating expense a corporation will be faced with in the running of the captive. Two alternatives are available to rebut
this criticism. First, many large corporations have insurance
departments. The experts already available will operate the
captive. If, on the other hand, the corporation does not have
the expertise necessary, management companies are available
in Colorado to provide services ranging from an initial study
to full operation.2 Finally, the possibility of catastrophic loss
is raised. Critics state that a major loss could occur before
reserves sufficient to cover such loss are established. They are,
however, forgetting that the majority of risk is reinsured, and
that the portion covered by the captive is probably no more
than the parent previously self-insured because of high deductibles. No extra risk is being assumed. As is demonstrated by
such analyses, the disadvantages of the captive are in fact
negligible.
IV. THE DECISION To ESTABLISH A CAPTIVE
The decision to establish a captive must be based on a number of factors and should not ordinarily be made without the
preparation of a feasibility study. The captive is not the solution to every insurance dilemma. It must be remembered that
high premiums and a lack of capacity, while widespread, are
not universal. 33 Further, if "there [will be] a frequency of
34
large shock losses, a captive must be approached with caution.'
These elements, or any other detrimental factors arising from
a particular corporate situation, may make the captive unattractive or even impossible.
However, should a company, for any reason, find its existing coverage inadequate, three areas must be probed before any
change is considered. A study should:
(1) check to see if the facilities to be covered are not adequately insurable by standard insurance companies at rea31

It has been estimated that the initial study and start-up cost of a captive
would be about $5,000. Interview with Charles H. Groves, president

32

As of October 19, 1972, three such companies had been established:
Frank B. Hall Management Co.; Transport Underwriters Ass'n, Ltd.;
and Darrah Associates, Inc.

33

Groves, supra note 8, at 16.
Hare, supra note 1, at 60.

of Frank B. Hall Management Co., in Denver, Colorado, June 20, 1972.

34
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sonable rates with a reasonable deductible. If such coverage
is readily available a captive may not be warranted;
(2) check to make sure that if reinsurance is necessary to
cover catastrophe loss, the reinsurance is available and within
the area of world wide reinsurance capacity; and,
35
(3) check to insure that the captive is potentially profitable.

Should a feasibility study incorporating

these questions

determine the captive to be a valid alternative to existing coverage, a decision must be made to determine whether the offshore or Colorado captive best serves the purposes of the proprietor. A comparison of their advantages and disadvantages
36
must be made to ascertain the more profitable location.
(1) The Colorado captive will be taxed on profits at the
normal federal income tax rate, but no state income tax will be
assessed. The off-shore captive is not required to pay an
income tax on profits to its host country, 37 but it will be subject to United States income tax on profits where the amount
38
of premiums on domestic risks exceeds 5 percent of the total.
The apparent income tax advantage of the off-shore captive
is illusory if substantial domestic risk is involved.
(2) The Colorado captive must pay a 1 percent state tax on
premiums received. The off-shore captive is not taxed by the
host nation on premiums received, but it is subject to a 4 percent federal excise tax on all premiums paid to it by United
States corporations.
(3) The Colorado captive is governed by the state insurance
investment statutes, but these "provide all reasonable latitude
desired assuming that the captive management follows prucaptive is unredent business practices." 39 The off-shore
40
stricted in the investments it can make.
Other advantages and disadvantages of the two are essentially
identical. The three paragraphs above support the conclusion
that unless substantial foreign risks comprise the majority of
the parent's business, the adverse cost factor generated by the
35 Id. at 61.

A comprehensive analysis of what should be included in a
feasibility study of this nature may be found in Deters' unpublished
thesis. Deters, supra note 24.
36
As a majority of off-shore captives owned by United States firms are
currently located in Bermuda, the Colorado captive insurance laws are
compared to the Bermuda laws.
37 Burge, supra note 30, at 47.
38
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 952(a) (1), 953(a). The Revenue Act of 1962,
which added Subpart F to the Code, provided that a U.S. shareholder
of a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) would be taxable on certain
undistributed income of the CFC as if a dividend had been paid to the
U.S. shareholder. Among the principle types of Subpart F income are
passive investment income, including capital gains on securities sales
and income derived from the insurance of U.S. risks. Burge, supra
note 1, at 42. See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 954(c).
39 Groves, supra note 8, at 79. See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-2-1 to
-3, -6, -11, -16, -22, -31, -32 (1963); §§ 72-2-17 to -18 (Supp. 1965);
§§ 72-2-4 to -5. -13, -19 to -21, -23 to-27, -29, -30, -34 to -36, -39 to
-44 (Supp. 1969); §§ 72-2-10, -22, -28, -32, -37, -38, -45 to -48 (Supp.
1971).
40 Burge, supra note 30, at 47,
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4 percent federal excise tax gives the Colorado captive a clear
advantage in profitability not overcome by the off-shore captive's slight edge in investment flexibility.
V. THE CoLoR DO REQuIEMENTs
The Colorado Captive Insurance Company Act defines a
"pure captive insurance company" as
any domestic insurance company licensed under the provisions
of this article for the purpose of making insurance and reinsurance .... Said insurance shall be limited to the risks, hazards and1 liabilities of its parent, associated and affiliated com4
panies.

This definition could include the off-shore captives mentioned
above, but would exclude wholly owned insurance companies
that sell insurance to the public.
The Act also provides for the establishment of "association
captive insurance companies." These are defined in the same
manner as pure captives in terms of coverage, but the owners
must be member organizations of the association. Further requirements state that "the association must have been in existence for a year and that members of the association own or
control all of the outstanding voting securities of the association captive insurance company. '42 Other requirements of the
Act are substantially the same for both types of captives. The
purpose in allowing the association captive is to give smaller
corporations the chance to take advantage of the captive form. 43
Prerequisites for the establishment of a captive in Colorado
appear in the Act mainly for the protection of existing domestic
insurance companies and agents and to guard against abuse
of the state's liberal law. Any corporation desiring to start a
captive in Colorado must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
commissioner of insurance the following:
(1) That adequate insurance markets in the United States
are not available to cover the risks, hazards and liabilities of
the parent and companies to be insured, or that the insurance
needed is available only at excessive rates or with unreason44
able deductibles.
41 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
42 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 72-36-4 (10) (1973).

§ 72-36-4 (4)- (5) (1973).
do have a special problem. A
captive is established to provide the same services as an outside insurer.
Most associations do not employ the experts necessary to run the captive. For this reason, management companies, useful in the establishment of pure captives, are especially important to the association captive.
They provide the essential services of feasibility studies, chartering,
negotiation of reinsurance treaties, claims handling and settlement,
safety engineering services, and accounting and data processing services.
Transport Underwriters Association, supra note 28.
44 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-36-5(2) (a) (1973) (emphasis added).

43 The "association captive" corporations
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That the total insurance coverage necessary to insure all
(2)
risks could develop, in the aggregate, gross annual premiums
of at least $500,000 for a pure captive or $1,000,000 for an as45

sociation captive.
(3) That the company applying to the commissioner for a

certificate of authority to engage in the insurance business be
46
a valid Colorado corporation filed with the Secretary of State.
(4)
That the home office of the captive be located in Colo-

rado.47

Any corporation or association that has found the captive to
be feasible as well as potentially profitable should have no problem in fulfilling these requirements.
The Colorado captive is subject to all Colorado insurance
laws except where they conflict with the Act. 48 In this regard
several prohibitions, exemptions, and requirements are especially
important. There is a prohibition against the sale of insurance
to the general public, 49 a protection for agents and their domestic
companies. The captive is exempted from participation in any
pools, plans, guaranty, or insolvency funds, 50 thus providing the
captive with another substantial saving. The Act does specifically
require captives to comply with the Colorado insurance investment statutes,5' a measure of regulation. The Act does allow
"[a]ny captive insurance company to reinsure all of its risks
in any reinsurer approved by the commissioner, and full credit
will be allowed. '5 2 Provisions such as these make the Colorado
Act unique.
The Act also provides for close scrutiny of captives by the
insurance commissioner. This provision of the Act is essential
to insure that the arm's-length dealings in rate setting required
by the Act are observed.5 3 The provision is even more important
when considering that many of the rates set by the captives
will not be comparable with independent insurers, as the captive
will frequently be insuring otherwise uninsurable risks.
One final important provision of the Act states that a captive will not be authorized to do business in Colorado unless it
possesses a minimum actual capital of $400,000 and an accumulated surplus of $350,000. 54 An irrevocable letter of credit issued
45

Id.

(emphasis added).

46 Id. § 72-36-5(1).
47 Id. § 72-36-7 (4).
48

Id. § 72-36-30.

49 Id. § 72-36-3.
50 Id. § 72-36-27; Groves, supra note 8, at 79.

51 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-36-21 (1973).
52 Id. § 72-36-22(3).
53 Id. § 72-36-24.
54 Id. § 72-36-16.
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by a national bank or approved state bank shall be accepted in
lieu of cash or securities deposit.5 5 Though not provided in the
Act, the insurance commissioner requires a certain minimum
cash surplus to cover operating expenses of the captive. 56 These
monetary requirements are less stringent than those imposed
upon domestic insurance companies.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

It appears that a very real need for the domestic captive
exists today. Colorado presently has the only law specifically
designed to accommodate this need. While it is probably true
that the first domestic captives to be incorporated will be owned
by large out-of-state corporations, Colorado also has some large
companies that will undoubtedly take advantage of the Act.
Corporate members of associations will become equally interested in association captives as, and when, they are confronted
with the rate and capacity problems of their larger contemporaries. It must be realized that the Act was passed not only
to benefit Colorado corporations, but also to provide a needed
service to business in general.
The unique requirements and exemptions of the Colorado
Act enable the captive to function in a manner best suited to
serve the purposes of industry while at the same time promoting the general welfare. Ultimately the Colorado public is the
beneficiary of the increased state revenue and production accompanying the captive decision. While the captive is not a
remedy for all insurance ills, it is a very valuable domestic alternative. Colorado is wise to have taken advantage of this
vacuum in domestic law.
W. James Foland

55
Id. § 72-36-17 to -19.
56
Interview with Bucher, supra note 5.
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LDLORD-TENAT

SECURITY DEPosrrs - COLORADO'S
WRONGFUL WITHOLDING OF SECURITY DEPosrrs ACT:
-

THmEE LITIGIOUS SNARES IN AN UNTESTED LAW

CoO. REV. STAT. ANN.

-

§§ 58-1-26 to -28

INTRODUcTION

the Colorado General Assembly, in 1971, enacted
W HEN
sections 58-1-26 through -28 of the Colorado Revised Statutes "to insure the proper administration of security deposits
and protect the interests of tenants and landlords,"' it was
responding to a widespread situation of disparate bargaining
power between landlords and tenants.2 The disparity lay in the
knowledge of tenant and landlord alike that the tenant's expense in enforcing his right to the return of the security deposit
through the judicial process would virtually always exceed the
amount of the recovered deposit. Thus, tenants frequently
waived their right to the return of the deposit rather than seek
court redress. Many landlords, recognizing this economic dilemma of the departing tenant, retained the deposit as a matter
of policyA The legislature's response promulgated standards and

procedures for the proper withholding of security deposits and
provided powerful incentives for landlord compliance with the
statute through provision for tenant's recovery of attorney's
fees, treble damages, and court costs. 4 This response ostensibly
brought the positions of landlord and tenant closer to parity,
potentially assuring a just disposition of the security deposit.
However, a closer examination of the legislation - still un1 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §

58-1-26

(Supp. 1971).

2 Interview with William Hazleton, Legislative Drafter, in Denver, Colorado, June 27, 1972. See Comment, Housing the Poor: A Study of the
Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 557 (1969).
3 Interview with Robert Keeler, attorney, in Denver, Colorado, Aug. 11,
1972.

4 As enacted, Colorado's Security Deposit Act is one of the most protective
of tenant's rights thus far' adopted by a state. See CAL. CIVIL CODE §
1951 (West Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 15b (Supp. 1972);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:18-19 to -26 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§§ 6:248 to 255 (McKinney Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.512
(Supp. 1972). Colorado is the only state allowing recovery of attorney's
fees and treble damages. While several other states prohibit retention
of the deposit for normal or reasonable wear and tear, only the Colorado
Act makes an attempt to define what constitutes normal wear and tear.
Only Colorado and Pennsylvania require a shifting of the burden of
proving no wrongful retention to the landlord, and only in these states
does the landlord automatically forfeit any claim to the deposit and his
right to sue for damages if he fails to provide a written statement of
claimed damages to the tenant.
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tested in Colorado appellate courts -suggests
three troublesome questions of legislative intent and interpretation which
may be anticipated by the courts.
This comment, while not attempting to analyze the Act
comprehensively, will focus on these problems and suggest guidelines for their resolution. The problems lie in the areas of contracts for repair, the meaning of landlord's willful retention,
and the legality of counterclaims when the landlord has failed
to provide the statement required by the statute.
I.

CONTRACTS FOR REPAIR

'5
To insure "the proper administration of security deposits
the legislature defined the nature of a wrongful withholding
of a security deposit. In seeking to fix the boundaries of wrongfulness, the Act states, "[n] o security deposit shall be retained
to cover normal wear and tear."6 Normal wear and tear is
defined as:

that deterioration which occurs, based upon the use for which
the rental unit is intended, without negligence, carelessness,
accident, or abuse of the premises or equipment or chattels by
the tenant or members of his household, or their invitees or
7
guests.

Further, a deposit is wrongfully retained, regardless of deterioration of the premises, if the landlord fails to "provide the tenant
with a written statement listing the exact reasons for the re5COLO. REV. STAT.
" Id. § 58-1-28(1).

ANN.

§ 58-1-26

(Supp. 1971).

7 Id. § 58-1-27 (3). In defining normal wear and tear, the Act, assuming a
prior understanding between landlord and tenant, requires that the differentiation between negligence, carelessness, accident or abuse, and
normal deterioration be made in light of the use for which the housing
unit was rented. This requirement reflects the common law flexibility
of the standards of negligence and carelessness and of the bounds of an
accident. Under Colorado law, a person is held to a standard of care
commensurate with his age and condition. See cases cited in Swerdfeger
v. Krueger, 145 Colo. 180, 187-88, 358 P.2d 479, 483 (1961) (dissenting
opinion); Kopplekom v. Colorado Cement Pipe Co., 16 Colo. App. 274,
279, 64 P. 1047, 1049 (1901). Thus, if the landlord and tenant agree that
the unit is to be rented for housing children or persons who fall below a
normal level of competency, the limits of normal wear and tear must
be more liberal than otherwise. An accident is commonly defined as
that which is unforeseen or unexpected. See Industrial Comm'n v. Ule,
97 Colo. 253, 256, 48 P.2d 803, 804 (1935); Carroll v. Industrial Comm'n,
69 Colo. 473, 475, 195 P. 1097, 1098 (1920). In this area the intended
use of a unit for housing children or pets would require that any deterioration foreseeable from such a use not be deducted from the deposit.
Likewise, if the premises are rented with the expectation that only
adults will reside therein, any deterioration caused by children or pets
that is either normal for their age and condition or that is foreseeable
from their character should still be deductible as the deterioration was
not normal within the intended use. Thus, to protect landlord and tenant alike, no fixed standard for normal wear and tear should be drawn.
A flexible standard should be recognized by the courts to reflect the
intended use of the premises and the age and condition of the tenants
within the bounds of that use.
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tention of any portion of the security deposit" 8 within 30 days
(or up to and including 60 days, if so specified in the lease) of
the termination of the tenancy or of abandonment and acceptance.9
In potential contradiction to the above definitions of wrongful withholding, the Act further provides that:
Nothing in this section shall preclude the landlord from retaining the security deposit for nonpayment of rent, abandonment
of the premises, or nonpayment of utility charges, repair
work, or cleaning contracted for by the tenant.10
Thus, when two provisions of subsection 58-1-28(1) are read
together - the first requiring that "[n] o security deposit shall
be retained to cover normal wear and tear,"'" the second stating
that "[n] othing in this section shall preclude a landlord from
retaining the security deposit for . . . repair work . . . contracted for by the tenant" 12 - a conflict may be expected where
a tenant, who has contracted with the landlord for repairs,
asserts his right to that portion of the security deposit used by
the landlord to repair normal wear and tear to the premises.
As the definition of normal wear and tear refers to deterioration of the premises, and such deterioration has been judicially
defined as a loss in value which cannot be remedied by cleaning, 13 a controversy is not anticipated in the area of contractual
cleaning. The conflict as to contracts for repair will focus on
whether the legislature's command that no deposit will be withheld for normal wear and tear is overcome by its command that
nothing shall preclude a landlord from retaining repair costs
from the deposit when the tenant has contracted for such repair.
When faced with such an ambiguity, the courts seek to give
sCOLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-1-28(1) to -28(3) (Supp. 1971). Whether
this written notice requirement is sufficient to meet the constitutional
due process limitation on the taking of property has been put into question by the Supreme Court's holding in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). In the Fuentes case, a replevin statute requiring no notice or
hearing before property was seized was held unconstitutional as a taking
of property without due process of law. If the Supreme Court follows
the reasoning used by a U.S. District Court in Adams v. Egley to hold
the repossession portions of the U.C.C. unconstitutional - that the legislative sanctioning of certain procedures is sufficient state action to bring
due process limitations into play- this security deposit statute could be
held constitutionally infirm. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). See

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
9 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28(1) (Supp. 1971).
10 Id.

11 Id. (emphasis added).
12 Id. (emphasis added).
'3

Rosen-Reichardt Brokerage Co. v. London Assur. Corp., 214 Mo. App.
672, 680-81, 264 S.W. 433, 436 (1924).
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14
effect to both provisions, looking to the statute as a whole,
15
the evil to be remedied, and the effect of the interpretation 6
to determine legislative intent. An aid in picturing the statute
as a whole is subsection 58-1-28(7), which provides:

Any provision, whether oral or written, in or pertaining to a
rental agreement whereby any provision of this section for the
benefit of a tenant or members of his household is waived,
7
shall be deemed to be against public policy and shall be void.'

As the provision of subsection 58-1-28(1) prohibiting retention
of the deposit for normal wear and tear is for the benefit of
the tenant, subsection 58-1-28(7) lends support to a reading of
subsection 58-1-28(1) which would allow a landlord to retain
monies under a contract for repair only to remedy deterioration
beyond the bounds of normal wear and tear.
The evil the legislature perceived was the arbitrary withholding of security deposits."' Efforts to remedy this would be
frustrated by an interpretation allowing the landlord to bypass,
through the use of a contract for all repair, the subsection
58-1-28(1) command that he withhold only for reasons beyond
the limits of normal wear and tear. Finally, in light of the landlord's greater negotiating power at the time of the making of
the lease, the effect of such an interpretation would be to
credit the legislature with sanctioning the situation it sought to
remedy.
Thus, the legislature's decree that no deposit be retained
for normal wear and tear and its public policy command that
any provision pertaining to a rental agreement that is in derogation of a tenant's rights be void- coupled with the unlikelihood of an interpretation giving fullest effect to a clause which
would strengthen the very evil being remedied- dictate that a
consistent reading of subsection 58-1-28(1) would allow a landlord to claim, under a contract for repair, only those costs due
to deterioration beyond normal wear and tear.
II. WILLFUL RETENTION
Where the landlord has failed to properly return or satisfactorily account for the withholding of the security deposit, the
tenant may seek redress in court. Prior to the adoption of this
14E.g., Wheeler v. Rudolph, 162 Colo. 410, 414, 426 P.2d 762, 763 (1967);
Hartner v. Davis, 100 Colo. 464, 467, 68 P.2d 456, 457 (1937); Ferris v.
Chambers, 51 Colo. 368, 370, 117 P. 994, 995 (1911).
15 In re Estate of Plich, 141 Colo. 425, 431, 348 P.2d 706, 709 (1960); Richardson v. El Paso Consol. Gold Mining Co., 51 Colo. 440, 447, 118 P. 982,
985 (1911).
16 Casados v. People, 119 Colo. 444, 448, 204 P.2d 557, 559 (1949).
17COLo. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 58-1-28(7)

18 Hazleton interview, supra note 2.

(Supp.

1971)

(emphasis added).
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Act, the tenant's freedom to assert this right in court was
restricted because the cost of claiming the return of his deposit
was greater than the potential recovery. As District Court Judge
Scott stated in Shapiro v. SCM Development Company:
[T]enants who are denied return of their deposit are usually
not in a financial position to take legal action for small sums
(an attorney's fee would be far more than the amount involved) ....19

Continuing, he stated that in response "the legislature saw fit
to give [tenants] assistance by providing [in subsection 58-128 (3) (a)] for treble damages and attorney's fees."' 20 Subsection
58-1-28(3) (a) provides:
The willful retention of a security deposit in violation of
this section shall render a landlord liable for treble the
amount of that portion of the security deposit wrongfully
withheld from the tenant, together with reasonable attorney's
fees and court costs .... 21

What must the tenant prove to avail himself of this legislatively created assistance? The Act clearly requires proof of
two elements: (1) a willful retention; and (2) a wrongful retention (one violative of section 58-1-28). As subsection 58-128(3) (b) expressly places upon the landlord a burden of proving that the retention was not wrongful, 22 this element is
presumptively established in the tenant's favor. What remains is
a showing of willfulness. There has been a split of authority
in Colorado's lower courts as to the mental state required for

a showing of willfulness, one court requiring a malicious retention, 23 the other requiring only a voluntary act for which a good
faith error is not a defense. 24 The second line of authority is in
accord with the interpretation given willfulness in other civil
statutes. While a malicious intent is required for a willful act
in a penal statute, 25 in those statutes with civil sanctions, the
courts have required only a conscious, 2 voluntary, or intentional
act.27 It is not necessary to a showing of willfulness that the
19 Civil No. 29251 (Dist. Ct., Boulder, Colo., June 2, 1972).
20 Id.
21 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28(3) (a) (Supp. 1971).
22 See discussion of wrongful withholding pp. 454-56 supra.
23
Ortiz v. Brownlee, Civil No. Z-4815 (Adams County Ct., Brighton, Colo.,
Apr. 28, 1972).
24 Shapiro v. SCM Dev. Co., Civil No. 29251 (Dist. Ct., Boulder, Colo.,
June 2, 1972).
25 Williams v. People, 26 Colo. 272, 274, 57 P. 701, 702 (1899).
26 E.g., Pupke v. Pupke, 102 Colo. 337, 340, 79 P.2d 290, 292 (1938) (guest
statute); Millington v. Hiedloff, 96 Colo. 581, 586, 45 P,2d 937, 939
(1935) (guest statute).
27 E.g., Burrell v. Anderson, 133 Colo. 386, 389, 295 P.2d 1039, 1040 (1956)
(guest statute); McCulloch v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Colo. 123, 127-28,
123 P.2d 414, 416 (1942) (workmen's compensation statute).
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actor "having the rule in mind, determined
enough to show that, knowing the rule, he
formed the forbidden act. ' 28 Thus, the courts
second line of authority, requiring only that
tention be an intentional and voluntary act.
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to break it; it is
intentionally pershould follow the
the landlord's re-

An argument asserting that, regardless of the civil nature
of the imposed sanctions, treble damages are exemplary in nature, and thus should require a showing of malice, is properly
rejected on either of two grounds. First, the expense of litigation is not fully compensated by an award of court costs and
attorney's fees. Second, while a common law award of treble
damages is considered punitive and requires malice, the legislature has previously fashioned remedies of treble damages
29
which are not conditioned on a showing of malice.
The problem, however, is not completely solved by a judicial
determination that "willful," as used in this statute, requires
only a showing of an intentional or voluntary act. A lingering
obstacle to the legislature's purpose of insuring proper administration of security deposits is the possible abuse inherent in
a defense of negligent retention. This problem may have been
anticipated by the legislature in subsection 58-1-28(3) (a), which
requires:
The tenant shall have the obligation to give notice to the
landlord of his intention to file legal proceedings a minimum
of seven days prior to filing said action.30

Because the tenant is required to give notice of his intent to
file, proof of such notice should serve to show that the landlord knew of his alleged violation. In the absence of a reasonable
offer of settlement, this should provide enough evidence of the
"intentional act" necessary to a showing of "willful retention"
to shift to the landlord the burden of going forward.
Ill.

COUNTERCLAIMS

When a tenant, in response to a landlord's failure to provide a written statement listing the exact reasons for retention
of the deposit, initiates legal proceedings for recovery, he is
commonly answered with a counterclaim- in an amount sevStockdale v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Colo. 494, 495, 232 P. 669, 670 (1925).
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1-16 (1963) (receiving fee for unlicensed
practice of law); Id. § 35-5-21 (unlawful demand, asking or receiving
of fees by sheriff); Id. § 73-2-7 (receiving of usurious interest); Id. §
77-4-8 (failure to return within prescribed time limit exempt property
improperly levied).
3OId. § 58-1-28(3)(a) (Supp. 1971).
28

29
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eral times that of the deposit- for damages to the premises. 1
Although at least one county court has expressly sanctioned
such a counterclaim, 32 the practice is highly questionable.
The Act requires that a landlord's failure to provide the
written statement "shall work a forfeiture of all his rights to
withhold any portion of the security deposit under this section
or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises. '33 Thus, there exists the incongruous situation in which
the Act prohibits the landlord from bringing suit against the
tenant for damages to the premises but in which a county
court has allowed a counterclaim. This result is contrary to
the established nature of a counterclaim as evidenced in a line
of cases beginning with Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. United States
where the court stated:
A counterclaim is, in its nature and effect, like an independent
action by the defendant against the plaintiff, and, as a general rule, a party cannot avail himself of a . . . counterclaim

unless it is a legally subsisting cause of 34action upon which he
could maintain an independent action.

Since the ability to maintain an independent suit is necessary
to the legal sufficiency of a counterclaim, and the right to
maintain such an independent action is forfeited by a landlord
who fails to provide a written statement, the courts should
bar any landlord's counterclaim if a written statement was not
furnished within the statutory period.
CONCLUSION

The Colorado legislature's purpose in adopting this Act
was to insure the proper administration of security deposits.
They sought to achieve this purpose by providing the impetus
for a landlord to return or properly account for the withholding of the tenant's security deposit. In so doing, they brought
the respective positions of landlord and tenant closer to parity.
This comment has dealt with several problems in the legislation and suggests guidelines for their resolution in line with
the legislature's purpose.
Under the statute, a tenant's rights are given substance by
prohibiting retention for normal wear and tear (as determined
by the intended use), and by requiring the landlord to bear
31
32

Interviews with Tom Ehrenkranz, attorney, and Dave Fletcher, Vice
President, Capitol Hill Tenants Union, in Denver, Colo., June 21, 1972.
Ortiz v. Brownlee, Civil No. Z-4815 (Adams County Ct., Brighton, Colo.,
Apr. 28, 1972).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28(2) (Supp. 1971).
34 170 F. Supp. 422, 425 (Ct. Cl. 1959); e.g.. Erie Lackawanna R.R. v.
33

United States, 439 F.2d 194, 200 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Colorado's rules of civil

procedure concerning counterclaims are similar to the federal rules.
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the burden of proving that any retention was not wrongful.
The landlord should not be allowed to bypass this requirement
through a clause in the lease (or by a separate contract) providing that all repair costs be met by the tenant.
The Act provides further impetus toward parity by allowing a tenant's recovery of attorney's fees, treble damages, and
court costs. These rights should not be contingent upon a showing of malice- but merely upon a willful (intentional) withholding. Additionally, access to the courts should not be undermined by a landlord's threat of a counterclaim where the
required written statement has not been provided.
Kathryn Porter Reimer

